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 This dissertation studies the Jewish community of the Algerian M’zab during the 
French colonization of the Sahara from 1882 until 1962.  French officials refused to 
extend the 1870 Crémieux Decree that emancipated Algerian Jews to the M’zab after its 
1882 annexation.  French administrators saw the M’zabi Jews as insurmountably 
different and consequently excluded them from emancipation.  Despite petitions from the 
community and French and Algerian Jewish advocacy for extending emancipation to the 
south, successive French colonial and metropolitan governments declined to extend the 
Crémieux Decree to the M’zab.  French officials justified this decision by invoking the 
insurmountable difference of M’zabi Jews, who were both too Jewish and too similar to 
Algerian Muslims to be “regenerated” as French citizens. 
 Within the colonial legal system, M’zabi Jews were classified as “indigènes,” or 
natives, alongside Algerian Muslims.  M’zabi Jews faced the restrictions that bounded the 
lives of Muslims in French Algeria and settler antisemitism that culminated in the Vichy 
abrogation of the Crémieux Decree in 1940.  When Free French forces reinstated the 
Crémieux Decree in 1943, the French again excluded the M’zabi Jews.  Following this, a 
number of individuals and families from the community left Algeria to join the growing 
Jewish community in British mandatory Palestine.   
 M’zabi Jews were the only organized Jewish community who left Algeria for 
Israel.  Their history challenges historiography that claims Zionism was unsuccessful in 
Algeria.  M’zabi Jews were not ardent Zionists, but they did take advantage of the 
opportunities for emigration made possible by international Zionist organizations 
including the American Joint Distribution Committee and the Jewish Agency.  In contrast 
to the larger history of Algerian Jews, the history of the M’zabi Jewish immigration from 
Algeria to Israel is part of the larger history of Jewish migrations from the Arab world to 
Israel after 1945. M’zabi Jews won full French citizenship in late 1961, but most still 
opted to make their way to Israel rather than France.








This project interrogates why and how the French colonial state determined that 
the Jews of the Algerian M’zab did not merit French citizenship and the consequences of 
that action on the Jewish community of Ghardaïa during and immediately after the period 
of French colonization.  These individuals were French subjects without full legal 
equality until just prior to Algerian independence in late 1961, when the French state 
replaced their Jewish personal status with the French civil status.  The unique history of 
French colonization in the M’zab and French relations with the Jewish community of 
Ghardaïa serves as a useful and heretofore relatively unexplored lens into French 
discourses about difference and nationality.  Debates about French identity, popular 
antisemitism in Algeria and the metropole, international pressure from Jewish and Zionist 
organizations, and the lobbying efforts of the M’zabi Jewish community alternately 
influenced these policies in the M’zab.  Colonial writings about M’zabi Jews, M’zabi 
Jewish interactions with French officials, and the relationship between M’zabi Jews in 
Algeria and Israel also influenced French policies in Algeria pertaining to Jews and 
Muslims and debates in Paris about nationality and colonialism.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A number of historians of French Empire have examined the dialogue between metropole and colony 
about nationality and colonial policies.  See e.g. Gerard Noiriel, The French Melting Pot, trans. Geoffrey de 
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 Historians of French Jewry have long argued that studying the discourses 
surrounding Jewish emancipation and integration into the French body politic reveal 
important ideas about difference and nationality in France.2  Jews were the minority, the 
“other” par excellence in France and much of Europe.  The “regeneration” of Jews as 
productive French citizens obsessed generations of French politicians, who sometimes 
conceived of French identity in opposition to Jewish identity or constructed definitions of 
citizenship based on their interpretation of the requirements necessary to solve the 
problem of Jewish difference.  Once France colonized Algeria, these policies and debates 
extended to the sizeable Jewish community there.  Algeria was the birthplace of many 
policies regarding Jews, as well as political antisemitism in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  Just as colonial histories can inform our comprehension of the 
metropole, so studying the history of Jews in Algeria is vital to understanding the history 
of French Jewry, as the two were deeply intertwined after 1830.  Though there were 
significant Jewish communities in Tunisia and Morocco, only Algeria was officially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Laforcade (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Patrick Weil, How to be French: 
Nationality in the making since 1789 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Neil MacMaster, Colonial 
Migrants and Racism in France, 1900-1962 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Herrick Chapman and 
Laura Frader, eds, Race in France:  Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of Difference (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2004); Tyler Stovall and Sue Peabody, eds., The Color of Liberty:  Histories of Race in 
France (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Cliff Rosenberg, Policing Paris: the Origins of Modern 
Immigration Control between the Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Alice Conklin, A Mission 
to Civilize: the Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa (Stanford University Press, 1997); 
Mary Dewhurt Lewis, The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in 
France, 1918-1940 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007).  
2 For examinations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when these debates were at their height in the 
public sphere, by Arthur Hertzberg, The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-
Semitism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Ronald Schechter, Obstinate Hebrews: 
Representations of Jews in France, 1715-1815 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), and Simon 
Schwarzfuchs, Napoleon, the Jews, and the Sanhedrin (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).  For the 
twentieth century, see Paula Hyman, From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906-1939 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), as well as Pierre Birnbaum, Jewish Destinies: Citizenship, 
State, and Community in Modern France, trans. Arthur Goldhamer (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000). 
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annexed by France and consequently a place where French citizenship could be fully 
extended to local Jews.3   
Histories of Jews in French Algeria have also been valuable for the ways that they 
complicate our understanding of Jewish identity, community, and culture in modern 
Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.4  Algerian Jews were the first non-European 
Jewish community (though many in the Jewish community had deep ties to Europe) to be 
emancipated.  The 1870 Crémieux Decree extended French citizenship to Jewish 
individuals of the Algerian départements for a variety of reasons: to cultivate them as 
allies in French colonization, to appease the demands for this emancipation from French 
Jews, and to demonstrate the expansiveness of French universalism.  The Crémieux 
Decree was an exceptional piece of legislation that radically reoriented the identity of 
Algerian Jewry, creating a kind of third space for them in the colonial binary, between 
“colonizer” and “colonized.”5   
After the Crémieux Decree, Muslims were largely seen and legally categorized at 
the lowest rung of the native populations in Algeria.  However, French authorities also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Joshua Schreier argues convincingly that Algerian Jews shaped French policies and colonial ideologies 
well before the Crémieux Decree emancipated them in Arabs of the Jewish Faith: The Civilizing Mission in 
Colonial Algeria (Rutgers University Press, 2010). 
4 The two classic comprehensive accounts of Algerian Jewish history are: André Chouraqui, Between East 
and West: A History of the Jews of North Africa (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 
1968), and H.Z. Hirschberg, A History of the Jews In North Africa (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974).  The narrative 
of emancipation, gallicization, and eventual immigration to France is elaborated in many histories of 
Algerian Jewry, including Norman Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times (JPS, 1991); Simon 
Schwarzfuchs, Les Juifs d’Algérie et la France, 1830-1855 (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981); Reeva S. 
Simon, Michael M. Laskier and Sara Reguer, eds., The Jews of the Middle East and North Africa in 
Modern Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Michael Laskier, North African Jewry in the 
Twentieth Century: The Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria (New York: New York University Press, 
1994); Sarah Taïeb-Carlen, Les Juifs D'Afrique du Nord: De Didon à De Gaulle (Saint-Maur: Sépia, 2000).  
Both Joshua Schreier, in Arabs of the Jewish Faith, and Todd Shepard in The Invention of Decolonization: 
The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), critically 
examine this narrative and question its veracity.  Shepard discusses the exceptional treatment of Jews in the 
M’zab, but focuses his study on the larger Algerian Jewish population in Chapter 6, “Repatriation Rather 
Than Aliyah: The Jews of France and the End of French Algeria,” 169-182. 
5 Albert Memmi, a Tunisian Jew, coined this phrase when discussing his childhood in North Africa in his 
classic The Colonizer and the Colonized (New York: Orion Press, 1965). 
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placed M’zabi Jewish legal status, uniquely of all Jewish communities in Algeria, on par 
with Muslim Algerians.  The Jews of Ghardaïa were never emancipated after the 1882 
annexation of the valley.  French officials determined that while most Algerian Jews 
could become French and were capable of “regeneration,” M’zabi Jewish difference was 
insurmountable.  The history of the Jewish community of the M’zab thus offers a 
radically different vision of the Jewish experience in French Algeria and suggests a new 
complexity in the relationship between the French nation and Jewish communities in the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Including the M’zabi Jewish historical 
experience in the historiography of Algerian and French Jewry expands our 
understanding of how the French state dealt with difference, the persistent stigmatization 
of Jewish practices, and the complex roles Zionism played in the lives of Jews in French 
Algeria. 
That Zionism played a critical role in the M’zab is indicative of a major difference 
between M’zabi Jewish history and Algerian Jewish history.  In contrast to the 
overwhelming decision on the part of most Algerian Jews to migrate from Algeria to 
France in 1962, the majority of Jews from the M’zab chose to immigrate to Israel and 
began doing so decades earlier.  The M’zabi Jewish migration to Israel places the history 
of this community within the larger history of Jewish migration from the Arab world to 
Israel after 1945. M’zabi Jews made aliyah to Israel for a variety of reasons.  Just as Jews 
from Iraq, Morocco, or Libya fled violence or instability, so too many in the M’zabi 
community chose to leave Algeria when confronted with the violence of the Algerian 
War.  Others sought to escape recurrent French antisemitism, while many simply 
believed they could win greater prosperity and full legal equality in Israel and not in 
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Algeria or France.  That so many in the community sought to immigrate to Israel instead 
of France even after the community finally won legal equality in late 1961 suggests a 
level of distrust M’zabi Jews may have felt towards the French state by that point. 
The divergences between the history of M’zabi Jews and Algerian Jewry reflect 
both the short-term changes that colonialism and Zionists brought to Jewish communities 
in Algeria as well as the long-standing differences between a Jew from Ghardaïa and one 
from Algiers or Constantine.  The unique experiences of this small community are both 
the product of French policies and the very real differences—cultural, historical, social, 
even genetic—between this isolated community and the Jews of the Maghreb generally.  
Thus, including this Jewish history in the canon of Algerian Jewish historiography is a 
necessary addition if we are to fully comprehend the diversity of Jewish identity and 
experience in North Africa in the modern era. 
 
The Crémieux Decree: French Nationality Policy in Colonial Context 
 
 “Since the Revolution, France has changed its laws more often and more significantly 
than any other democratic nation has, and policies governing French nationality have 
been the object of continual political and legal confrontations”6 
 
 The emancipation of Algerian Jewry in 1870 is an important moment in both 
modern Jewish and modern European history.  This legislation and the earlier 
emancipation of French Jews occurred at exceptional moments in French history and are 
useful for historians to examine  French nationality policies and their evolution.  Even at 
the moment of their inception, these emancipatory policies evidenced prevalent 
discourses and ideas about otherness and Jewishness at that particular moment in Europe 
and in France.  Jews were often used as symbols of the pre-modern period and its woes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Weil, How to be French, 3. 
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and philosophers and historians argued that their practices and beliefs had to be changed 
or eradicated in order to achieve full, productive citizenship.  Voltaire argued that 
“regenerating” the Jews could demonstrate the transition from “primitive” to “civilized” 
society, from archaic religion to modern reason.  In the philosophe imagination, Jews 
could stand in for any challenge to the progress of the Enlightenment.7  Consequently, 
their “regeneration” as “proper” French citizens often signified the success of the 
Revolutionary project after the emancipation of every individual French Jew in 1790 and 
1791.8 
Widespread antisemitism and official criticism followed the emancipatory 
moment.  French Jews were condemned for their lack of acculturation, particularly those 
in eastern France.  While the cosmopolitan Sephardim9 of southwest France and Paris 
moved increasingly into French social, economic, and political circles, the Ashkenazim10 
living in Alsace and Lorraine remained poor and isolated, much as they had before 
emancipation.  After seizing power in 1805, Napoleon was particularly vested in 
integrating French Jews, a symbolic task that would prove his power.  He hoped to 
delegitimize what he saw as a separate Jewish “nation” and bring Jewish individuals into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ronald Schechter interrogates Voltaire’s obsession with the Jews in Obstinate Hebrews (2003). 
8 The Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre famously addressed the National Assembly on the subject of the 
emancipation of the Jews in 1789, asserting “We must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord 
everything to Jews as individuals.”  For Tonnerre and his peers, Jewish loyalty to rabbinical authority 
posed a threat to the Republic and the solution was to emancipate Jews and incorporate them into the nation 
as individuals.  This is one of the fundamental inconsistencies in the French universalist project.  Napoleon 
also argued that French Jews constituted a “nation within a nation” and convened an assembly of Jewish 
notables, a Grand Sanhedrin, to address how Jewish law might be brought into harmony with the Code 
civil. For additional readings on the emancipation of French and Algerian Jews, see Schechter, Obstinate 
Hebrews, Arthur Hertzberg, The French Enlightenment and the Jews: the origins of modern anti-Semitism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 360-380, and Joshua Schreier, “Napoleon’s Long Shadow: 
Morality, Civilization, and Jews in France and Algeria, 1808-1870,” French Historical Studies 30, no.1 
(Winter 2007): 78-81. 
9 From the Hebrew Sefarad for the Iberian Peninsula, generally denotes Jews who fled late fifteenth century 
persecution to Western Europe, North Africa, the Levant, and the Balkans.  Adj. Sephardi. 
10 Jews of European descent. Adj. Ashkenazi. 
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French society.  Towards this end he convened an Assembly of Jewish Notables in 1806 
to specifically address the problem of Jewish moneylending in the northeast, with the 
goal of “recalling their brethren to the exercise of useful arts and professions in order to 
replace, through honest industry, the shameful practices to which many of them have 
resorted from father to son over many centuries.”  This commission was also generally 
tasked with solving the issue of Jewish separateness.  Napoleon focused a great deal of 
energy on the “Jewish Question” at least in part because he believed that by facilitating 
the “regeneration” of a population widely seen as static he would appear yet more 
powerful to the French populace.11   
Part of these efforts was identifying and eliminating “objectionable” practices in 
Jewish family life, bringing Jewish private lives into line with the recently promulgated 
Napoleonic Code civil.  Emancipation thus blurred the lines between the public and 
private spaces of Jewish lives, extending state control into their homes and families.  The 
Assembly reassured Napoleon that Jews no longer practiced bigamy or child-marriage 
and were committed to being good French citizens.  Dissatisfied with their findings, 
Napoleon ordered a second, more imposing body to convene, a Grand Sanhedrin of 
Jewish religious and lay leaders to create a centralized system of Jewish consistories that 
would enforce civil law amongst the Jewish population.   
The 1808 decrees that established the consistory system codified a mechanism by 
which the state could intervene in the daily lives of French Jews, creating for the first 
time a centralized hierarchy of Jewish religious authorities from both the Sephardic and 
Ashkenazi communities.  Consistories throughout France would monitor Jewish religious 
activities and ensure that Jews followed French law before Jewish halakhah (religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Schechter, Obstinate Hebrews, 195. 
	   8 
law), reporting back to the Central Consistory in Paris.  Simon Schwarzfuchs described 
the creation of the consistory system as “a turning-point in the long history of Judaism,” 
an unprecedented integration of Jewish authorities into the national government that 
marked a new interventionist attitude towards Judaism in the West.12  Napoleon III 
expanded the consistory system to Algeria in 1848 after declaring the areas surrounding 
Oran, Algiers, and Constantine départements of France, legal extensions of the 
metropole.   
Though the consistory system imposed a unified system of government on the 
Algerian Jewish population, the historically diverse Algerian Jewish community was 
deeply divided by class, location, and origin.  Cosmopolitan Sephardi and Livornese 
merchants and shopkeepers lived in the cities of the Mediterranean coast while poorer 
Jewish communities dating back centuries in North Africa populated the smaller cities 
and interior.13  The Jews of the M’zab were distinct from all these groups.  They lived in 
close proximity with their Muslim neighbors in the remote city of Ghardaïa, on the 
northern edges of the Sahara.  Early histories of Algerian Jewry focused almost 
exclusively on the Sephardi communities of the coast, who had little to do with Algerian 
Muslims and had close commercial and familial bonds with Europe.  These European 
connections proved vital to France when, in 1830, Jewish merchants from the Livornese 
community in Algiers aided the French conquest of Algiers.  French officers relied on 
Jewish information and financial support in the first decades of their arrival in Algeria. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Schwarzfuchs, Napoleon, the Jews, and the Sanhedrin, 179. 
13 Benjamin Stora, Les trois exils Juifs d’Algérie (Editions Stock, 2006), 30.   
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Jewish merchants in Algiers in turn benefitted from the closer trade relations with Europe 
that French colonization facilitated.14 
Many of the same Sephardim who benefited from colonization also lobbied for 
their emancipation after the 1848 decree that made Algeria’s territories French 
départements.  In doing so, these Algerian Jews adopted much of the rhetoric about 
Jewish “regeneration” from early French Republican debates about the emancipation of 
French Jews in 1791.  The same expectations of French Jews only a few decades earlier 
now resurfaced in the assertion that citizenship would facilitate the “regeneration” of 
Algerian Jews.  A 1836 letter from the Jewish leaders of the Central Consistory in Paris 
to the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs advocated Jewish emancipation as a 
mechanism to further French and Jewish interests in Algeria: 
Some advantage to the Government could result from the establishment of 
a Jewish Consistory in Algeria.…It appears to us that this would attach to 
France an important part of the African population and accelerate the 
moral regeneration of these new fellow citizens.15 
 
This was a new iteration of the French civilizing mission from a French Jews who feared 
the non-European orientation of many Algerian Jews might reflect badly on Jews as a 
whole and on French Jews in particular.  In their efforts to convince the French of their 
case for Algerian Jews, many contrasted the potential for the regeneration of Algerian 
Jews with the backwardness and insularity of Algerian Muslims.  The 1842 Altaras-
Cohen report, written by Isaac Altaras and Joseph Cohen, emissaries of the Central 
Consistory, asserted that while Algerian Jews held the potential for regeneration, 
Algerian Muslims were resistant to French influence.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Genevieve Dermenjian and Benjamin Stora, “Les juifs d’Algérie dans le regard des officiers français de 
la conquête, 1830-1855,” in La Revue historique (September 1991): 333-339. 
15 Zosa Szajkowski, “Socialists and Radicals in the Development of Antisemitism in Algeria,” Jewish 
Social Studies 10 (1948): 258. 
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 Within the hierarchy of race and religion in Algeria, the French deemed fellow 
Europeans and Jews as the most easily assimilable, followed by Berbers and finally Arab 
Muslims.16  Many French colonial officers viewed the Berbers, and in particular the 
Kabyles, as superior to the Arabs, a trope termed the “Kabyle Myth.”  Though no 
legislation was every passed to codify this hierarchy, it influenced generations of French 
colonial officials, journalists, and historians.  Central to the valuation of Berbers above 
Arabs was a deep distrust of Islam, which was almost exclusively tied to Arabs, though 
many Berbers were themselves Muslims.  Many in the colonial administration saw Arab 
and Muslim society as intrinsically opposed to modernity, based often on superficial 
assumptions about Muslim culture and often on the treatment and appearance of veiled 
Muslim women.  In this context of French secular, enlightened civilization versus Islam, 
it was the duty of the French, their civilizing mission, to uplift the peoples of Algeria and 
bring them into the French orbit.17 
Although French anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and government 
officials wrote lengthy treatises and memoranda about the difficulties of colonizing the 
Berber and Arab peoples of Algeria, it was the Jews who were first used to represent the 
regenerative possiblities of the civilizing mission.  After 1840, the “regeneration” of 
Algerian Jews also became an important indicator of the extent to which French Jews had 
fulfilled the promise of their own emancipation.  French Jews lobbied heavily for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This was an oversimplification of the diverse populations in the area that came to be known as Algeria at 
the time of French conquest, which included Turks, Sub-Saharan Africans, Jews, and others.  Benjamin 
Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902 
(New York: Columbia University Press), 20-21.  Assumptions about Muslim inassimilability persist to the 
present-day in France, as evidenced by the debates surrounding the headscarf.   
17 Patricia Lorcin traces the development and repercussions of the “Kabyle Myth” in Imperial Identities: 
Stereotyping, prejudice and race in colonial Algeria (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), and Paul Silverstein 
examines its later consequences for Algerian migrants in the metropole in Algeria in France: Transpolitics, 
Race, and Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
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citizenship to be extended to the Algerian Jews.  After 1860, the Alliance Israelite 
Universelle assisted these efforts to “uplift” the Jews of Algeria.18  The first international 
Jewish organization, the AIU aimed to “regenerate” the Jews of the Middle East, North 
Africa, and the Balkans in the image of the enlightened and emancipated Jews of France, 
primarily through a widespread network of schools that supplied valuable educational 
and social resources.19  Certainly, teachers of the AIU worked altruistically throughout 
the Jewish world, but this altruism was predicated on a valuation of French Jewish 
practices and behaviors above those of the Maghreb and elsewhere. 
At the time that the Third Republic succeeded the Second Empire in 1870, a new 
formula for categorizing colonized populations emerged, that of the non-citizen French 
“subject.”  This was the status applied to the Jews of Ghardaïa in 1882 and all Algerian 
Muslims.  This category opened up a vague space between citizenship and nationality and 
created a new hierarchy of Frenchness in Algeria, from subjects to French citizens.  The 
M’zabi Jews occupied the former, least enfranchised, category despite their Jewishness 
and legal arguments supporting their claim to the Crémieux Decree.  The progression 
from “subject” to “citizen,” from personal status to civil status, was often predicated on 
an abandonment of religious and cultural mores that the French authorities deemed 
incompatible with full political rights.  The category of “subject” was closely related to 
that of indigène, or “native,” and each was bounded restrictively by the Code de 
l’indigènat in 1881, just prior to the annexation of the M’zab.  This collection of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Schreier, “Napoleon’s Long Shadow,” 103. 
19 For an early history of its founding and an examination of the AIU’s activities in Turkey, see Aron 
Rodrigue, French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israelite Universette and the Politics of Jewish 
Schooling in Turkey, 1860-1925 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); for an analysis of AIU 
activities in North Africa, see Michael M. Laskier, The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Jewish 
Communities of Morocco 1862-1962 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983). 
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restrictive laws punished “natives” in the colonies for crimes as vague as showing 
“disrespect to the administration and its civil servants.”20  Gregory Mann describes the 
indigènat in French West Africa as “both a set of sanctions and a colonial state of 
being.”21  It defined what it meant to be “native” in the French empire at different 
moments of colonization and extended French control in the Empire into the most 
mundane and private lives of colonized populations.  At the historical moment of its 
implementation in 1881, when M’zabi Jews fell under French sovereignty, the indigènat 
constricted the spaces in French society open to colonial “subjects,” delineating clear 
boundaries between French and non-French. 
Despite the indigènat and its restrictions, many Jews in Ghardaïa remained 
optimistic about their future under French rule.  There had been several legislative efforts 
offering new possiblities for citizenship.  The 1865 senatus-consulte decreed that 
Muslims and Jews of Algeria could become French citizens if they surrendered their 
personal status, meaning that they would agree to have personal law matters arbitrated 
not in local courts under local Muslim or Jewish law, but in French civil courts.22  This 
decree of July 14, 1865, confirmed that all Algerians possessed French nationality and 
“Algerian” signified all individuals living in the conquered area of “Algeria,” not a 
particular racial, ethnic, or religious group.  However, few Algerian Jews or Muslims 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Emmanuelle Saada traces the evolution of this category from Revolutionary and Napoleonic discourses 
about race, slavery, and colonization, in “The Republic and the Indigènes” trans. Renée Champion and 
Edward Berenson, in The French Republic: History, Values, Debates, ed. Edward Berenson, Vincent 
Duclert, and Christophe Prochasson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 229. 
21 Gregory Mann, “What was the indigènat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa” Journal of 
African History 50, no. 3 (November 2009): 336. 
22 For more on the senatus consulte of 1865, see Florence Renucci, “Le statut personnel des indigenes: 
comparaison entre les politiques juridiques française et italienne en Algérie et en Libye (1919-1943),” 
(diss., Aix-en-Provence Law School, 2005), and also “Le débat sur le statut politique des israélites en 
Algérie et ses acteurs (1870-1943)” Les administrations coloniales: contributions aux séminaires de 
l’IHTP (2009-2010): 31-49. 
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took advantage of this decree, particularly after the Crémieux Decree invalidated it five 
years later.  Yet, though largely ineffective, this decree evidenced a certain assimilatory 
possibility, however limited, for Muslim and Jewish male elites in French Algeria. 
The Crémieux decree was the result of decades of lobbying by French Jews, a 
small number of wealthy Algerian Jews, and liberal French officials.  Minister of the 
Interior Adolphe Crémieux (who was himself Jewish) was particularly active in the effort 
to naturalize Algerian Jews.  The decree stated: 
 The native Israelites of the Algerian departments are declared French 
citizens; consequently, their real status and their personal status will be, as 
of the promulgation of this decree, regulated by French law.23 
 
The wording of the decree limited it to those Jews and their descendants living in the 
départements of Oran, Algiers, and Constantine, excluding the as-yet unconquered south 
as well as Jews from other areas of the Maghreb.24  What came to be termed the 
“regularization” of Jewish personal status simply meant that the previous control given to 
local courts in personal matters of birth, marriage, divorce, inheritance, and so on, would 
thereafter be recorded and adjudicated by French civil authorities and French courts, as 
criminal matters had been for decades under French colonial rule. 
A decade later when the M’zab came under French military control, those Jews 
living in Southern Algeria, almost exclusively in the M’zab, entered into the Jewish 
personal status.  The “regularization” of the Jewish personal status that the Crémieux 
Decree initiated did not apply to these Jews located geographically outside the bounds of 
the Algerian départements in the militarily administered Territoires du Sud.  French 
officials couched their reasoning for excluding the Jews of Ghardaïa within jurisdictional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Shepard, Invention of Decolonization, 28. 
24 Schreier, Arabs of the Jewish Faith, 103. 
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debates.  However, underlying assumptions about general Jewish inferiority and M’zabi 
Jewish inferiority in particular informed the decision by successive French officials not to 
emancipate these Jews.  Additionally, widespread settler condemnation of the Crémieux 
Decree, a resurgence of political antisemitism, and assertions that Jewish emancipation 
was to blame for Muslim revolts (in particular, the 1871 Mokhrani Rebellion) further 
hindered efforts to win M’zabi emancipation after 1882.25 
 
French Annexation in the M’zab and the Jews of Ghardaïa 
The M’zab was a unique socio-cultural space in modern (and pre-modern) 
Algeria.  While Sunni Islam dominated the religious landscape in most of Algeria, Ibadi 
Islam was the dominant religion in Ghardaïa and the reason for the M’zabi settlement of 
the valley.  Ibadi Muslims fleeing persecution from the Sunni Caliphate established the 
towns of the M’zab in the eleventh century.  Geographically and symbolically, Ghardaïa 
and its environs demarcated the border between the Berber lands of Saharan Algeria and 
the Arab-dominated cities of the Mediterranean coast.  In this distinctive space, Ibadi and 
Sunni Muslims shared power with each other and the local Jewish community, which 
numbered around ten percent of the population in the twentieth century.26  In this 
tripartite configuration each community held a level of autonomy in their religious affairs 
and self-governance, with Jewish personal matters arbitrated by Jewish religious 
authorities much as they would later be in French Algeria.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Charles Ageron persuasively denied these claims about Jewish enfranchisement inciting Muslim 
rebellions in his thesis, Les Algériens musulmans et la France: 1871-1919 (Paris: Presses Univ. de France, 
1968). 
26 Lloyd Cabot-Briggs and Norina Lami Guède, No More For Ever: A Saharan Jewish Town (Cambridge, 
MA: The Peabody Museum, 1964). 
27 Amos Gitai, “Communities in Transition: Five urban Jewish communities and their architecture,” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1986). 
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Surrounded by the desert, Ghardaïa was also a unique historical space because of 
the severe environmental conditions that determined the rhythms of life for its diverse 
inhabitants.  The Oued M’Zab is one of the most arid climates in the Sahara, with an 
average of ten days of rain per year.  In spite of these extreme conditions, because of its 
location at the center of north-south and east-west trade routes, Ghardaïa was long a 
center of trans-Saharan trade.28  Its strategic commercial position brought the first Jewish 
inhabitants to the M’zab, probably sometime in the fifteenth century, from the vibrant 
Jewish community at Djerba, in present-day Tunisia.  According to Ibadi lore, in the late 
fourteenth century a delegation of Mozabite authorities went to Djerba to convince a 
venerated sheikh to return with them to Ghardaïa.  This sheikh brought with him Jewish 
tailors, carpenters, and metal smiths who found the M’zab attractive for its proximity to 
major trans-Saharan trade routes. 29  Despite social and legal restrictions that limited their 
movement and interactions with non-Jews, Ghardaia’s Jews remained active in 
metalworking and carpentry well into the twentieth century and were reknowned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 126. 
29 Versions of this Jewish migration to the M’zab are included in a number of travel accounts, dissertations, 
anthropological studies, histories, and memoirs, including Cabot-Briggs and Guède ; André Chevrillon, Les 
Puritains du désert (Paris : Libraire Plon, 1927); A. Coyne, Le Mzab (Alger : Adolphe Journal, 1879) ; 
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(Barr : Kleinknecht C., 1990) ; Marcel Mercier, La civilisation urbaine au Mzab (Algiers : Emile Pfister, 
1922) ; Jean Moriaz, “La vie économique au Mzab,” Bulletin de liaison saharienne 11, no.39 (September 
1960): 119-140; Pessah Shinar, “Réflexions sur la symbiose Judéo-Ibadite en Afrique du nord,” in 
Communautés Juives des marges sahariennes du Maghreb, ed. Michel Abitbol (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi 
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the community, as in Eliahou Sebban, Vayikah Amram: Traditions des Israelites du Mzab (Israel: 5762).  
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.   
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throughout North Africa for their skill.30  Official French census records estimate the 
Jewish population in the M’zab at 738 Jewish individuals in 1882, 1,400 in 1921 and 
1,300 in 1931.31  The rapid growth of the Jewish population in the early period of French 
colonization suggests that French annexation and the extension of French resources 
improved the general quality of life for Jews in the M’zab. 
From their arrival in the valley, Ghardaia’s Jews had a single modest synagogue.  
A trained rabbi arrived in the community only in 1870, assuming the duties previously 
undertaken by a rotating authority from one of the family patriarchs.  Soon after, a local 
Jewish merchant began building a new, more elaborate synagogue in 1872.  However, 
according to French accounts, a mob of local Muslims destroyed this synagogue and stole 
its funds from the safe box.  The likelihood of such an outpouring of violence is 
somewhat suspect, as there are no records of earlier attacks on the Jewish community.  
Following this episode of violence, the local French military authorities headquartered in 
Laghouat  noted that the Jews of Ghardaïa appealed to them for help.  French 
Commander Colonel Margueritte ordered the Muslim community to make pecuniary 
compensation to the Jews.  Using these funds, a new synagogue was finally completed in 
1887, five years after the official French annexation of the M'zab.32 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Gitai, “Communities in Transition,” 128.  A number of reporters from The New York Times remarked on 
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31 Mercier, La civilization urbaine au Mzab, 122; Cabot Briggs and Guede, No More For Ever, 9. 
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Figure 1.1  "Map showing the location of the Mzab," Briggs and Guède, No More For Ever. 
Several French travelers to the region in the late nineteenth century cited French 
support for the construction of a new synagogue as proof of the positive effects of French 
colonization.  In Ghardaïa and elsewhere in Algeria, North Africa and the Middle East, 
historians, state and military officials have sometimes emphasized moments such as this, 
constructing a picture of Jewish oppression under centuries of Muslim rule.33  Mark 
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Cohen has dubbed this a “neo-lachrymose conception of Jewish-Arab history,” 
borrowing the earlier term coined by Salo Baron to criticize the historiography of 
European Jewry that emphasized Jewish oppression and persecution.34  It is true that 
Ibadi strictures heavily circumscribed Jewish life in the Mzab, with Jews confined to the 
mellah and subject to a number of economic restrictions.35  Yet there existed a certain 
level of cultural interpenetration and cooperation, bred of necessity and longstanding 
cohabitation.  Far removed from the administrative centers of the Mediterranean coast, a 
unique social, economic, and political organization took place in Ghardaïa.  Additionally, 
in the Ottoman Empire, when Jews in North Africa were dhimmi, a tolerated minority, 
there had been few outbreaks of Muslim-Jewish violence because the same structures that 
had bound Jews and Muslims remained undisturbed.  
All this is not to dismiss the real improvement in Jewish status in the M’zab that 
accompanied French annexation.  Another trend in recent historiography has been to 
adopt a near total reversal of Cohen’s “neo-lachrymose conception of Jewish-Arab 
history,” which asserts that relations between Jews and Muslims in North Africa and the 
Middle East were almost idyllic in a “Golden Age” before the arrival of European 
colonizers and Zionists.  Much of this historiography, by individuals descended from 
Jewish families displaced in the twentieth century, evidences the great pain that 
colonialism and the migrations and political eruptions of the postwar era had on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Mark R. Cohen coined this phrase in “The Neo-Lachrymose Conception of Jewish-Arab History,” Tikkun 
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Stein, “Jews and French colonialism in Algeria: an introduction,” The Journal of North African Studies 17, 
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35 Certain Jewish merchants from Ghardaïa were nevertheless able to build profitable trade businesses, 
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by Charles Kleinknecht, the last French official to leave Ghardaïa, in his memoirs, Les Juifs du Mzab. 
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Jewish communities of North Africa.36  However, this narrative can misrepresent the 
complexity of these Jewish individuals and communities just as their characterization by 
others as “miserable wretches” reduces their history to one of violence and oppression.37  
The historical experience of the M’zabi Jewish community, and Jews throughout the 
Muslim world, was far less linear than either of these two schools of thought would 
argue. 
Apart from offering a new challenge to both the neo-lachrymose and the “Golden 
Age” schools of North African Jewish historiography, M’zabi Jewish history differs 
significantly from the larger history of Algerian Jewry and can offer an alternate history 
of Jews in the French Empire.  These critical differences have not as yet been fully 
treated by historians, or have more recently been dismissed as simply French constructs.  
Sarah Abrevaya Stein argues that colonial law and military policy “hardened, if not 
altogether invented” the differences between Jews in the Algerian south and north.38  The 
French law system in Algeria certainly did create artificial categories that divided 
populations and communities, imposing new hierarchies of citizen and subject predicated 
on racial, religious, or ethnic lines (as seen by the French).  However, a cursory reading 
of the field of Algerian Jewish history reveals a great diversity within the Algerian Jewish 
communities of the north and between the north and south that pre-dated French 
colonization and contradicts the argument that Algerian Jews were part of a unified 
community or felt themselves to be so before the French conquest. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See, e.g., Gideon N. Giladi, in Discord in Zion: conflict between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews in Israel 
(London: Scorpion Publishing, 1990), as well as Ella Shohat in “Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the 
Standpoint of its Jewish victims,” Social Text 19/20 (August 1988): 1-35.. 
37 As in Norman Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication 
Society, 1991). 
38 Sarah Abrevaya Stein, “Dividing south from north: French colonialism, Jews, and the Algerian Sahara,” 
the Journal of North African Studies 17, no. 5 (December 2012): 784. 
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Although many descriptions of M’zabi Jewish difference reveal more about the 
prejudices of their French authors than about the community per se, there were significant 
differences in the religious practice, social customs, and economic practices of M’zabi 
Jews when compared with other Jews in Algeria.  The isolated and inwardly focused 
communities of the south were in many ways more similar to their Muslim neighbors 
than, say, a Livornese Jewish family in Algiers or a Jewish rabbi in Tlemcen.  The Jews 
in Ghardaïa practiced a number of rituals heavily influenced by their close association 
with the local Ibadi community and unique in all of the Maghreb and many daily 
behaviors and customs that would look quite foreign to a French or Algerian Jew. 
M’zabi Jewish difference was partly a product of the remoteness of the M’zab and 
the insularity of its populations.  Most Jews in the M’zab married almost exclusively 
within the few families who initially settled there in the medieval period and had one of 
the highest rates of endogamous marriage in the world, the consequences of which have 
been the subject of several studies.  In particular, M’zabi Jews and their descendants 
living today in France and Israel have had one of the highest rates of hereditary deafness 
in the world, approaching 2.5% of the population.  Members of the community created 
their own sign language, which Israeli researchers dubbed “Algerian Jewish Sign 
Language,” or AJSL, in the 1960s.39  To brush aside the difference of this community is 
to reduce the whole of the Algerian Jewish community to a simplistic argument about the 
effects of colonialism and colonization on Jews anywhere in the Middle East and North 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Cabot Briggs and Guede; Ronald L. Nagel, “Jews of the Sahara,” Einstein Journal of Biological 
Medicine 21 (2004): 25-32; and especially, Irit Meir, Wendy Sandler, Carol Padden, and Mark Aronoff, 
“Emerging Sign Languages,” in Oxford Handbook of Deaf Studies, Language, and Education, M. 
Marschark & P. E. Spencer, eds. 2 (2010): 267-280.  The persistence of this rate of deafness outside the 
M’zab supports the hypothesis of congenital hearing loss rather than the influence of local environmental 
factors. 
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Africa while ignoring the specificity of the M’zabi Jewish experience.  French law and 
military policies certainly hardened the divisions between the emancipated Jews of the 
north and the Jewish subjects in the south.  Yet, the cultural, social, and yes, biological, 
dissimilarities between this and other Jewish communities of the Maghreb cannot be 
reduced to a simple consequence of colonial intervention. 
The Crémieux Decree did impose a kind of unity on Algerian Jewry by legally 
separating them from Jews elsewhere in the Maghreb, seeking through emancipation to 
“regenerate” Algerian Jews and centralize Jewish practice in French Algeria.  However, 
by the same measure than the Crémieux Decree legally bound all Jews living in the 
Algerian départements by the same legal frameworks, it also drew a clear line of 
separation between those emancipated Jews in the north and M’zabi Jews.  Consequently, 
Jews living north of the M’zab could be characterized as being the more atypical 
community when contrasted with Jews living throughout the Muslim world.  In this 
larger context, the historical experience of M’zabi Jews who maintained a greater level of 
communal autonomy under loose French control more closely resembled other Jewish 
communities across this region than the exceptional treatment of Algerian Jews who 
acquired French citizenship.  Much as it had in France, emancipation in Algeria imposed 
a new French identity onto Jews and inserted the state into daily Jewish life and ritual.  
As the French state had forced Jews in Alsace to submit to the authority of the Republic 
and the consistory, so too did emancipation in Algeria supplant the pre-existing structures 
of Jewish life, further empower the consistory system, and flatten the differences between 
the affected Jewish communities. 
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The history of M’zabi Jews can act as a kind of foil to that of Algerian Jews, 
offering a glimpse at what French policies and attitudes towards Algerian Jews might 
have been without the Crémieux Decree.  Examining the French treatment of M’zabi 
Jews and the gradual enfranchisement of the community until their final acquisition of 
full legal rights in 1961 can tell us much about the experience of those Algerian Jews 
who were emancipated.  French officials who were opposed to the Crémieux Decree but 
unable to appeal or reverse it sometimes focused their efforts on preventing any further 
Jewish emancipation, which is to say, on stymying appeals and petitions for M’zabi 
Jewish citizenship.  In communiqués and memoranda about the M’zab and its Jewish 
residents, French military and civil officials revealed their biases against Jewish 
Algerians, even after the extreme antisemitism of the Vichy periods.   
These discussions and arguments sometimes condemned M’zabi Jews and their 
aspirations for citizenship not because of their Jewishness, but instead because of their 
similarities—both perceived and actual—to Algerian Muslims.  The exclusion of M’zabi 
Jews and the persistent resistance to their emancipation yields further evidence of French 
prejudice towards Algerian Muslims and is part of the larger history of Muslim exclusion 
in French Algeria.  French officials and military officers saw little distinction between 
different individuals and communities grouped under the category of “indigènes,” 
“natives” of Algeria.  As such, M’zabi Jews and Algerian Muslims belonged to an 
inferior legal and social stratum of colonial society.  French documents pertaining to the 
issue of M’zabi Jewish emancipation expand historical knowledge of what it meant to be 
an “indigène" in Algeria, from an unusual Jewish perspective.   
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Antisemitism and Zionism in Algeria and the M’zab 
 When the Vichy government abrogated the Crémieux Decree on October 
7, 1940, the M’zabi Jewish population found themselves for the first time on the same 
legal footing as the formerly emancipated Jews of the northern départements.40  The 
treatment of Jews in northern Algeria, however, was markedly worse than that of Jews in 
Ghardaïa.  While all Jews were subject to the numerus clausus and heightened state 
surveillance, no M’zabi Jews were ever imprisoned in the labor camps of the desert or 
accused of espionage, a regular fate for many Jews from the coast, some of who passed 
through Ghardaïa en route to their internment.41  However, despite the treatment of Jews 
in Vichy-era Algeria and the prolonged debates about reinstating the Crémieux Decree 
after the Liberation in 1943, the vast majority of Algerian and French Jews characterized 
the Vichy period as an aberrant episode of antisemitism, reaffirming the power of 
assimilation and their French identities in its wake.42 
 Most historians interpret the eventual immigration of over 130,000 Algerian Jews 
(of a population numbering approximately 140,000) to France in 1962 as evidence of 
Algerian Jewish assimilation and support for France and, by some, as evidence of the 
success of French Universalism. It is intriguing then, that Algerian Jews, who 
experienced worse antisemitism in this period than M’zabi Jews, chose migration to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Comprehensive accounts of Vichy policies affecting Jews in Algeria include Michel Abitbol, The Jews of 
North Africa During the Second World War (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989); Michel Ansky, 
Les Juifs d’Algérie: du decret Crémieux à la Libération (Paris: 1950); Michael M. Laskier, “Between 
Vichy Antisemitism and German Harassment: The Jews of North Africa during the early 1940s, “Modern 
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interrogated the logic behind the abrogation of the Crémieux Decree in “Why the Crémieux Decree was 
abrogated,” Contemporary Jewish Record 6 (1943): 115-123. 
41 For a study of Algerian Jewish incarceration in Vichy labor camps see Norbert Bel Ange, Quand Vichy 
internait ses soldats juifs d’Algérie: Bedeau, sud oranais, 1941-1943 (Paris: Harmattan, 2006). 
42 Shepard, 170-171.  Shepard points out that this attitude was further reinforced by the events of the 
Algerian War and used to reinforce the boundary between assimilable Jews and non-assimilable Muslims.   
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France while Jews from Ghardaïa by and large chose to immigrate to Mandatory 
Palestine and Israel.  A great number of historians have explored why and how Algerian 
Jews came to see their only viable option at the end of the Algerian War to be migration 
to the metropole.43  Relatively few, however, have examined the choice that most M’zabi 
Jews made to migrate to Israel instead.44  This ignores a fascinating body of archival 
evidence that includes many notes and reports form French officials who expressed deep 
surprise when Jewish individuals and families from the M’zab began leaving Algeria for 
Palestine in 1943.  In the larger context of Jewish migrations from North Africa and the 
Middle East, this is an unusually early date for immigration to begin and indicates 
instability in Jewish life in Algeria despite the reassurances of the post-Vichy 
government. 
There is likely some correlation between the mercurial French abrogation and 
then reinstatement of the Crémieux Decree and M’zabi decisions to emigrate.  Many 
Algerian Muslims interpreted Vichy-era antisemitism and anti-Jewish policies as 
evidence that assimilation was ultimately impossible in the face of French racism and we 
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might infer that M’zabi Jews reacted similarly.  However, this is not to imply direct 
causality between antisemitism in Algeria and the Jewish emigration from the M’zab.  
Many factors influenced the decision to leave Ghardaïa, and the “push” of antisemitism 
and poverty was sometimes weaker than the “pull” of Israel.   
The M’zabi immigration to Israel demarcates a second historical moment in 
which the history of the Jews of Ghardaïa diverged from that of the Jews in Algeria’s 
urban north.  After 1882, when Jews in the Sahara were not emancipated, their 
experience of French colonial rule began to differ dramatically from the emancipated 
Jews of Algeria’s north.  While citizenship afforded Jews from Oran, Constantine, Batna, 
Tlemcen, or Djelfa the opportunity to attend French schools, universities, and join the 
French military to fight in World War I, the Jews of Ghardaïa remained relatively 
isolated inland, though many attended local French schools.  Thus, we might argue that it 
is unsurprising that the M’zabi Jews left Algeria not for the French metropole as the rest 
of the Algerian Jewish community did, but for Israel.  Yet, the simple argument that a 
lack of familiarity with French cultural, economic, and social networks discouraged their 
immigration to France paints a far too simplistic picture. 
French officials first remarked on the number and frequency of Jewish emigration 
from the M’zab shortly after the first organized aliyah in 1943.  However, rather than 
enact policies to encourage Jews to remain in Ghardaïa, French policies in the M’zab in 
the Fourth Republic restricted Jewish economic practices and specifically targeted 
Jewish-dominated areas of trade.  The postwar period also saw the entry of international 
Jewish relief agencies into the lobbying effort aimed at the French government to extend 
Jewish emancipation to the M’zab.  In addition to the AIU, the American Joint 
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Distribution Committee and the Jewish Agency were actively involved in monitoring the 
situation of Jews in Ghardaïa and assisting the Jewish emigration from Algeria to 
mandatory Palestine and Israel.  The M’zab is one of the few places in Algeria where 
French colonialism and Zionism confronted each other, in the differing visions that 
French officials and Zionist emissaries had for the future of North African Jews. 
The presence of Zionist organizations or representatives in the M’zab and even 
the involvement of a small number of M’zabi men in Zionist leadership positions does 
not mean that the majority of the M’zabi Jewish community was actively supportive of 
Zionism.  Though certainly aware of political Zionism as a movement, the attraction to 
Israel was for most predicated on a deeply religious interest in returning to Zion, 
fulfilling the biblical injunction for Jews to go back to the land of their forefathers, and 
not an engagement with the largely secular political ideology of Zionism.  This religio-
historical attachment to Zion had long figured in Jewish life in the M’zab; what changed 
after 1943 was the presence in Algeria of a successful and well-funded international 
Jewish relief network that facilitated their migration.  French authorities often assumed 
that the relationships between M’zabi Jews and Zionists from the United States, Europe, 
or Israel indicated M’zabi affiliation with Zionism, which led to a number of 
confrontations between colonial authorities and Zionists. 
These confrontations between France and Zionist organizations came at the same 
moment that the French and Israeli militaries became increasingly close allies.  At times, 
Israeli strategic objectives appeared contradictory in the M’zab, with the imperative to 
bring Jews to Israel clashing with the Israeli need to support the French in order to win 
French military supplies, notably French fighter jets.  For the most part, though, Israeli 
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and French diplomatic objectives intersected, as they did in the unsuccessful Suez Crisis 
in 1956.  One unfortunate consequence of this collusion between French and Israeli 
military forces to seize the Suez canal was widespread attacks on Jewish communities 
across North Africa, who were often mistakenly believed to support Israeli actions 
against Egypt. 
Muslim-Jewish relations in Algeria and the M’zab deteriorated in the 1950s as a 
result of the mounting tension between Israel and neighboring Arab states.  M’zabi Jews 
wrote to French officials and international Jewish relief organizations of their fear about 
Muslim violence, fears that intensified after the commencement of the Algerian War in 
November 1954.  To a certain extent these fears were the product of propaganda from the 
Jewish communities of the Algerian north and the French themselves, who encouraged 
the new vision of vulnerable Jews at the mercy of Muslim violence.45  Ibadi Muslims in 
Ghardaïa were directly involved in trying to assuage Jewish fears, but there were a 
number of Algerian nationalist organizations and individuals associated with the FLN 
who later launched attacks on local Jews or encouraged economic sanctions.  The 
violence that characterized the conflict between French colonial and Algerian nationalist 
forces in Algeria only encouraged Jewish emigration from the M’zab. 
However, the rate of emigration actually decreased soon after the Algerian War 
began as a result of French investment in the Sahara, where many in the government 
believed lay the future economic success of France.  In 1956, French engineers began 
developing oilfields in Hassi Messaoud, seventy kilometers northwest of Ghardaïa, which 
brought renewed French interest and investment to the area.  M’zabi Jews profited from 
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the development in the Sahara, expanding their businesses to serve the increased demand 
for transportation services and general trade.  Despite the economic growth of this period 
and assurances delivered by the French president and members of the AIU, Jewish 
emigration from Ghardaïa again picked up after 1958, when the violence of the Algerian 
War arrived on the doorsteps of the M’zabi Jewish community, in several small 
bombings and targeted stabbings of Jews in the south.  Sometimes working with, 
sometimes against, the French, the Jewish Agency and the American Joint Distribution 
Committee worked steadily to assist M’zabi Jews in their emigration.46 
In the final years of the Algerian War, French officials elaborated the hierarchy of 
colonial citizenship, sometimes in negotiations with Algerian nationalists.  The 
boundaries between those classified as “Muslim” Algerians and “Europeans” had to be 
reiterated and redefined as the French and the FLN determined who would be part of a 
future independent Algeria and who would be repatriated to France.  In this climate, 
French Jews, led by the AIU, advanced the call to emancipate the M’zabi Jews.  The 
ambiguity of Jewish “indigènes” had to be resolved, and in 1961 and 1962 French 
authorities were insistent on elaborating new ideologies and policies that rigidly included 
Jews while excluding (most) Muslims.  Jewish leaders in Ghardaïa also petitioned the 
government for full citizenship and the replacement of their personal status with civil 
status, articulating their own demands and willingness to undergo what they termed 
“Frenchification.”  They were successful and a bill regularizing the civil status of the 
M’zabi Jews passed the French National Assembly and Senate on June 28, 1961. 
By the time of their full emancipation, over half the community had already 
emigrated from Ghardaïa to Israel.  After an independent Algeria was declared in March 
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1962, the Jewish Agency worked with the French to mobilize an airlift of the remaining 
Jews from the M’zab.  On June 1, 1962, there were nine hundred Jews left in Ghardaïa.  
By August 1 of that year, there were none remaining.47  The final emigration was 
dramatic in its rapidity and totality.  Most of these individuals left Algeria for Israel, but a 
small group of M’zabi Jews, between fifty and one hundred and fifty individuals, chose 
to immigrate to France in 1962.48 
French Jewish lay and clerical leaders observed that the absorption of Jews from 
the Algerian south was more difficult than that of other Algerian Jews, that these Jews 
were more traditional and less familiar with French culture and society.  M’zabi Jews in 
Strasbourg and elsewhere in France found adjustment very difficult and quite a few 
ultimately made aliyah, leaving France for Israel.  This experience of adversity contrasts 
with the absorption of Algerian Jews more broadly in France, which was met at the time 
with great expectations and has been characterized since as largely successful, both by 
Algerian Jews themselves and by the French Jewish community and French government.  
The more difficult history of M’zabi Jews in France after 1962 has been largely 
disregarded by Algerian Jewish historians and underrepresented because there have been 
no Jewish historians from the M’zab, while there have been many Algerian Jewish 
historians from northern Algeria.  Without such “memory carriers,” as Algerian Jewish 
historian Benjamin Stora calls himself and his peers, to transmit this history, it has fallen 
under the historiographical radar.49 
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The absorption of M’zabi Jews in Israel has gained greater attention insofar as it 
falls under the rubric of the historiography of Jewish aliyah from the Middle East and 
North Africa.  In Israel, unlike France, M’zabi Jews were one of a tremendous number of 
Jewish communities who arrived in Israel from Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia.  After their arrival in Israel, the particular provenance of these 
communities was subsumed to the larger category of mizrahim, “Oriental” or “Eastern” 
Jews.  Thus, while it is possible to trace their travel from Algeria to Israel and initial 
resettlement, archival evidence documenting specific communities after their arrival in 
Israel is scarce. 
 This project is bounded by the limited sources available on the history of the 
M’zab and the Jewish community in Ghardaïa.  By far, the most sources are located 
within the French national archives, especially at the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in 
Aix-en-Provence.  However, French archival documents only very rarely include items 
written by Jewish authors from the M’zab.  For the most part, materials from French 
archives represent the attitudes and opinions of French authorities, which are valuable for 
an analysis of the multiple logics underlying French policies towards the Jews of 
Ghardaïa.  Reading these documents “against the grain” does enable us to see the actual 
subjects of French correspondence, their aspirations, daily lives, and conflicts with each 
other and the French state.50  Similar interactions with foreign European observers 
include the private journals, memoirs, and academic reports of various French and 
European travelers to the M’zab, from the late nineteenth century through the period of 
the Algerian War.   
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 In addition to French and European archives, the archives of Jewish communal 
and international organizations are critical to this study.  The Jewish community of 
Ghardaïa was bound within international networks of Jewish travelers and organizations 
that communicated with the leaders of the community and also wrote extensively about 
assisting the Jews of the M’zab.  The Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), the American 
Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC), the World Zionist Organization (WZO), and the 
Jewish Agency all worked individually and collectively to address the needs of the Jews 
in the Algerian south.  Representatives of these individual agencies sent detailed reports 
back to their headquarters about the social, economic, and political lives of the Jews in 
Ghardaïa, accounts that constitute an important source of non-governmental analysis and 
anecdote.  These organizations also demonstrate the great diversity in ideology and 
objectives within the international Jewish community, from the assimilationist AIU to the 
Zionist Jewish Agency, and correspondence between them and the M’zabi Jewish 
leadership reveals the complex and sometimes contradictory positions held by different 
M’zabi Jews in the twentieth century. 
 Finally, the writings and recollections of Jewish individual and families from the 
M’zab, including memoirs of both their lives in Algeria and after emigration, were 
invaluable to this dissertation project.  In particular, conversations with Marc Balouka, 
the self-designated historian for the community and the documents he has compiled over 
a number of years, as well as the published memoirs of Eliahou Sebban, were valuable 
sources for reconstructing the rich tapestry of Jewish life in the Algerian Sahara.   
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Chapter Overview 
Chapter two maps out the long history of Jewish existence in Ghardaïa and the 
unique environment, physical and cultural, of the M’zab.  Comparing the family 
structures and religious practices of the M’zabi Jewish community with those of Jewish 
communities in North Africa and Europe highlights the unique and traditional practice of 
Judaism in the M’zab, as well as its linkages with Ibadi Islam.  The M’zab and the larger 
Sahara fascinated French travelers and colonial officials of the nineteenth century who 
romanticized and exoticized its inhabitants.  Labeled alternatively as more “open” than 
Muslims and less civilized than their northern coreligionists, the French portrayed the 
Jews of the M’zab as non-assimilable French subjects after annexation in 1882.  French 
prejudices and imagined constructs about the Jews and Muslims of the M’zab persisted 
well into the twentieth century and informed the French decision not to transform the 
status quo in the south.  
The third chapter explores increased French involvement in and surveillance of 
the M’zab in the 1930s and early 1940s.  The 1930 centennial of French rule in Algeria 
heralded a number of French attempts at reforming the colonial system under a range of 
governments, culminating in the failed efforts of Léon Blum’s Popular Front government.  
These gestures at change reflected the increasing organization and effectiveness of 
Algerian nationalists, who established various Algerian nationalist organizations in 
Algiers and Paris in the 1930s.  Ibadi M’zabis also initiated their own reform movement, 
while M’zabi Jews petitioned for emancipation in 1919 and 1932.  In response, French 
colonial administrators examined the status of M’zabi Jews and admitted that their 
“indigène" status presented difficulties and highlighted the disharmony of colonial 
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policies.  However, bureaucratic inertia and a recurrence of the perennial antisemitism of 
Algeria’s pied-noirs meant no change to M’zabi Jewish status resulted.   
This antisemitism culminated in widespread support for the 1940 abrogation of 
the Crémieux Decree.  During the Vichy period and after the Allied landing in North 
Africa, M’zabis came increasingly into contact with the outside world.  After liberation, 
Jewish M’zabis were in regular contact with international Jewish relief organizations 
during the campaign to have the Crémieux Decree restored.  However, when reinstated in 
1943 the Crémieux Decree still did not encompass the Jews of the south.  Beginning in 
that year, largely as a consequence of growing disillusionment with their prospects in a 
French colony and the economic disruptions of the war years, a number of young men 
left the M’zab for the first time, seeking economic opportunity instead of spiritual succor 
in Palestine.  This marked the beginning of emigration from Algeria to Israel. 
The “Question Palestinienne” obsessed French officials in the M’zab in the years 
between the fall of the Vichy regime and the beginning of the Algerian War.  Chapter 
four examines the contradictory policies of French colonial authorities that specifically 
targeted and restricted Jewish-dominated trades.  These economic restrictions, along with 
growing antagonism between Jews and Muslims in Algeria, encouraged increased 
numbers of Jews to make aliyah during this period.  The deterioration of Muslim-Jewish 
relations reflected larger trends across North Africa resulting from the mounting 
hostilities between Israel and neighboring Arab states.  During this period international 
Jewish organizations increased their activities in Algeria and the M’zab and enlisted the 
assistance of government officials in the United States and elsewhere, expanding the 
issue of M’zabi Jewish legal inequality to a diplomatic level. 
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While this chapter introduces an international diplomatic dimension to this 
historical narrative, chapter five introduces the question of economic and resource 
development in the Sahara.  The development of the desert preoccupied a new generation 
of French officials after the discovery of vast reserves of oil, coal, and natural gas there in 
the late 1940s.  Spurred by hope for an economic regeneration in the desert, Fourth 
Republic officials turned their eye ever southward and the residents of the M’zab became 
increasingly critical allies in the development of the Sahara.  At the same time, in the 
early 1950s, the increasingly intense forces of Algerian nationalism, led by the FLN, 
challenged French hegemony and forced the French towards greater compromise with 
potential allies.  French officials argued they could not emancipate the Jews in Ghardaïa, 
as this would anger the still disenfranchised Muslims of the south. 
Only in 1961 did the French finally emancipate the Jews of the M’zab, and 
chapter six delves into the morass of diverse actors and interests that mobilized to 
convince the French government of the utility of Jewish emancipation.  In this final 
period, through economic, political, and social interactions, the Jews of Ghardaïa 
developed friendly relationships with local French officials.  The under-prefect of 
Ghardaïa and the Commissioner expressed a certain fondness for the Jewish community 
and its leaders in their later memoires and writings.  These friendships assisted the Jewish 
community in lobbying for their full integration into the French body politic, with the 
physical process of emigration from the M’zab, and with their absorption in France.  A 
final comparison of absorption processes and experiences in France and Israel 
demonstrates the difficulties of migration and the contrast between the experiences and 
choices of Jews from Ghardaïa and Jews from elsewhere in Algeria. 






PART I: 1882-1945 
 
 
Chapter 2:  
 
The Limits of Emancipation and Les Puritains du Désert:  
The M’zab in French Algeria, 1882-1930 
 
 
 For the residents of the M’zab, French annexation violated the centuries-old 
autonomy of the valley and marked a profound shift in the relationship between the 
Algerian Sahara and the Mediterranean coast, binding what had been an independent 
confederation of city-states to the northern administrative urban centers of Laghouat, 
Algiers, and distant Paris.  The M’zabis were now officially categorized as French 
nationals—but not citizens—according to the senatus-consulte decree of 1865.51  As non-
citizens, M’zabis had access to most French civic rights, but were excluded from voting 
or serving in the French military.  Algerian nationals classified as “Algerian Muslims” or 
“native Israelites” could become citizens only if they renounced their personal status.52  
The 1865 senatus-consulte had been very unpopular.  Of the estimated Algerian Jewish 
population of thirty-five thousand, only two hundred and eighty-eight applied for 
citizenship between 1865 and 1870.53  Most Algerians, Muslim, Jewish, or otherwise, did 
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not chose to abandon their local laws.  They instead continued to live their lives 
according to their customs and have disputes relating to personal status arbitrated by their 
own religious leaders.   
 After annexation in 1882, M’zabis followed the “Mozabite customary law,” and 
M’zabi Jews the “Mosaic personal status,” according to halakhah, Jewish law derived 
from the Torah, tradition, oral law, teachings from rabbis and scribes, and custom 
(minhag).  Halakhah was (and is) in constant evolution, responding to local needs and 
respecting the local custom, law, and authorities.  For centuries, halakhah guided 
“personal, financial and social relationships amongst Jews and between Jews and 
Gentiles, as well as all other practices and observances of Judaism.”54  Jews enjoyed 
much judicial autonomy in the Muslim world.  In the M’zab and in Ottoman Algeria Jews 
had been able to regulate their communities and adjudicate conflict according to 
halakhah and in their own court system, the beit din.  French colonization and the 
emancipation of Algerian Jews put an end to this system, bringing Algerian Jews into the 
French legal system and delegitimizing halakhah in favor of French courts.  For the Jews 
of the M’zab, exclusion from citizenship meant they were able to retain both halakhah as 
a valid legal system for themselves and a certain measure of autonomy in their personal 
affairs.  However, this autonomy was often compromised by French interventions into the 
private lives of colonial subjects.  For example, a law of March 23, 1882, obligated 
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Muslim judges to register all Muslim marriages with the colonial office of records within 
three days of the ceremony.  Jewish marriages were similarly recorded.55 
In light of the 1870 emancipation of Algeria’s Jewish population, it is surprising 
that the French decided only a decade later that M’zabi Jews would be legally “ranked” 
not as emancipated French Jewish citizens, but as non-citizen subjects alongside 
“Algerian Muslims.”  The official explanation for the French exclusion of M’zabi Jews 
from citizenship was their geographic location approximately two hundred kilometers 
south of the borders of the départements of French Algeria, which were under military, 
not civilian, administration.  However, internal French correspondence indicates a more 
complex logic behind their exclusion from citizenship.  An 1881 telegram from the 
Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior summarized the various opinions of 
high-ranking French officials about the potential emancipation of the Jewish community 
on the eve of the annexation of the M’zab.  Governor General Tirman argued that there 
were “inconveniences presented by the extension to the M’zab of the provisions of the 
[Crémieux] decree.  Positioned in a markedly inferior situation vis-à-vis the locals, the 
Jews of the M’zab are in no way prepared for naturalization en bloc.”  General Saussier 
added “giving the status of French citizen to all the Israélites of the M’zab and removing 
them from paying local taxes could compromise the moral success of our endeavors.”56  
These French officials expressed concern either than these particular Jews were too 
different from other Algerian Jews or that improving the situation of the Jewish 
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community would antagonize the local Muslim community, couching their arguments in 
a bureaucratic dispute over jurisdictional boundaries. 
Since the late nineteenth century, legal scholars have argued that if the wording 
and intended meaning of the Crémieux Decree were followed exactly, M’zabi Jews 
would have obtained citizenship when the M’zab was integrated in 1882.57  The non-
application of the Crémieux Decree to the M’zab in 1882 and afterwards can be 
interpreted both as evidence of the exceptional emancipatory moment in 1870 when the 
Crémieux Decree passed the National Assembly and the following decades of opposition 
to Algerian Jewish emancipation.58  The non-application of the Crémieux Decree to the 
Jews of the M’zab is perhaps more indicative of the backlash against the decree in 
Algeria and France than reflective of French attitudes towards the M’zabi Jewish 
community. 
French fears that Jewish emancipation in the M’zab would antagonize the local 
Muslim community revealed a reductionist interpretation of Jewish-Muslim relations to 
which French officials clung during the period of Algerian colonization.  French 
reluctance to extend citizenship to the M’zabi Jews reflected their belief that Muslim 
M’zabis would be critical allies in the colonization of southern Algeria.  French 
colonizers depended on the support of local notables to secure their control over the 
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Sahara and framed the decision not to extend citizenship to M’zabi Jews in terms of 
economic and political utility.  Both in 1882 and in later debates over emancipating the 
Jews of the M’zab, the French were sensitive to any possibility of alienating the Muslim 
majority in the M’zab.   
 Lastly, French hesitation to apply the Crémieux Decree in the Sahara was also the 
product of French prejudice against the M’zabi Jews, whom they considered culturally 
backward and unprepared for membership in the French polity.  Periodically, French 
officials, academics, and journalists also repeated the claim that the Jews of the M’zab 
were themselves uninterested in French citizenship, which would interfere with their 
traditional way of life.  These claims failed to reconcile the petitions to the French 
military command filed by members of the community asking for mass naturalization in 
accordance with the Crémieux Decree, in 1892 and 1919.59  Regardless of the actual 
wishes of M’zabi Jews, French officials constructed a wall of insurmountable difference 
around them.  French arguments about the incompatibility of M’zabi Jews with 
modernity and Republican values bear many similarities to French arguments about the 
preparedness of French Jews for emancipation in the early years of the French 
Revolution, demonstrating a continuity in French discourses about Jews from the late 
eighteenth to early twentieth centuries. 
Rhetoric about the “regeneration” of M’zabi Jews and French complaints about 
their non-European cultural practices persisted into the twentieth century and echoes of 
this earlier colonial logic can be heard in documents from the 1930s and 1940s, when 
successive French governments abrogated and then reinstated the Crémieux Decree and 
debated, for a second time, the possible emancipation of the M’zabi Jews.  This chapter 
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introduces the peoples and place of the M’zab and examines the multilayered French 
logic behind the refusal to extend citizenship to M’zabi Jews in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  Though French annexation brought dramatic changes to Jewish 
life in Ghardaïa, following an initial bout of colonial intercessions and interferences, the 
French stopped short of applying the Crémieux Decree in the south.  French assumptions 
about the particularities of the M’zab and the non-assimilable nature of the M’zab and 
M’zabi Jews, influenced by popular representations of the area, colored official reports 
and colonial policy.  During this period, Jewish and Muslim M’zabis engaged in various 
efforts at reform and modernization.  This initial period of French colonization in the 
Sahara coincided with the spread of political antisemitism that would restrain official 
French attempts to amend the situation of the Jews in Ghardaïa.   
 
The M’zab and its Inhabitants 
 The first decades of French colonization in the Sahara did not interfere deeply 
with most of the existing political, social, and cultural frameworks of the M’zab, leaving 
them intact well into the twentieth century.  The Jews of the M’zab and their Muslim 
neighbors maintained relative autonomy in their internal affairs under the small French 
command established at Ghardaïa in 1882.  Weak French intervention in M’zabi affairs 
echoed earlier Ottoman approaches towards the region.60  Before the French conquest in 
1830, interaction between the Ottoman Dey in Algiers and the M’zabis had been largely 
confined to commercial dealings.61  Those few M’zabi men, mostly Muslim but also 
some Jews, who lived for brief periods of time in Algeria’s coastal cities did so for trade 
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purposes and remained an insular community.62  The Beni M’zab fiercely guarded their 
isolation and independence, maintaining distance from the Ottoman authorities in Algiers 
and from the populations of the urban Mediterranean coast.  Though the M’zabi economy 
depended heavily on the trade they conducted abroad, economic advancement was 
secondary to maintaining the integrity of their community.  
 This insularity stemmed from the religious ideology of the M’zab: Ibadism, a 
theological descendant of Khariji (sometimes Khawaridji) Islam.63  Kharijism formed in 
the tumultuous decades following the death of Mohammed, when disputes over his 
succession resulted in a series of sectarian rifts in the Islamic community in the seventh 
century.  In this period of the first Caliphate, a small group broke with the dominant 
Ummayad Islamic ruling power, calling themselves the Kharijis, or “the seceders.”64  The 
Kharijis were notoriously hostile to other Muslims, following their belief in the doctrine 
of isti’rad, the execution of all non-Khariji Muslims.65  A number of moderate Kharijis 
disagreed with the practice of isti’rad and at the end of the seventh century a theologian 
named Abdullah b. Ibad broke with the extremist Kharijis, forming a more moderate sect 
that came to be known as Ibadism.66 
 More tolerant than Kharijism, Ibadis nevertheless maintained poor relations with 
other Muslim communities.  Their violent relations with non-Ibadi or non-Khariji 
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Muslims led to regular conflicts.  Originally centered in Basra, present-day Iraq, Ibadi 
groups gradually moved further afield in order to create independent Ibadi cities and 
empires, which they accomplished both in present-day Oman and in the Maghrib.  
Ibadism spread across North Africa and reached its zenith in the ninth century Rustamid 
empire founded by ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Rustam in 776.  The Rustamids converted a 
large number of indigenous tribes across the western Maghrib, swelling their numbers 
and integrating local language and customs.  The success of the Rustamids was short 
lived.  Less than two hundred years after its foundation, the Sunni Fatimid Empire sacked 
the Rustamid capital, Tahert (present-day Tiaret, Algeria), in 909.  Fleeing further 
persecution, a group of Ibadi notables fled south, first to Ouargla, then west across the 
dry, hilly chebka plateau to a Saharan valley where they constructed five walled cities 
(ksours) along a dry riverbed, the Oued M’zab.67   
 Each kçour sat on a hill, the city descending down the hillsides from the mosque 
at its apex.  Atop the mosque sat a tall minaret that doubled as a watchtower.  The urban 
landscape of the cities in the M’zab demonstrated the two primary concerns of Ibadi life: 
religion and defense from outside invasion or interference.68  The hostile environment of 
the M’zab accomplished much of the latter for them.  The uninviting climate of the 
Sahara discouraged settlement.  This was the primary reason the Ibadis chose the valley, 
accessible only across large swathes of hostile desert, for it provided them the isolation 
from religious persecution that they sought.69   
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 There was hardly anything else to recommend the M’zab beyond its remote 
location.  The oued, a dry riverbed running through the valley, flooded only every three 
to five years, providing scant water resources for agriculture.  Yet, the Ibadis built seven 
thriving cities in the valley, transforming the few oases along the oued into vast gardens 
dedicated to the cultivation of date palms.  By the time French troops arrived in Laghouat 
in the mid-nineteenth century, the M’zab was well known for its date production, as 
French painter Eugene Fromentin noted in his 1853 voyage to the area, “the Beni-
Mzab…who count their palm trees in the hundreds of thousands and bring us their dates, 
the best in the world.”70  Surrounding the date gardens were vast necropolises where the 
Ibadis buried their dead along the hillsides rising up from the valley floor.71 
 Inside its walls the city was divided into four distinct areas: the commercial 
district surrounding the great souk, or market, and three residential areas where Ibadis, 
Malikis, and Jews lived.  The Malikis were non-Ibadi Muslims descended from the Sunni 
mercenaries the Ibadis had recruited in the early years of settlement in the M’zab.  These 
three groups conducted business with each other in the souk, as well as with the many 
travelers who passed through Ghardaïa, one of the most important trading cities of the 
northern Sahara.  Ghardaïa was a way station along the great trading routes that crossed 
the Sahara, connecting Sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean.  Passing traders and 
travelers could not rest in the city after dark and were forced to remain outside the city 
walls in small tent encampments or, after French annexation, one of the few hotels that 
appeared in the early twentieth century.72 
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 The three dominant religious groups in the M’zab, Ibadis, Malikis, and Jews, 
occupied distinct spheres of influence and existence.  Prior to the French annexation in 
1882, Jews lived alongside the majority Muslim population of the M’zab as dhimmi, or 
“protected people,” a status accorded Jews and Christians throughout the Muslim 
world.73  As a historian of Moroccan Jewry, Emily Benichou Gottreich, points out, 
Christian groups disappeared from the Maghrib by the twelfth century, thus “Jews came 
to constitute the region’s only indigenous religious minority; in the Maghrib, a dhimmi 
was, by definition, a Jew.”74  Similar to Jewish communities throughout the Maghrib, 
Jews in the M’zab depended on Muslim protection and patronage for their survival.  This 
support was predicated on their payment of additional taxes and willingness to adhere to 
the dhimmi system.  Though discrimination against Jews rarely took the form of physical 
attacks in the M’zab, it did elsewhere in North Africa, and the economic, political, and 
social structures of the dhimmi system reinforced Jewish difference and inferior status.75 
 Jews lived in a mellah, a ghetto separated from the rest of Ghardaïa by high stone 
walls, accessible only through two gates that were closed at night.76  They were 
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prohibited from building outside the mellah, cultivating date gardens, or wearing the 
haik, a white cloak worn by Ibadi men.77  The ruling Ibadis allocated one, insufficient, 
well in Ghardaïa to the Jewish community.  In addition to these limitations on property 
ownership and residence, a number of additional customs restricted daily contact between 
Jews and Ibadis.78  Similar restrictions existed for each minority group in Ghardaïa and 
were not exclusive to the Jewish community.  Non-Ibadi Maliki Muslims were similarly 
required to live in a part of the city separate from the Ibadi majority.  As a descendant of 
the community later recalled, “each resident [of Ghardaïa] lived in their particular sector 
and did not mix with the others, which did not prevent the existence of good neighborly 
relations between all.”79   
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Figure 2.1 "Simplified plan of the city of Ghardaïa," Briggs and Guède, No More For Ever, 6.  Dotted 
lines indicate the area of the mellah. 
 
 The Jewish community in the M’zab numbered almost one thousand by 1896.80  
The sheer existence of a relatively large community in this isolated place, for centuries 
after their arrival, attests to the possibility of a vibrant Jewish life amongst the Ibadis.  
After 1882, French officials emphasized the terrible conditions of Jewish life in the 
M’zab, both stressing French responsibility for uplifting the Jewish community and 
simultaneously condemning the Ibadis and the Jews themselves for their poverty and lack 
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of education.  A critical omission from French reports of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century is any mention of Jewish-Muslim cooperation in the M’zab.  Non-
official French and Jewish accounts of the M’zab do, however, make mention of what 
Pessah Shinar describes as “a productive symbiosis” in the M’zab for centuries.81  
 
“The Jews of the Desert” 
 Ibadi men lived for periods of time outside the M’zab conducting trade vital for 
the M’zabi economy.  While abroad, Ibadi and Jewish M’zabis maintained their distance 
socially and in business ventures from non-M’zabis.  Coupled with their acute business 
acumen, these behaviors won them little love from their customers and the M’zabis had a 
reputation, both under the Ottomans and the French, as the greedy “bankers of North 
Africa.”  Throughout the nineteenth century, Sunni Muslims from the Tell attacked Ibadi 
travelers and settlements.  In one such instance, the sack of Medea in 1835, the Maliki 
leader demanded “all Jews and M’zabis be delivered up to him, in order to put them to 
the sword.”82  In 1914, a Muslim guide described the M’zabis as the “Jew[s] of the 
Desert.”83  The boundaries between Jewish and Ibadi M’zabis thus faded in the eyes of 
non-M’zabis who considered them both part of the same problematic minority from the 
Saharan hinterlands. 
 Despite this hostility, Jewish and Ibadi M’zabis grew wealthy from trade.  In 
addition to dates, they traded in gold, bronze, and ostrich plumes from Sub-Saharan 
Africa that arrived in the M’zab via trans-Saharan trade routes, passing through Ghardaïa 
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en route to the port cities of Algiers and Oran.84  Some of the precious metals that passed 
through the M’zab found their way to the workshops of Jewish jewelers renowned for 
their metalworking skills.85  The first Jewish tinsmiths, goldsmiths, and metalworkers 
arrived in Ghardaïa sometime in the late fourteenth century, accompanying an Ibadi 
sheikh from the island of Jerba, present-day Tunisia.86  These Jerban Jews augmented the 
pre-existing Jewish community of Ghardaïa, comprised of Jewish immigrants from the 
Mediterranean coast who had fled south alongside the Ibadis following the Fatimid 
conquest in the eleventh century.87   
 By the arrival of the Ottomans in North Africa in the fifteenth century, Jewish 
M’zabis were important commercial allies of their Ibadi neighbors and, as Julia Clancy-
Smith has demonstrated throughout the Sahara, “Jewish traders often enjoyed ties of 
patronage with Muslim associates and were indispensable for economic and other sorts of 
exchanges.”88  Along with their joint commercial trading ventures, Jews and Ibadis 
interacted in their daily public and, sometimes, private lives.  Though rules governing the 
proper behavior of dhimmi limited Jewish exchange with the Ibadis, they sometime 
worked together and even developed personal relationships across religious and ethnic 
boundaries.   
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A 1905 European travelogue mentions a marriage between an Ibadi man and 
Jewish woman in Ghardaïa.89  This was unusually rare as Jews in Ghardaïa married 
almost exclusively within the faith, and usually within the community.90  More common 
were moments of indirect contact or long-standing cultural associations.  Isolated as they 
were from Jewish communities elsewhere in North Africa, M’zabi Jews interacted most 
frequently with their Ibadi neighors and adopted many of their cultural practices, 
including the food they ate and the languages they spoke.   
 Family structures were much the same in Ibadi and Jewish households in 
Ghardaïa, partly as a result of the economic system, which required men to travel for 
extended periods of time, and also due to the strict Ibadi religious doctrines that 
influenced the Jewish practices of the local community.  While M’zabi men traveled 
extensively, with at least a fourth of all M’zabi men abroad at any one time, M’zabi 
women were banned from leaving the M’zab, a prohibition that the djemaa believed 
would protect and sustain the integrity of the community.91  Jewish women, like Ibadi 
women, were similarly prohibited from leaving the M’zab.92 
In the late nineteenth century, most M’zabi men and women married at the age of 
fourteen or fifteen.93  Both Ibadi and Jewish M’zabis practiced polygamy, which was 
especially troubling to later French colonial officials and, though diminished, persisted 
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into the twentieth century.94  An alternative to taking multiple wives was divorce and 
elevated rates of divorce in the Jewish community surprised French travelers, who 
observed its detrimental effects on Jewish women.  The anthropologist J. Huguet 
observed in 1902 that “there are not any men who had not wed two or three wives, or 
even five or six.  As soon as the wife is old enough and used up by repeated pregnancies, 
the husband looks for a pretext to divorce her.  I knew a 35 year old Jewish man who was 
on his fourth wife.”95  However, Jewish women could also divorce their husbands 
according to Jewish law, which is to say with the acquiescence of their husband to a 
termination of the marriage contract, and demand child support.96  Huguet failed to note 
this possibility in his survey of the community.   
 Like their Ibadi counterparts, Jewish women in the M’zab had a heavily 
circumscribed daily existence.  Nevertheless, they did participate in the local economy by 
weaving intricate fabrics and lace from materials brought to their houses, products that 
men sold in the souk.97  As did women in traditional or orthodox Jewish communities 
around the world, married Jewish women in Ghardaïa covered their hair outside the 
home.  In addition, for much of their history married Jewish women in Ghardaïa publicly 
covered their faces with a white veil specific to the Maghreb, the melah’fa, which 
covered them from head to toe.98  Over time, this conservative dress gave way to more 
open female clothing and by the early twentieth century, European travelers to the region 
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noted that, unlike the Ibadis, Jewish women in the M’zab wore no veils, though they did 
cover their hair.99  European travelers found the Jewish women of Algeria, and Ghardaïa, 
fascinating and they were the subjects of hundreds of postcards in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  The girls from Ghardaïa seen in the image below are both 
representations of the particular dress worn by Jewish women in the M’zab as well as 
revealing of the ways that Europeans saw women from the Sahara, exotic images meant 
to excite or inspire sympathy. 
 
Figure 2.2  “Juives de Ghardaïa,”  c. 1905.  Juives d’Afrique du Nord, Cartes Postales (1885-1930), ed. 
Clémence Boulouque and Nicole S. Serfaty (Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule, France: Bleu autour, 2005). 
 Jews in Ghardaïa followed the basic tenets of orthodox Jewish practice as it was 
performed throughout the Jewish world, but also had several unusual practices that 
suggest an Islamic influence specific to North Africa.  Jews in Ghardaïa maintained their 
adherence to kashrut, with a shochet, or ritual slaughterer, appointed by the 
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community.100  Uniquely, Jewish men spoke Hebrew with each other as well—a language 
rarely spoken colloquially in Jewish communities elsewhere—which they studied in a 
religious school after the age of five.  Jewish religious education, limited to male 
children, culminated in the bar mitzvah ceremony at the age of thirteen.  Jews in 
Ghardaïa marked the passage of time with Jewish yearly festivals, including Rosh 
Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and Passover.  These practices resembled those of orthodox 
Jewish communities elsewhere.  Their religious practice was an integral part of everyday 
life, public and private, and their customs were certainly influenced by the very austere 
Islamic practices of the Ibadis, though they also resembled other variants of Judaism 
elsewhere in North Africa. 
 Jewish practices particular to the Maghrib included an emphasis on mysticism, 
pilgrimage, and Zaddik (saint) veneration, which were similar to corresponding Islamic 
practices in the region.  Many M’zabi Jewish mystical beliefs resembled those of the 
community at Jerba, though as Ghardaïa was even more isolated than Jerba, M’zabi Jews 
developed practices distinct from those of their Tunisian coreligionists.101  Jewish belief 
in mysticism manifested in daily recitation of prayers to repel evil spirits and the 
prominent display of various material symbols to repel the evil eye.  Writing in 1927, 
traveler André Chevrillon observed in Ghardaïa that Jewish homes resembled Ibadi 
homes in that the lintels of both were decorated with “hands of Fatima, crescents, stars, 
suns, painted or carved into the stone,” indicating both communities believed in the evil 
eye and used similar symbols to repel it.102 
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 Pilgrimage and Zaddik (plural Zaddikim) veneration evidenced theological cross-
pollination between Muslims and Jews in North Africa.  While Jewish pilgrimages to 
Jerusalem resembled most closely the Muslim Hajj pilgrimmage to Mecca, Jews in North 
Africa more frequently made pilgrimages to the graves of venerated rabbis in the 
Maghrib.  In Ghardaïa, at least one Jewish man made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and 
returned to the community in the 1920s.103  More frequent were visits to the graves of 
local or regional Zaddikim, usually former rabbis from the community who were 
venerated for performing ‘miracles’ during their lifetime.  These pilgrimmages took place 
annually in a hillula, a gathering of hundreds of Jews to the tomb of a great rabbi, which 
occurred regularly throughout Algeria and Morocco.104  Tlemcen in northern Algeria was 
an important site for pilgrimmage, as it was host to a number of Jewish religious schools.  
More frequently, Jewish men from Ghardaïa made pilgrimage to the nearby gravesites of 
former rabbis from the community, who appear to have come almost exclusively from 
one of the two most prominent families in the M’zab, the Partouche or Sebban.105   
Deviating from Jewish practice elsewhere, M’zabi Jews celebrated lifecycle 
events with unique festivals and traditions, some of which borrowed from the Ibadi 
custom.  These practices were largely confined to celebrations of male lifecycle events 
and began at birth.  While Jewish male infants in the Maghrib and wider Jewish world 
were circumcised on the eighth day after birth, many M’zabi Jewish boys were 
circumcised at three years of age.106  This was perhaps a result of Ibadi influence, as 
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Islamic practice dictates a later date of circumcision.  The community celebrated the 
entrance of young boys, usually between four and five years of age, into their religious 
education with a ceremony called the kittab, from the Arabic for “book.”107  
Anthropologist J. Huguet experienced a kittab ceremony during his study of the M’zabi 
Jews in 1896 and noted that the family and friends of the celebrated child spent the day 
drinking heavily of the date liquor that Jews exclusively produced.108  In the 1950s, Lloyd 
Cabot-Briggs found the kittab ritual alive and well.  Ceremonies lasted for up to thirty 
days and included twenty days of banquets at family homes, followed by a henna 
ceremony for the boys, and a final procession through the synagogue.109  There is little 
evidence that similar ceremonies occurred elsewhere in the Maghrib, even in Jerba, the 
community with the closest cultural ties to the M’zabi Jewish community.  The M’zabi 
Jewish community, while part of the larger North African Jewish world, was a distinct 
community with its own particular traditions.  These unique characteristics were largely 
the product of their long coexistence with the Ibadi community in Ghardaïa. 
 
Dhimmitude to the Jewish personal status 
Conflicts between the Jewish and Muslim communities grew in frequency after 
the arrival of French forces to the south and the crumbling of the dhimmi system that had 
enforced rigid boundaries between the two.  One of the first such historical occurrences 
arose around the issue of building a new synagogue.  From their arrival in the M’zab until 
the late 1880s, the Jews of Ghardaïa had a single modest synagogue, indistinguishable 
from the surrounding houses.  Perhaps emboldened by news of the 1870 Crémieux 
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Decree, some members of the community tried unsuccessfully to build a second house of 
prayer a few years before official French annexation of the M'Zab, in 1872.  Construction 
of a second Jewish house of prayer drew criticism from the Ibadi community and the 
djemaa, the local council of laypeople, found the synagogue objectionable.  Soon after its 
completion, a group of around one hundred Ibadi men came to the mellah and destroyed 
the new house of prayer in a single night.  Jewish communal leaders appealed to the 
French commander at Laghouat, who demanded the djemâa make restitution for the 
damages.110  However, with only loose French influence over the independent M’zab, it 
is unclear how or if this French order for compensation had any effect.   
After this traumatic episode, the Jewish community halted their construction plans 
until French annexation of the M'Zab.  In 1882, members of the Jewish community 
planned for a second time to construct an additional synagogue.  Motivated partly by 
intracommunal friction between the prominent Balouka and Sellam families, patriarch 
Bers ben Itzhaac Balouka petitioned the French command for permission to construct a 
new synagogue.  In his petition, Balouka complained that the existing synagogue was 
plagued by people who “arrive drunk and with mischievous intentions.”111  The Balouka 
family may well have been trying to demonstrate their growing wealth to their rivals, but 
the sharpest rejection of their plans came from the Muslim community.  Construction did 
not begin until 1887, slowed by five years of objections from the Ibadi community. 
Again, as in 1872, the Ibadi community responded disfavorably to the idea of a 
second synaoguge.  However, this time they stopped short of taking physical action 
against the Jews and instead inundated the French Colonel in Ghardaïa with counter-
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petitions challenging the construction of an additional synagogue.  As in the earlier 
period, the French rejected Ibadi objections to the synagogue and gave permission for the 
construction of this second synagogue, which was successfully built.  In the 1920s, a 
member of the Balouka family constructed an additional synagogue following a feud 
within the family.  By that time, construction in the mellah ceased to cause unrest 
between the Muslim and Jewish communities, as the Jewish neighborhood had long been 
open and the dhimmi system dismantled.112 
That construction of a synagogue came swiftly on the heels of French annexation 
suggests that the Jews of Ghardaïa found a new freedom after 1882.  This particular 
episode is instructive for our understanding of how Jews and Ibadi Muslims interacted 
prior to the arrival of the French.  However, taken alone, it suggests a hostile relationship 
between the Jewish and Muslim communities of the M’zab and diminishes the strong 
historic ties and collaboration between the communities.  Jewish and non-Jewish M’zabis 
did interact and these relationships complicate assumptions about the inferior position of 
Jews in the dhimmi system.  Though episodic, there were instances of alliance and 
exchange between the Jews and Ibadis of the M’zab before the arrival of the French to 
the region in the late nineteenth century, particularly in their frequent joint economic 
activities.  Ibadis frequented Jewish businesses, especially some Jewish cafes.  However, 
this is not to say that the status of Jews in Ghardaïa did not benefit in many ways from 
the French presence in the M’Zab, for French annexation heralded the end of the dhimmi 
system.   
In the period immediately following annexation, the French military command 
ordered that the mellah be opened and Jews allowed greater freedom of movement.  Jews 
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were now allowed to wear clothing previously forbidden them and photographs from the 
early twentieth century show Jews in Berber clothing, particularly Jewish men who wore 
the haik or gandoura, a white cloak made from a large rectangle of cloth folded in on 
itself, sometimes covered by a second layer, a burnous.113  Anthropologist J. Huguet 
noted during his passage through the M’zab in 1902, “The Israelites no longer have walls 
separating them from the rest of the population, can now dress like the rest of the 
population, and are allowed to own gardens in the oasis; in 1882, they had already 500 
palm trees, one well in the city and 7 in the oasis.”114  The structural subjection of Jews 
characteristic of the dhimmi system largely disappeared by the twentieth century, 
however, the stigma of Jewishness remained, both from the M’zabi Muslim community 
and from the newly arrived French military command. 
 When France annexed the M’zab to French Algeria it did so as a militarily 
administered térritoire, not as a département governed by the civil state.  Consequently, 
the Jewish community became non-citizen French nationals; the status formerly accorded 
Jews in the now-emancipated Algerian north and all Algerian Muslims.  Without 
citizenship, M’zabi Jews and Muslims could not participate in French elections; instead, 
the M’zabis retained their preexisting local governmental system, including the djemaa, 
the same group of notables who signed the 1853 treaty with General Randon.  The French 
decision not to emancipate the M’zabi Jewish community ignored the fact that M’zabi 
Jews very much wanted to become French citizens, as their 1892 petition to have the 
Crémieux Decree applied to the south attests. 
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Jews in Ghardaïa may have believed French intercession into the M’zab would 
benefit them.  Despite their geographic isolation, some Jews from Ghardaïa witnessed 
firsthand the benefits of French citizenship after 1870 on their frequent journeys 
northward.  The Crémieux Decree extended as far south as Laghouat, where Jews from 
the M’zab often went for commercial and personal reasons.  A French traveler to the 
M’zab in the late 1870s noted,  
These Israelites of the Mzab [sic], temporarily living in Laghouat or 
elsewhere, come back to the confederations, where they are again subject 
to the laws specific to the M’zab, after having been treated in Laghouat 
like French citizens.115 
 
After visiting Jewish citizens in the French départements, no doubt many M’zabi Jews 
felt dissatisfaction with their inferior status upon their return to the M’zab, and were 
perhaps intrigued by the possible benefits of obtaining French citizenship. 
 Without eliminating the preexisting djemaa and other local governing bodies 
specific to each religious group, the French created a new municipal commission with 
representatives from the Ibadi, Maliki, and Jewish communities.  To represent the Jewish 
community at the municipal commission, the Governor of Algeria created the post of 
Chef de nation juive, and named Aaroun ben Khalfalla Partouche the first leader of the 
“tribe of the Israelites of the city of Ghardaïa” in 1887.116  This created a second authority 
in the Jewish community in addition to the religious leadership of the rabbi who was 
loosely under the jurisdiction of the French military command.  The appointment of 
Partouche and creation of the post of Chef de nation juive bore similarities to earlier 
French ways of organizing the Jewish communities of the north after the conquest of 
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Algeria in 1830, which in turn were extensions of the original Republican system of 
classification created in the early nineteenth century. 
 The most dramatic change French annexation brought to Jewish life in the M’zab 
was the initial destruction of the mellah and end to the dhimmi system.  This and the 
establishment of the Chef de nation juive, a largely symbolic role, were accomplished 
within the first decade of the French arrival.  However, when the Jewish community 
petitioned the French command for the application of the Crémieux decree to the south in 
1892, the French took no action.  From the quick response in their initial arrival, at the 
turn of the century the French colonial administrators in the desert maintained the status 
quo.  This meant the continued categorization of Jews in Ghardaïa as French nationals 
and their legal treatment according to the Jewish “personal status.” 
 A critical factor in French hesitation to extend the Crémieux Decree to the south 
was the backlash against Jewish emancipation that swept through Algeria in the 
following decades.  Much antisemitic propaganda in Algeria asserted that Jews voted en 
bloc against the interests of the state.117  A number of riots against Jews in major 
Algerian cities erupted, in Oran in 1884, and in Algiers in 1897 and 1898.  Politicians 
including Max Régis and Edouard Drumont used the Crémieux Decree to mobilize a new 
wave of antisemitism that culminated in the Dreyfus Affair.118  The political antisemitism 
amongst the Algerian settler population persisted into the 1940s and the Vichy regime. 
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Colonization and Reform in the M’zab 
In addition to the continuing opposition to the Crémieux Decree, Jewish 
emancipation never came to the Sahara in these years because the nature of the French 
colonial enterprise in the south differed dramatically from the earlier colonization of the 
Algerian coastal regions after 1830.  On his travels through Ghardaia in the 1920s, the 
writer André Chevrillon observed,  
It’s forty-five years that France has been in the Mzab.  One might think 
that we just arrived…France has only installed tokens of their capture: a 
few écoles indigènes, a post office, a fort.  With two officers, a dozen 
mokhaznis,119 some indigenous soldiers, this fort, that holds the [M’zab], 
is all the military.120   
 
Chevrillon aptly described the French approach to the M’zab, which contrasted 
dramatically with the intensively colonized Algerian coast.  The different tempo and path 
of French colonization in the M’zab suggests that the French colonization of the Sahara 
differed in critical ways from earlier colonial periods.  Unlike the settler colonization of 
the Algerian coast, French annexation of the M’zab did not result in an influx of French 
or European settlers, as many Europeans believed the Sahara to be increasingly hostile 
after the 1881 Flatters massacre.  The different tack taken by the French in the M’zab 
also reflected French suppositions about the uniqueness of the M’zab and its residents.  
With only a small military command center in Ghardaïa, French colonial control did not 
make significant inroads into the M’zab for decades. 
This late nineteenth century approach to colonization differed from earlier, more 
invested colonial efforts in Algeria.  Partly a product of the remoteness of the M’zab, the 
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small investment the French made in the northern Sahara also reflected new ideologies 
about colonization and about colonial subjects.  The universalism espoused by the Third 
Republic did not extend to its new colonial possessions, where a new policy of 
association replaced the old practice of assimilation.  Assimilatory colonial policies 
assumed that colonial subjects, like French peasants in an earlier era, could be made into 
French citizens.  This schema was based on the belief that all individuals were inherently 
equal and consequently able to evolve into civilized Frenchmen, an idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the Republican ideals of liberty, fraternity, and equality.   
The ideology of association was instead predicated on a belief in universal 
difference, that colonized subjects were not receptive to the civilizing process. Patricia 
Lorcin argues that this new policy was deceptive,  
…for, rather than impelling a conformity to an alien culture, it held the 
promise of the tolerance spawned of cultural pluralism.  In fact, because 
its basic premise did not arise out of a notion of equality but, on the 
contrary, out of one of racial inequality, it marginalized the indigenous 
population even more than before.121 
 
The logic underlying this civilizing mission drew on nineteenth century scientific race 
theory and social Darwinism.  The idealistic, patronizing colonial vision of the 
assimilatory civilizing mission yielded to a more pessimistic colonial logic that assumed 
French racial superiority.  In Algeria, the racial hierarchy placed Europeans at the top, 
followed by the now-emancipated Algerian Jews, then Berbers, with Arab Muslims at the 
bottom.  The close association of Jews in the M’zab with Muslims and their adoption of 
various Berber customs influenced the French decision not to emancipate the community 
after 1882.  Reflecting this disdain for the M’zabi Jewish community, the General 
Commander of the nearby region of Médéa wrote in 1886, “The Israélites of the M’zab 
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are in no way French citizens.  They should be considered as foreigners.”122  Negative 
opinions about the M’zabi Jewish community persisted well into the twentieth century.  
Similar objections to the Ibadi community also informed French actions in the M’zab and 
the French Colonel in Ghardaïa and his small command center made little investment into 
the area for many years.   For the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth, life in the M’zab continued much as it had in the period prior to annexation, 
with few French interventions into M’zabi life. 
French civilians often did not share the opinions of the French military command, 
though their exoticized imaginings of the M’zabis were also predicated on the racial and 
ethnic inferiority of the M’zabis vis-à-vis the French.  As it had in the nineteenth century, 
the Sahara intrigued French writers and travelers, though, frustrated by its inaccessibility, 
few made the journey to the M’zab until after the the arrival of the French railway system 
in the 1910s.123  Facilitated by the new accessiblity of the region, a number of French 
writers, journalists, and scholars passed through the M’zab after the First World War.  
This new era of Orientalist fascination with the Sahara yielded academic works including 
Marcel Mercier’s La civilization urbaine au Mzab (Alger, 1922) and an anthropological 
study of M’zabi women by A.-M. Goichon, La vie feminine au Mzab (1927), as well as 
popular travelogues including Gouvion’s Monographie du Mzab (Casablanca, 1926) and 
Chevrillon’s Les Puritains du désert (1927). 
Though these accounts differed in their intended audiences and tone, each 
critically observed the treatment of women in the Muslim community.  This criticism was 
sometimes posed in opposition to the perceived openness of Jewish women and Jewish 
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homes.  André Chevrillon, a professor of English and member of the Académie française, 
wrote of Ghardaïa, “I feel, in this mellah, that I am back in the middle of Europe.  What a 
contrast with the closed faces of the Muslims, with their refusal to socialize with us!”124  
French observers and colonial officials had long asserted that the veiling of Muslim 
women, which frustrated European gazes, was proof of both the exoticness of North 
African women and the incompatibility of Islam with Western civilization.  If they 
observed an improvement in Muslim women’s social status, it was often credited to 
European intervention.  This was the case with Anne-Marie Goichon’s detailed 
anthropological study of M’zabi women.  Goichon found that the situation of women in 
the M’zab was improving in the twentieth century and attributed this to “the period of 
transition opened up by the French occupation, which has imported several character 
traits that undoubtedly will soon better them.”125  Changes in M’zabi women’s lives were 
thus attributed to outside colonial intervention, not internal efforts at reform. 
Though none of these authors discusses it, there were internal reforms taking 
place in the M’zab during this time.  In the Muslim community, M’zabi Ibadi religious 
leaders in regular contact with other Ibadi communities in Jerba and Oman initiated these 
movements, and Ibadi scholars elaborated a new theology influenced by the Islamic 
cultural renaissance of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  These Ibadi 
reformists opposed French occupation and sought to build, in tandem with their peers in 
Tunisia and Oman, a new pan-Ibadi movement to unite Ibadis across the Middle East and 
North Africa.  New religious schools opened in Ghardaïa, and Arabic was emphasized as 
the language of daily life instead of the local Berber dialect or French.  Pan-Ibadism was 
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in many ways similar to the larger movements of Pan-Arabism and early Arab 
nationalism.  Ibadis reinterpreted their religious texts to emphasize their commonalities 
with other Muslims and became invested in the situation of other Muslim communities.  
Ibadis were, for instance, very interested in the outcome of Ottoman battles in World War 
I, when only a century earlier they had rarely interacted with the Ottoman Dey in 
Algiers.126 
During the same period, M’zabi Jews found themselves in greater contact with 
Jewish communities outside the Sahara.  Whereas earlier rabbis had been chosen 
exclusively from the community, after 1900 a number of rabbis arrived in Ghardaïa from 
Morocco, starting with Rabbi Avraham Layani from Figuig who arrived in the late 1890s 
and was succeeded in the early 1900s by Rabbi Yossef Elbaz, born in Demnat, Morocco.  
Shortly thereafter, Rabbi Elbaz left Ghardaïa on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, where he 
remained for the rest of his life; his successor, Rabbi Avraham ben Simon ‘Attia, was 
also born and trained in Morocco.127 
The early twentieth century also saw the establishment of an Alliance Israélite 
Universelle school in Ghardaïa.  Created in 1860, the Alliance Israélite Universelle was 
an association of French Jews dedicated to educating Jews in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and the Balkans according to European standards.  In some ways adopting the 
French civilizing mission, the AIU established schools throughout North Africa where 
young men, and sometimes young women, took vocational classes, courses in French 
language, and came in contact with teachers trained in Paris, all aimed at bringing them 
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into the European sphere of influence.128  In Ghardaïa, the school was small and is rarely 
mentioned in sources from the M’zabi Jewish community; however, its existence in the 
early twentieth century indicates a growing level of interaction between M’zabi Jews and 
Jewish communities elsewhere in North Africa and France.129 
 
Conclusion 
In his doctoral thesis, Marcel Mercier concluded that Jews from Ghardaïa were 
uninterested in French citizenship because they held traditional beliefs and did not want 
to engage in civil marriages or allow women to inherit.130  Mercier ignored or failed to 
properly research his subject; the Jewish community from Ghardaïa had petitioned the 
Governor General of Algeria for citizenship in 1919.131  His description of M’zabi Jews 
echoed eighteenth and nineteenth century conceptualizations of the “eternal Jew,” 
stubbornly clinging to an archaic set of beliefs and uninterested in modernity or change.  
Influential members of the M’zabi Jewish community were interested in obtaining French 
citizenship by the turn of the century, in contrast to the assumptions of French writers and 
academics.  The military command ignored or rejected these petitions and no changes in 
the legal status of M’zabi Jews occurred until the 1930s.  Colonial officials’ rejection of 
Jewish petitions for naturalization reflected their prejudices and assumptions that M’zabi 
Jews were unchanging and resistant to modernity, their fears of antagonizing the local 
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Muslim population, and the general political climate in Algeria opposed to expanding the 
Crémieux Decree.   
Popular representations of M’zabi Jews also influenced the decision not to engage 
with the problematic situation of Jews in Ghardaïa.  Some of these prejudices are 
reminiscent of earlier critiques of Jews in France, then in recirculation in Algeria.  For 
instance, a doctoral dissertation from the 1930s noted that, “In the Territories of the 
South, the preponderant usuror is the Israélites.”132  The author blamed “usury” for 
weakening the Algerian economy and fomenting local conflicts.  The accusation of 
moneylending echoed the early nineteenth century criticisms of Alsatian Jews.  Though 
Jews in Ghardaïa did indeed act as moneylenders well into the twentieth century, they did 
so alongside Ibadi moneylenders, who acted as loan agents for travelers along the trans-
Saharan trade routes and neighboring tribes.133   
Moneylending was, in the M’zabi context, a vital economic activity associated not 
only with the Jewish minority, but, in contrast to European history, with the Muslim 
majority and yet another link between the Ibadi and Jewish communities in the M’zab.  
French failure to grasp the particular context for Jewish activities they deemed 
objectionable colored their refusal to extend to the Jews of Ghardaïa the same rights 
granted Jews in the Algerian north.  French officials had similar misunderstandings of 
M’zabi Jewish culture in the following decades.  Not until the late 1950s did a critical 
consensus of French officials support full citizenship for the M’zabi Jews, influenced by 
culturally sensitive colonial officials with experience living in the M’zab. 
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Members of the M’zabi Jewish community petitioned the French military 
command at Laghouat for naturalization again in 1932 and, for the first time, won the 
attention of the Governor General, who initiated an investigation into the civil status of 
M’zabi Jews.  The investigation suggests that the colonial regime recognized that the 
legal status of the M’zabi Jewish community was problematic, although such 
acknowledgement did not produce the desired results.  In lieu of actual emancipation, the 
commission made only superficial changes to the administration of the community, 
including transferring responsibiilby for recording ceremonies affecting the civil status of 
M’zabi Jews to the chef de la fraction israélite de Ghardaia, formerly the Chef de nation 
juive.134  This individual would then supply this information to the Colonel in Ghardaïa, 
effectively adding a powerless Jewish middleman to the same process of surveillance. 
Significant alterations to the legal status of M’zabi Jews would not arrive until 
after the Second World War, when the French colonial government reinstated the 
Crémieux Decree, abrogated from 1940 to 1943 under the Vichy regime.  The treatment 
of Algerian Jews during the Vichy period manifested many of the prejudices and 
antisemitism that M’zabi Jews had experienced from French officials since the 
annexation of the M’zab in 1882.  The restrictive Vichy policies also, paradoxically, 
expanded the Jewish world for M’zabi Jews who were put in contact with Jews from 
northern Algeria, some for the first time.  As in this period, later changes to Jewish 
practice and daily life would arise from a combination of French policy and colonial 
intervention with internally generated Jewish calls for reform, change, and political 
enfranchisement.  Yet, when Algerian Jews were re-naturalized following the liberation 
of North Africa, France again excluded the Jews of Ghardaïa based on the logic of their 
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cultural difference.  Nevertheless, M’zabi Jews would utilize new avenues of soliciting 





















The Long Arm of Vichy:  
French Antisemitism in the M’zab, 1930-1946 
 
 
Be wary of those in power, for their friendship is often a matter of convenience.  
They appear as friends when it suits them, but they will not stand by you in time of need. 
--Pirkei Avot II:3 
 
On December 9, 1943, a bus left Ghardaïa headed north towards Algiers on the 
long road across the desert carrying sixty Jewish men and women out of the M’zab.  For 
most of the passengers, this was their first trip out of the desert and the beginning of a 
long journey that would take them by boat from Algiers to Marseilles and then on to 
Palestine.135  This was the first organized group migration to Palestine from the M’zab 
and the individuals who chose emigration were mostly young couples seeking a better 
life away from the M’zab.  The first of many such migrations from the South of Algeria, 
this and the following migrations to Israel in the 1940s and 1950s marked a dramatic 
divergence between their history and that of most other Algerian Jews.  Whereas most 
Algerian Jews argued that the antisemitism of the interwar and Vichy years was an 
aberration in French policy in Algeria, many of the Jews of the M’zab, like Jews in 
Morocco and Tunisia, reacted to French and Algerian settler antisemitism by leaving the 
French sphere of influence for Palestine, and later, Israel.136 
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Michael Laskier writes “in Algeria, the Jews were more inclined to let bygone be 
bygones.  Their faith in France, particularly Free France, was not shaken as a result of 
Pétain’s laws or the German threat.”137  While true for many, persistent French 
antisemitism persuaded some M’zabi Jews to seek a new home in mandatory Palestine 
after 1943.  The choice to emigrate in 1943 or 1946 was linked to the M’zabi Jewish 
experience of greater instability and vulnerability throughout the interwar and Vichy 
periods.  Historian Robert O. Paxton writes of mainland France that the “incipient civil 
war of the 1930’s” was linked to “the social transformations of the postwar years.”138  
The same could be argued for Algeria and the M’zab, where the upheavals in the status 
quo during the 1930s foreshadowed the coming political changes of the 1940s and 1950s.  
As in the first encounter with the French in 1882, after the liberation of North 
Africa from the Vichy regime French officials again refused to extend the Crémieux 
Decree to the Jews of Ghardaïa, citing both their cultural difference and fears about 
antagonizing the local Muslim community.  While Jews elsewhere in Algeria, given 
French citizenship in 1870 and then re-emancipated in 1943, could dismiss Vichy as an 
aberration, for the Jews of the M’zab the Vichy period evidenced how easily the French 
could turn against the Jewish population.  How little their status changed following 
Vichy’s fall suggested that it was part of a continuum of French imperial antisemitism, 
not an imposition of foreign ideas but the realization of homegrown colonial policies and 
attitudes. 
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During the Vichy regime Jews throughout Algeria, citizen or no, were equally 
repressed by the antisemitism of colonial officials.  In October 1940, the French declared 
the Crémieux Decree null and void, leveling the status of all Algerian Jews to non-citizen 
French nationals.  In this tragically ironic turn, M’zabi Jews thus found themselves on the 
same legal footing as their coreligionists for the first time in fifty years.  Compared with 
the experiences of most Algerian Jews, the Jews of Ghardaïa were spared the worst 
persecutions of the rabidly antisemitic Vichy officials in Algeria.  No evidence suggests 
any Jews from Ghardaïa were sent to the wretched labor camps of the Southern Sahara, 
where Jewish and other political prisoners were forced to excavate stone and sand for 
Pétain’s beloved Trans-Saharan Railroad project.139  Spared this, the French nevertheless 
subjected Jews from the M’zab to the numerus clausus and extensive surveillance of their 
activities and interactions with Jews from other communities. 
The defeat of the Vichy regime eventually brought about a return to citizenship 
for the Jews of Algeria.  This historical return to citizenship for most marked the second 
great divergence in the history of M’zabi Jewry from that of the larger Algerian Jewish 
community—the first the non-application of the Crémieux Decree to the M’zab in 1882.  
In a bitter repetition of history, the reinstatement of the Crémieux Decree in 1943 yet 
again excluded the Jews of Ghardaïa.  Additionally, the return to citizenship for the larger 
Algerian Jewish community was put up to public debate and repeatedly denounced by 
French officials in the months following the Allied liberation of North Africa.  In these 
debates, Jews throughout Algeria, France, and the rest of the world saw deep-seated 
antisemitism voiced by officials at the highest ranks of French government.  For the Jews 
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of the M’zab—and many Algerian Muslims as well—these arguments were further 
evidence that French antisemitism and racism were alive and well even after the removal 
of the Vichy government in North Africa. 
 International and American Jewish organizations attempted to sway French 
opinion about the reinstatement of the Crémieux Decree in 1943. American Jewish 
Committee (AJC) president Joseph Proskauer personally wrote to Under Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles to intervene with French officials on behalf of the Algerian Jewish 
community.140  Even while Vichy controlled North Africa and curtailed the rights of the 
Algerian Jewish population, international and American relief organizations like the 
American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC), the Jewish Agency for Palestine (JA), 
the World Zionist Organization (WZO), and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) 
turned their efforts to assisting the Jews of North Africa.  The AJDC raised hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to aid Jews affected by Vichy’s anti-Jewish policies and established 
a number of refugee and relief camps in northern Algeria for Algerian, Moroccan, and 
Tunisian Jews seeking to immigrate to Palestine.  After liberation, emissaries from the 
Jewish Agency arrived in Algeria and elsewhere in North Africa to encourage 
emigration. 
These international Jewish relief organizations were part of a growing cast of 
characters, ideologies, and political movements with which the Jews of the Sahara had 
growing contact in the interwar and postwar period.  Diverse and numerous, the political 
movements of the interwar period captured the imaginations of many Algerians and 
reached far inland to the isolated M’zab.  Political ideologies centered on religion gained 
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popularity amongst the Ibadi Muslim community, particularly the religious political 
ideology of Sheikh Ahmed Ben Badis.  Largely benevolent towards the Jewish 
population, Ben Badis and his Ibadi followers nevertheless placed Jews at the margins of 
their visions of empowerment for Algerian Muslims.  Yet, political indifference towards 
the Jewish community in the M’zab did not shift to physical violence from the Muslim 
majority in this period as it did elsewhere in Algeria after 1930.   In Eastern Algeria, 
worsening relations between Jews and Muslims produced increasingly violent 
encounters, and after 1929 anti-Jewish riots in British Mandatory Palestine widened the 
schism in Jewish-Muslim relations throughout North Africa.  For the Jews of the M’zab 
these decades were ones of great change in their interactions with the larger Jewish and 
Gentile worlds. 
During the interwar and Vichy periods, Jewish-Muslim relations shifted in 
Algeria in new and dramatic ways.  The growing war between Zionist and Arab forces in 
Palestine contributed significantly to the worsening conflicts between Jews and Muslims 
in Algeria as throughout North Africa.  However, local French misreading of the relations 
between Jews and Muslims as well as isolated incidents of French colonial officials 
fomenting conflict between the two also incited greater distrust and violence.  In 1943, 
French officials argued that giving citizenship to the M’zabi Jewish community would 
anger Algerian Muslims who were then beginning to demand their own citizenship.  
However, in the M’zab and elsewhere, many Algerian Muslim political leaders, in 
particular Islamist elites, worked actively to maintain positive relations with Jews for 
much of the interwar period.   
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Eventually, the declining power of the old Islamic elites in the face of an Algerian 
political awakening weakened the protective symbiosis of centuries and contributed to an 
outbreak of conflict between Jewish and Muslim communities in the 1930s and 1940s.  
Followed swiftly by the official violence of the French colonial Vichy regime, these 
shifts in public discourse and military action against Jews set the stage for the eventual 
success of Zionism in the M’zab.  Emigration emerged as a viable option to the status 
quo in the M’zab, presenting the Jews of Ghardaïa an option unused by other Algerian 
Jews. 
In addition, in the aftermath of the Statut des Juifs and in the extended debate over 
the reinstatement of the Crémieux Decree, events brought the Jewish M’zabi community 
into greater contact with the outside world and, critically, with Jewish communities 
elsewhere in Algeria and the world.  Some M’zabi Jews interacted with Jewish political 
prisoners from Algiers and other points in northern Algeria, sent by Vichy to the south 
under house arrest to minimize their efforts to undermine the Pétainist government.  
Others met Jews from mainland France and Eastern Europe who came south seeking 
refuge in the Maghreb, but ended up in various labor camps in the Sahara, forced into 
arduous work in mines, breaking rocks, or building the Trans-Saharan Railway.  And 
after 1942, some Algerian Jews met with representatives of the AJDC and the Jewish 
Agency who visited the area to evaluate the need for aid.  While limited, these encounters 
between M’zabi Jews and foreign Jewish individuals and organizations brought the 
community into an unprecedented level of contact with the world and revealed to them 
new opportunities and possibilities outside of the M’zab and French Algeria.   
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Antisemitism, Old and New 
Anti-Jewish and antisemitic rhetoric were long a feature of Algerian politics.  
Largely in reaction to the Crémieux Decree, political antisemitism was a constant of 
Algerian politics, ebbing between elections only to resurface in physical violence or 
polemical attacks a few years later.  Indeed, when the fate of Algerian Jews was first 
brought to the center of political debate in the 1840s, Marshall Thomas-Robert Bugeaud 
suggested, “expelling every single Jew from our African possessions.”141  As various 
pogroms in the following decades, the growth in popularity of antisemitic political 
figures like Édouard Droumont, and the reticence to emancipate the Jews of the M’zab 
indicated, the Crémieux Decree was tremendously unpopular with the French and 
European settler population.  A number of political parties arose in Algeria in the 1880s 
and 1890s around the theme of rescinding the Crémieux Decree and agitating against 
Algerian Jews.   
Assaults on Algerian Jews were particularly widespread at the time of the Dreyfus 
Affair, more so than in the metropole, during what was termed Algeria’s “Anti-Jewish 
crisis” of the late nineteenth century.  Mayor of Algiers Max Régis famously wrote in an 
1898 editorial, “We will water the tree of our liberty with Jewish blood.”142  Many 
antisemitic politicians and political ideologies originated in Algeria and made their way 
back to the metropole and not vice versa, such as the Antisemitic League founded in 
Algiers in 1899.  When, in the 1920s, antisemitism again moved to the center of the 
political debate in Algeria, many of the politicians and public figures that had been 
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involved in the anti-Jewish crisis of the 1890s again emerged on the national stage.  One 
critical factor distinguishing this second anti-Jewish crisis from earlier periods was the 
involvement of a number of Algerian Muslims in violence against Algerian Jews. 
Colonial politicians manipulated antisemitic sentiment to distract Algerian 
Muslims from their own oppression and to win the support of the settler population, who 
feared both Jewish and Muslim empowerment.  Following the First World War, French 
officials introduced a number of reforms to appease Algerian Muslims, of whom many 
had fought for France.143  Reforms following World War I, including the 1919 Jonnart 
Law, allowed the election of Algerian Muslims at the municipal level amongst other 
reforms.  In this period of legislative change, M’zabi Jews filed a petition asking that the 
Crémieux Decree be expanded to include them, but their appeal fell on deaf ears.  The 
settler population was deeply opposed to the 1919 reforms and in an effort to appease 
them the colonial government in 1920 established a new law that brought back parts of 
the old Code de l’indigénat.  This included allowing, among other things, “Muslims” and 
“indigènes” to be arrested without charges.   
Resentment grew in Algeria over the next decade, with Algerian Muslims 
sometimes venting their frustration not at the French, but at their Jewish neighbors, a 
practice condoned and sometimes enabled by the local French authorities.  Perhaps the 
most notorious episode of anti-Jewish violence during this period occurred in August 
1934, over the course of several days of rioting that left twenty-five Jews and three 
Muslims dead in the eastern city of Constantine.  The immediate spark for this violence 
was an exchange of insults between a somewhat inebriated Jewish tailor and several 
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Muslims preparing for prayer, which snowballed into a multi-day outbreak of violence 
against Jewish property and persons.  The riots would probably not have spread so widely 
or lasted for so many days had the French authorities not been slow to intervene.  The 
events of Constantine revealed persistent antisemitic tendencies in the French colonial 
administration.  It also indicates some wished to exacerbate tensions between Jews and 
Muslims in order to consolidate French power.144 
The mayor of Constantine at the time of the attacks, Emile Morinaud, was one of 
a group of antisemitic settler politicians and clerical leaders who grew increasingly 
outspoken against Algerian Jews in the 1930s.  Included in this group was the mayor of 
Sidi-bel-Abbès, Lucien Bellat.  Bellat removed the names of hundreds of Jews from the 
electoral lists prior to the election of 1939, which the French minister of the interior later 
ruled a violation of the law.145  Bellat and Morinaud represent two kinds of antisemitic 
settler politicians of this period.  Bellat was consistently antisemitic.  Morinaud, on the 
other hand, cultivated Jewish support and won Jewish votes in the 1920s, promising the 
community support and greater integration.  His 1930 denunciation of Constantine’s Jews 
was an abrupt about-face from his earlier position.  In the face of the economic crisis of 
1930, Jews were again a convenient scapegoat and were unceremoniously abandoned by 
former political allies.  Morinaud, along with many politicians in Algeria, chose to shift 
his allegiances in order to appeal to Fascist-inclined Algerian voters, such as the veterans 
of the Croix de feu. 
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These right-wing groups gave voice to fears amongst the European population in 
Algeria about the rise in Algerian Muslim political agency.  Many in Algeria believed 
Léon Blum’s left-wing government was attempting to appease Algerian Muslim leaders 
at the expense of the settlers.  In fact, the few attempts at reform to the colonial system 
made by the Blum government were half-hearted and would have improved the standing 
of only a very small number of Algerian Muslims.  The most prominent such attempt was 
the aborted Blum-Viollette proposal of 1936, a bill for the extension of citizenship to 
about 25,000 Algerian évolués, which was completely blocked by colonial 
representatives in Paris and never even reached the floor of the National Assembly.146  
The failure of Blum-Viollette was widely seen as the death knell of assimilatory colonial 
attitudes.  Maurice Viollette, coauthor of the bill and former governor of Algeria, 
anticipated the consequences of this failure to recognize Algerian demands in his 1931 
book L’Algérie vivra-t-elle?: “If France commits the unpardonable offence of not 
understanding them, they will be drawn, as in Indo-China, into angry nationalism.”147   
In these tumultuous decades, the French colonial administration took little notice 
of the petitions filed by the Jewish community of the M’zab for citizenship in 1932.  The 
legal status of the community remained unclear and irregular and census data from this 
period indicate little population growth.  In fact, official French census records estimate 
that the Jewish population in the M’zab declined in this period, from 1,400 in 1921 to 
roughly 1,300 in 1931.148  While in 1945 and 1946 poverty and drought would slow 
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population growth, in the 1920s this decline appears the consequence of the local political 
and social situation, in which the future of the Jewish community was increasingly unsure 
and economic hardship lowered birth rates. 
Local relations between the Muslim majority and Jewish minority in the M’zab 
changed more dramatically in the 1920s than they had since the arrival of the French in 
the 1880s.  The first stirrings of reform and political change in the Muslim community 
reached the M’zab when Ibadis first engaged with the renaissance in Arabic culture and 
Ibādi theology of the early twentieth century.  After 1919, Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben 
Badis’s Islamic Islah (Reform) movement appealed to the deeply religious Ibadis.  Ben 
Badis was an elite cleric from the religious and conservative city of Constantine who 
advocated a return to an ascetic version of Islam and opened his first “revived” Islamic 
school in 1924 as part of a program to foster a revival in Islamic culture and Arabic 
language.149  Ibadi leaders from the M’zab joined with Ben Badis in this period, though 
their efforts at modernization and reform began much earlier as a result of their closer 
relationships with Ibadi communities in the Levant. 
When compared to other interwar Algerian Muslim political leaders, Ben Badis 
was sympathetic to the Jewish community and worked to maintain good relations with 
them.  He co-founded the Union des Croyantes Monothéistes in 1936 alongside Jewish 
and Catholic leaders from Constantine in an effort to repair the fissures between the 
communities following the riots of 1934.  Ibadi leaders from the M’zab who were 
involved with the Islamic reformists were similarly sympathetic towards the Jews of the 
M’zab, particularly as Ibadi religious leaders had a centuries-long history of protecting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Ageron, Modern Algeria, 77; Hugh Roberts, “Radical Islamism and the dilemma of Algerian 
nationalism: The embattled Arians of Algiers,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (April 1988): 556-589. 
	   80 
“their” Jews.150  There was a long history of local Muslim notables protecting the Jewish 
minority from mob violence.  Pessah Shinar suggests that Ben Badis and other sheikhs 
involved in the Islah party were protective of Algerian Jews both before, during, and after 
World War II because of this tradition; if so, Ibadis who had been operating under a 
similar practice for centuries would likely act in a similar manner. 
 Other Algerian political leaders and movements held varying attitudes towards the 
Jews. Assimilationist Ferhat Abbas maintained a moderate, tolerant position throughout 
the 1930s and denounced the Vichy abrogation of the Crémieux Decree in 1940, while 
Communist-influenced Messali Hadj’s Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA) and the later Parti 
du Peuple Algérien (PPA) both argued that Algerian Jews were hostile to the indigenous 
Arab and Berber populations as a consequence of the Crémieux Decree.  During the 
Vichy period, some PPA members supported Pétain at least in part because of his anti-
Jewish policies.151  However, in the 1920s and 1930s, Algerian Muslim political leaders 
were much more invested in reforming their own communities than discussing the Jewish 
situation, in the M’zab or elsewhere. 
 One consequence of the Algerian Muslim political awakening was the weakening 
of old elite structures that dated from at least the Ottoman period.  This included the local 
elite families who, it was sometimes argued by Hadj and Abbas, supported the colonial 
disenfranchisement of poorer Muslims.  Hadj, Abbas, and their peers presented a new 
alternative voice and newly elected Algerian officials like Bendjelloul could speak for 
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Algerian Muslims in lieu of the old clerical families.  This change in the pre-existing 
hierarchy weakened old elites at the local level throughout Algeria, elite families who had 
a tradition of protecting local Jews, or at least intervening in conflicts.  At the very least, 
the possibility of losing an old ally would have produced anxiety in the Jewish 
population.  When coupled with the official oppression of the National Revolution after 
1940, it would herald a complete destabilization of Jewish life in southern Algeria.  
 
The changing status quo and the long arm of Vichy 
From the armistice with Germany in 1940 until well after the Anglo-American 
liberation of North Africa in 1942, Vichy colonial authorities aggressively curtailed the 
rights of Algerian Jews.  Vichy officials in Algeria took the initiative in implementing 
antisemitic policies.  Often policies from Algiers preempted similar ones in the 
metropole, most notoriously the Statut des juifs, which contained an article abrogating the 
1870 Crémieux Decree on October 7, 1940.  The normal flow of legislation regarding 
Algerian’s Jewish population was upended in these years, as Michael Marrus and Robert 
O. Paxton argue, “it was Vichy that felt pressured by Algiers in Jewish matters, rather 
than vice versa.”152  For many on the right, the ascendancy of the Vichy regime presented 
an opportunity to undo the Crémieux Decree. 
Many members of Pétain’s National Revolution government were trained in the 
Empire, often in North Africa.  Minister of the Interior Marcel Peyrouton, a former high 
commissioner of Tunisia and Morocco, was a cosignatory to the Statut des Juifs and 
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deeply sympathetic to the settlers of Algeria, of whom many supported Vichy and the 
opportunity it presented to finally disenfranchise those Algerian Jews benefitting from 
the Crémieux Decree since 1870.  The settlers of Algeria were not alone in their 
celebration of the mass de-emancipation of Algerian Jewry.  Right-wing newspapers in 
France lauded the act, including the collaborationist Le Matin in Paris, which hailed the 
abrogation as an “historic act” that would remedy the “inequality between Jews and 
indigènes.”  The antisemitic Action Française wrote presciently that the abrogation was 
“the preface to a general law establishing a statute for Jews” in France.153  The abrogation 
of the Crémieux Decree in October 1940 had no immediate effect on the Jewish 
communities of the M’zab as they were already without citizenship rights.  Nevertheless, 
the Vichy era marked an unprecedented level of official surveillance in the southern 
territories and a new awareness on the part of French officials of the activities of Jews in 
the M’zab.   
In a strange twist of fate, the Jews of the M’zab were much better off than those in 
the north affected by the Crémieux Decree abrogation.  The Statut des Juifs mandated 
that Algerian Jews would remain governed by the civil code once deprived of their 
citizenship.  This was similar to the status of M’zabi Jews.  However, their exceptional 
personal status gave M’zabi Jews the right to have various personal affairs taken care of 
by their local religious leaders, as was the case for indigènes throughout Algeria.  After 
losing their citizenship, the legal status of Algerian Jews disenfranchised by the October 
7 decree did not revert to the personal status accorded them before 1870.  Algerian Jews 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 “Anti-Jewish Papers Hail Rescinding of Cremieux Law,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency 10 (October 
1940), doi: http://www.jta.org/1940/10/10/archive/anti-jewish-papers-hail-rescinding-of-cremieux-law.  
The assertion that the Crémieux Decree sowed conflict between Muslims and Jews would reemerge in the 
debates over the reinstatement of Jewish citizenship after liberation. 
	   83 
did not switch from citizens to indigènes accorded a measure of personal status 
autonomy.  Rather, those individuals were doubly disenfranchised, as their lack of a 
personal status precluded the possibility of organizing local religious governing bodies.  
The sole exception to the abrogation decree were Jewish veterans of the French army 
who retained their citizenship.  The Vichy government in Algiers authored a second 
decree four days after the Statut des Juifs, on October 11, 1940, which suppressed the 
1865 senatus-consulte and ensured that Algerian Jews had no mechanism by which to 
acquire citizenship, forbidding them to apply for citizenship as Jews had done prior to the 
Crémieux Decree.  Save a small number of veterans, Algerian Jews thus had no path to 
citizenship after October 11, 1940. 
 In addition to abrogating their citizenship rights, the Statut des Juifs banned 
Algerian Jews from a number of occupations including, but not limited to: the civil 
service, advertising, insurance, real estate, trade in grain or livestock, trade in antiquities 
or paintings, lumber, gambling, masonry, locksmiths, teachers, and money changers.154  
The numerus clausus laws of 1941 limited the numbers of Jewish doctors and lawyers; 
this set of quotas also limited the number of Jewish students in universities to 3% of 
students, and in secondary and elementary schools to 14% (this was later reduced further 
to 7% in 1942).155  Jewish bars and drinking establishments were forcibly closed when 
Jewish business owners were particularly targeted as part of the economic “Aryanization” 
of Algeria, in which Jewish property was seized by the state and held by state-appointed 
trustees.156 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Abitbol, Jews of North Africa, 71-72. 
155 Ibid., 67-68. 
156 Ibid., 73. 
	   84 
 Vichy memoranda described Jewish drinking establishments, pubs and cafés, as 
particularly dangerous, subversive places that the local French authorities should closely 
monitor.   In January 1942, the office of the governor circulated directions to all of the 
prefects of the Algerian departments, warning them “…Cafes run by Jews are often 
frequented by indigènes.  It is to be feared, under these circumstances, that they only 
encourage subversive propaganda.”157  In his reply, the Commander of Ouargla, 
Ghardaïa’s neighbor, assured Algiers that “not a single one of the bars is run by a Jew in 
the Territoire des Oasis.”158  This was only partly accurate, as Jews often owned cafés 
with drinking rooms in the rear, where Ibadis and other Muslims might enjoy a libation 
out of public sight.159  The commander’s possible deception in his response to Algiers 
might signal that he maintained a sympathetic outlook towards the Jewish community in 
the M’zab, but more likely evidences a lack of communication between the Jewish 
community and French command in Ghardaïa at this time. 
 Although the abrogation of the Crémieux Decree did not directly affect the legal 
status of the Jews in Ghardaïa, the state increasingly monitored and restricted Jewish 
activities after 1941.  Increased surveillance of Jewish cafes and bars is one example of 
this shift and would be a constant of Jewish life in Ghardaïa until 1962.  Letters from 
Algiers to the military commanders in the military territories in Colomb-Bechar, 
Laghouat, Touggourt, and Ouargla ordered that these policies be carried out consistently 
throughout Algeria.160  The commander in Ouargla responded on July 21, “the few Jews 
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living temporarily in Ouargla belong to the Jewish community of Ghardaïa.  The 
professions they hold: merchants, jewelers, do not appear to be amongst those in the 
professions regulated by the law of 2 June.”161  In October, he sent a list of Jews living in 
Ouargla to the governor, whose names indicate their M’zabi provenance.  These fifteen 
individuals were: “Albert Amsellek, Mouchy Ben Brahim El Baz, Simon ben Mouchy El 
Baz, Nedjouma bent Mouchy El Baz, Gamra bent Isaac El Baz, Sliman ben Saoud 
Sellam, Esther bent Sliman Sellam, Minana bent Sliman Sellam, Simon Balouka, 
Fortunée bent Jacob Zenou wife of El Baz, Brahim ben Mouchy El Baz, Ben Brahim El 
Baz, Aziza El Baz, Isaac ben Sliman Sellam, Semba bent Slimane Sellam.”162  No further 
action was taken against these individuals, but the recording of their names and places of 
residence marked one of the earliest such instances of surveillance of the M’zabi Jewish 
community and mimic similar records of Jewish movement kept throughout Vichy 
Algeria and France. 
 Commander Duprez continued to monitor the activities of these Jewish 
individuals in Ouargla.  On October 8, 1941, he sent a letter to the military commander at 
Ghardaïa concerning what he perceived to be illegal actions on their part, warning that 
M’zabi Jews living in Ouargla were interfering with legal processes in Ghardaïa.  
Specifically, that the son of Daoud Balouka Sebban (of Ghardaïa) who was under house 
arrest in Ouargla had tried to hire a European living in Ouargla to act as his proxy in a 
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conflict over trading rights in the souk (market) back in Ghardaïa.163  Of course, had this 
individual not been restricted to house arrest in Ouargla, he would have been his own 
agent in this dispute.  The number of Jews from Ghardaïa placed under house arrest was 
ostensibly small, as in Ouargla. 
In August 1941, General Weygand ordered a census of all Jews living in French 
Algeria.  Following their registration with the relevant local authorities, all Jews were to 
have the letter “J” stamped into their identification documents.  This counting of the 
Algerian Jewish population took months and included all Algerian Jews as well as Jewish 
prisoners of labor camps and refugees from Europe, and noted their origin accordingly.164  
The Service des Questions Juives found that by the time the census officials conducted 
their work in 1942, the Jewish population of Ghardaïa consisted of 1,636 “French” Jews 
and six “Moroccan” Jews, out of a total Jewish population of 2,932 in the Territoire de 
Ghardaïa, which included the cities of Djelfa and Laghouat.165  The classification of the 
M’zabi Jewish population as “French” is perplexing here, as they were in most official 
documents called “indigenous” Jews (indigènes).  In light of later documents that revert 
to this appellation, we might assume that the “French” designation in the census reflects 
the presence of non-“indigenous” Jews from the Algerian north in the M’zab. 
 Throughout the south, French officials applied the full weight of the Statut des 
Juifs and the numerus clausus to Jews, both indigènes from the M’zab and foreigners.  A 
decree of December 2, 1941, stipulated that all the Jews of the Territoires du Sud would 
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be subject to military tribunals and disciplinary commissions for any infractions.166  
Shortly thereafter, the governor stipulated that “indigenous Jews who are not citizens” 
would be subject to the disciplinary commissions.167  Clearly, this meant the Jews of the 
M’zab.  A later communication from Algiers emphasized that “indigenous Algerian Jews 
from the territoire civil or living in this territory who commit a felony, a misdemeanor or 
an infraction in the territoire militaire,” as well as any Tunisian or Moroccan Jews in the 
same conditions, would answer to the military tribunals and disciplinary commissions 
and be subject to “vigorous sentencing.”168   
M’zabi and other Algerian Jews not only now shared the same legal status, but 
were also often in the same physical spaces when Algerian Jews from the north were sent 
to work camps or placed under house arrest in the Sahara, or, as in Ouargla, when placed 
under house arrest alongside one another.  A letter to Ouargla on September 1, 1941, 
informed the commander there that sixteen Jews would be sent to the south from Algiers 
due to suspicion of “illicit” activities in the city.169  In November, the Secretary General 
informed the Director of the Department of the Oases that “indigenous Algerian Jews” 
had been sent further south, to the work camps at Bedeau and at Telergma.170  The usage 
of the term indigènes here is again confusing, applied this time to formerly emancipated 
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Algerian Jews from the north, not Jews from the M’zab.  No evidence suggests Jews 
from Ghardaïa were interned at Bedeau or in any other camp.171 
Jews from the M’zab knew of the existence of work camps in Algeria and the 
presence of Jewish prisoners there.  In addition to the camps at Bedeau and Telergma, 
there were camps at Berrouaghia, Bidon V (south of Columb-Béchar), Boghar, Bossuet, 
Crampas, Djelfa, Djenien-Bou-Rezk, al-Arisha, Fort-Cafarelli, Géryville, Hadjerat 
M’Guil, Kenadsa, Kersas, Relizane, and Saïda.172  The nearest camp to Ghardaïa, some 
three hundred kilometers north at Djelfa, held roughly six hundred, mostly foreign, Jews. 
At the time of liberation, French sources estimated that 2,185 Jews were interned in 
Algeria, most of them European Jews seeking shelter there.173 
 Some of the most difficult work to which prisoners were sentenced was the Vichy 
project of building a trans-Saharan railroad.  The Pétain government promoted this 
project to the public with posters throughout the cities of Algeria that explicitly linked the 
National Revolution to the earlier colonial project of the Third Republic while also 
serving to illustrate the new efficiency of the Vichy régime vis-à-vis its predecessor.  One 
such placard advertised, 
The trans-Saharan line is the indispensable connection of A.O.F. [Afrique 
Occidentale Française] to the Mediterranean….The governments of the 
Third Republic debated it for more than fifty years without making a 
decision.  One meeting of Marshal Pétain’s cabinet council was enough to 
implement the immediate start of the project.  Settler remember this!174 
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Most of the Jewish internees who worked on the Trans-Saharan were not, in fact, 
Algerian or North African, but Europeans who had fled to the Maghreb following the 
Spanish Civil War and the Nazi advance in Central and Eastern Europe.  On August 4, 
1942, the Governor sent the Prefects of the Algerian departments a list of foreigners who 
had escaped from work groups stationed in North Africa.  They included “Marcak 
Mordka, Polish Jew, 25 years old, height 1m68, blond hair blue eyes, long face, straight 
nose,” and “Henri Stoffmacher, German Jew, 32 years old, height 1m70, auburn hair, 
grey eyes, straight nose,” on a list of nine prisoners.175  
In the south, the local military commanders monitored the presence of any 
foreigners, who were easily discernible amongst the small, relatively homogeneous 
populations there.  Many Jewish and non-Jewish internees passed by or through Ghardaïa 
en route to their final destinations under house arrest or imprisonment in the far south, via 
the main road linking the desert and the coast.  One such Jewish prisoner en route to 
internment at In Salah (Aïn Salah) caught the attention of local, regional, and national 
authorities after passing through Ghardaïa.  In so doing, Elie Douieb brought the full 
attention of the Vichy authorities in Algiers to the Jewish community in the M’zab.  His 
case generated dozens of memoranda and telegrams in the Algiers offices of the governor 
and the military. 
Algiers issued an arrest warrant for Douieb on June 27, 1941.176  By July 8 he was 
in Ouargla, the nearest city to Ghardaïa, two hundred kilometers to the east, halfway 
between Algiers and his final destination at In-Salah.  There he was subjected to a 
detailed medical examination on July 8, 1941.  The presiding Dr. Chollet described 
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Douieb as a man of fifty-five years, “without a particularly traumatic past…suffering 
from vague gastrointestinal trouble that necessitates a particular diet.”  After his 
examination Chollet wrote that Douieb also suffered from night “attacks” of suffocation, 
which the doctor attributed to his “obesity” and the “very real heat” of the desert.  Collet 
concluded his report remarking on his patient’s “tremendous fatness [adéposité] and a 
‘racial’ tendency towards … gout,” but found “nothing special about this particular 
subject.”177  Chollet did not note any reasons Douieb might be reprieved from his forced 
exile in the Sahara.  Thus certified (relatively) healthy, Douieb was then sent onwards to 
the south. 
On October 24, 1941, Governor-general Yves Châtel wrote to the Attorney 
General that “according to information from a reliable source” a Jewish internee at In-
Salah named Elie Douieb had written to his family in Algiers, including his wife, that he 
had married a young Jewish girl from Ghardaïa.  It is unsurprising that Vichy officials 
would monitor the correspondence of political prisoners.  What is remarkable about this 
incident is Châtel’s reaction to the contents of Douieb’s letters.  In his memorandum, 
Châtel outlined the ways in which this plural marriage to a possibly underage girl 
violated the personal status laws pertaining to Algerian Jewry, as mandated by the law of 
October 7, 1940, which, though abrogating the Crémieux Decree, made Algerian Jews 
subject to French civil law.  Châtel mused that if it were not possible to prosecute Douieb 
for polygamy or adultery, since his first wife had yet to make a formal complaint, it might 
be possible to prosecute the rabbis in Ghardaïa who participated in the second marriage 
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ceremony.  Châtel concluded by suggesting the Attorney General charge the Jewish 
authorities involved in this crime and keep him apprised of this affair.178 
 Happily for the Jewish clergy of Ghardaïa, Châtel never carried through on the 
threat.  He ordered a Captain Przezdziecki, the principal administrator of the Commune 
Indigène du Tidikeit-Hoggar, to interrogate Douieb and find out more about the situation.  
Przezdziecki did so and emphatically stated in a letter to the military commander of the 
oases at Ouargla that during questioning, “the Jew Douieb” told him that not only had he 
not married a young girl in Ghardaïa, he had never married after the death of his first wife 
in 1924.  Douieb, according to Przezdziecki’s account of his interrogation, claimed to 
have lived in recent years with another woman out of wedlock in Algiers.  Przezdziecki 
closed his account, “The Jew Douieb formally denied ever having contacted a Jewish 
marriage in Ghardaïa, a city where he has never lived nor visited.”179   
 Soon after Przezdziecki’s interrogation, Douieb managed to escape the camp and 
fled north with another internee named Amsallak.  The latter, Amsallak, was possibly 
related to a family of Ghardaïa by a similar name (Amsallek) and thus gives credence to 
Douieb’s prior contact with the M’zabi community.  Both were apprehended by 
December 15, 1941, and separated from each other.  The French sent Amsallak to Biskra 
and Douieb to Djelfa, whence he would continue to the camp at El Golea.180  The 
following spring the Governor launched an inquiry to investigate any possible collusion 
on the part of the French authorities in the south with Douieb.  They investigated the 
commander at Tidikelt, who signed a declaration avowing he had never had any contact 
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with Douieb.”181  No record has been found indicating whether or not Douieb survived 
his second internment at El Golea, or if he reunited with any of his partners or spouses 
after the war.  However unresolved, this account of French involvement in this dubious 
case of polygamous marriage in a remote part of Algeria demonstrates the obsession of 
some Vichy officials with monitoring Jewish activities.  The involvement of the governor 
of Algeria himself also suggests a certain fascination with the M’zabi Jewish community 
on the part of the French government. 
 In early 1942, the Commander in Ghardaïa sent news to Algiers of a potential 
conflict between local Muslims and the “indigenous Jews of the military territories,” 
resulting from Jewish failure to pay debts claimed by Muslim moneylenders.  The 
Director of the Territories suggested that until the matter could be verified and the 
amount due the Muslim authorities determined, the duly appointed authorities in the 
affected areas should pay the Muslim authorities “in order to avoid any clash between the 
agents of the Muslim authorities and the indigenous Jews.”182  In this instance, 
maintaining stability and order was the first concern of colonial officials. 
 These moments of conflict between Jews and Muslims in the M’zab were rare 
during the Vichy period, as they were throughout Algeria.  In this period, most anti-
Jewish and antisemitic actions stemmed from the antisemitism of the Vichy regime, not 
Algerian Muslims who were often equally repressed by the colonial state.  For their part, 
it seems most Algerian Muslims saw in the abrogation of the Crémieux Decree evidence 
of the disdain the French held towards Algerians generally.  As a letter from 29 
November 1942, written by a group of Muslim leaders indicated, “It was thought that at 
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the abrogation of the Crémieux Decree, the Muslims would rejoice; but the latter can 
easily see the dubious worth of a citizenship that the granting authority can take away 
after seventy years’ enjoyment.”183  For the Jews of Algeria and the M’zab, this period of 
oppression and surveillance revealed the mercurial attitudes of the French towards their 
Jewish subjects in Algeria. 
 
Liberation and the non-emancipation of the M’zabi Jews 
The November 1942 allied landings in North Africa did not bring a quick 
restoration of citizenship to Algeria’s Jews.  This shocked many in Algeria and around 
the world.  Many Vichy-era officials carried over to the new régime, including Maurice 
Peyrouton, who was named the new governor of Algeria by Admiral Darlan and General 
Giraud in Algiers.  Peyrouton, who served as Minister of the Interior under Pétain, would 
serve as governor from November 1942 until the belated reinstatement of the Crémieux 
Decree in October 1943, a long, drawn-out process that involved the lobbying of 
international Jewish relief organizations and the American government.184   
Jewish individuals in Algiers aided the Allied landings in Operation Torch, and 
Jews throughout the colony welcomed the news of Vichy’s overthrow.  In Ghardaïa, the 
monthly report on the city noted, “The Jewish community welcomed the Allied landing 
more or less joyfully.  […]  When they expressed their feelings they gave the impression 
of waiting calmly for the results they expect from the Allied intervention.”185  These 
hopes were foiled, however, when General Giraud announced four months after the 
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Allied landings that all Vichy legislation was null and void except the abrogation of the 
Crémieux Decree.  Peyrouton and Giraud argued that a Muslim uprising would happen if 
the Jews were to be given citizenship.186  Giraud later wrote of his decision, 
I argued then, and I still do now, that North African Jews must not be 
treated differently from Muslims.  They are simply natives practicing a 
religion different from that of their neighbors, that’s all.  …  Of course, if 
these natives, Jews, or Muslims show by their intelligence, their education, 
their diplomas, by the services they have given that they are worthy of 
becoming French citizens, I am ready to grant them this citizenship if they 
give up their personal status.187 
 
Thus Giraud, Peyrouton, and their government returned to the same sentiments about 
Jewish eligibility for citizenship made by the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre in 1790, that 
“the Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals.”  
Giraud also deliberately misled his readers or conveniently forgot that the Algerian Jews 
affected by the abrogation of the Crémieux Decree had not remitted to the personal 
status, to the legal status of M’zabi Jews.  The assumption of Jewish preference for the 
Jewish personal status over French citizenship in this case revealed more about the 
author’s prejudices than the reality in Algeria. 
American and world Jewish organizations were quick to respond to Giraud’s 
announcement, fearful that a permanent abrogation of the Crémieux Decree might set a 
dangerous precedent.  The AJDC and prominent Jewish individuals voiced intense 
concern about this issue to the United States government; however, the Americans were 
hesitant to intervene in French affairs.  An exchange between Baron Edouard de 
Rothschild and Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles resulted in Welles’ telling 
Rothschild that Giraud had assured him he was acting in good faith.  Welles, notoriously 
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antisemitic, insisted, “The decree is abrogated but in the near future a procedure will be 
established whereby native Algerian Jews who desire to become citizens may acquire 
citizenship.”188  Welles and the American government’s assurances did little to assuage 
the fears of Algerian Jewry.   
The legal arguments about reinstating the Crémieux Decree continued for months.  
Despite the uncertainty of their future, daily life improved for Jews in Algeria and the 
M’zab following the removal of the numerus clausus laws in March 1942.  In his April 
1943 report to Algiers, an administrator in Ghardaïa wrote: “The Jews do not hide their 
satisfaction about the measures taken in their favor, especially the reintegration of 
functionaries and the abolition of the ‘numerus clausus.’”189  The administrators filed no 
reports of Muslim outrage at these developments, contradicting French assumptions 
about Muslim reactions to Jewish reintegration, at least in the M’zab.  Conflicts would 
soon arise between Jews and Muslims in Ghardaïa and elsewhere, but not until several 
years later and largely as a result of international and regional tensions resulting from the 
situation in Mandatory Palestine. 
 General Charles de Gaulle and his Comité français de libération nationale 
(CFLN) assumed power in Algeria on June 1, 1943, and shortly thereafter De Gaulle 
appointed General Georges Catroux governor of Algeria.  Catroux embarked on a series 
of reforms of both Jewish and Muslim status including the reinstatement of the Crémieux 
Decree on October 21, 1943.  In late December, De Gaulle announced the passing of the 
Blum-Viollette proposal, almost a decade after its inception, with the added stipulation 
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that Algerian Muslims who gained citizenship in this way could also retain their personal 
Islamic status.  Both Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj, who demanded greater reform for 
more Algerians, rejected this offer.  De Gaulle and Catroux appointed a commission to 
draft possible reforms, composed of Algerians ranging from the religious ulema to the 
PPA, but these disparate Algerian parties had difficulty coming to any agreement.  Before 
they finished deliberating, De Gaulle and Catroux announced the Ordinance of March 7, 
1944, which was more or less identical to the Blum-Violette proposal.  This extended 
citizenship to a larger number of Muslims than the évolués originally included in the first 
Blum-Viollette proposal.  Most critically, this ordinance abolished the Code de 
l’indigénat, creating juridical equality between Muslims and French citizens. 
 In the flurry of new reforms issued by the Free French government, the Jews of 
the M’zab found themselves again excluded from citizenship.  Neither the reinstituted 
Crémieux Decree nor the March 7 ordinance applied to them.  The Director of the 
Territories of the South explained in a memo circulated within the Office of Muslim 
Affairs and of the South that, as his predecessors had argued, the Jews of the M’zab were 
excluded from the 1870 Crémieux Decree because the M’zab was not annexed until 
1882.  In the case of the March 7 ordinance, Director Lehuraux noted that it applied only 
to French Muslims, and though this decree left the Jews of the M’zab markedly worse off 
than their Muslim neighbors, the status quo should be maintained.190 
 Yet the status quo had changed, whether or not the French officials in Algiers or 
Ghardaïa wished to acknowledge it.  The Vichy treatment of Jews from the north and 
south, imprisonment of Jewish political prisoners, and the insecurity of Jewish and 
Muslim relationships indicated to the Jews of Ghardaïa and the M’zab that their situation 
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was tenuous at best.  Soon after liberation, Jews from the M’zab explored the possibilities 
of leaving Algeria.  The first organized migration to Palestine occurred in December 
1943.  Soon more Jews left Ghardaïa; however, the number of Jews leaving the M’zab 
for Palestine remained small.  Conditions in Palestine during this time were difficult and 
immigration to the Levant required circumventing the British blockade on Jewish 
migration to Palestine.  An additional factor that encouraged migration was the number of 
anti-Jewish riots that swept across North Africa between 1943 and 1947. 
 These attacks started in Tripoli in 1943 and spread from Cairo to Marrakech.  
There were anti-Jewish in Tripoli and Cairo in 1945, in Oujda and Marrakech, Morocco, 
in 1946, and across the region in 1947 and 1948.  These conflicts stemmed both from 
local instability following the war and in reaction to the conflict between Zionist and 
Arab forces in Palestine.  The upsetting of old hierarchies of Jewish-Muslim relationships 
contributed to instability throughout the Maghreb.  In Ghardaïa, the military commander 
assured the governor that the “demonstrations in Tripoli between Muslims and Jews” in 
December 1945 had no repercussions in the M’zab and the two communities there 
continued to live at peace.191   
 
Conclusion 
 Steady waves of Jewish emigration from the M’zab continued after 1945, 
expedited by American and international relief organizations.  The AJDC and World 
Zionist Organization established relief stations around Algiers as early as 1940, originally 
to assist European Jews fleeing persecution.  The AJDC assistance program in Algiers 
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expanded and shifted its focus to aiding local Jewish individuals and communities soon 
after the war.192   The goal of these centers was to provide “medical aid, cash relief, 
clothing, shelter, and educational opportunities.”193  This network expanded 
tremendously as hundreds of Moroccan Jews hoping to immigrate to Palestine fled to 
Algiers.  The AJDC spent nearly $300,000 in North Africa in 1943, largely dedicated to 
providing immediate relief for Jewish immigrants and facilitating their travel from 
Algiers to Marseille and eventually to Palestine.194  This network was well organized and 
efficient at moving Jewish immigrants from Algeria to points in Europe, thence onwards 
to Palestine.   
A new French census in 1946 counted 2,699 Jewish individuals in the Territoire 
de Ghardaïa.  Following the census, the French administration offered the Jews of the 
M’zab the option of limited French civil rights, including the possibility of voting in the 
second college.  This would equalize their civil status and legal classification to that of 
other former indigènes and was the first significant change in M’zabi Jewish legal status 
since the annexation of the south in 1882.  Another set of legal reforms brought renewed 
optimism to the community when, in 1947, a new series of laws reclassified the Sahara:  
“the special government of the Territories of the South is abolished.  These Territories are 
regarded as Départements.”195  Civil administration replaced the military laws formerly 
applied to the south and the Sahara was then bound more closely into the economic 
networks of the north.   
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That same year, hopeful leaders of the Jewish community from Ghardaïa 
presented anew a proposal for their emancipation to the French authorities in Algiers.  
This time, the community also appealed to the newly formed Fédération des 
Communautés d’Algérie, affiliated with the World Jewish Congress, for support in their 
petition to the French.196  In this request, as in 1882, 1919, 1932, and only a few years 
earlier in 1943, the French administration denied the Jews of the M’zab.  Colonial 
officials argued that the transition from territoire to département did not automatically 
apply all earlier legislation applying to the Algerian départements, specifically the 
Crémieux Decree.  French recalcitrance in 1947, as at every previous opportunity, 
signaled to many in the M’zab that official antisemitism had not ended with Vichy’s 
demise.  Unlike the many Algerian Jews who dismissed Vichy as a fluke, M’zabi Jews 
experienced and recognized the continuity of antisemitism in French policies from the 
late nineteenth century into the postwar period. 
In the following years, the situation of the Jews in Southern Algeria would come 
to the center of Jewish relief agency conferences and bulletins, alongside Jews from 
Morocco and Tunisia, as a massive international effort to assist those Jewish 
communities in immigration to Israel unfurled in the 1940s and 1950s.  Confronted with 
the presence of successful Zionist emissaries on Algerian soil, French officials in the 
M’zab and Algiers took notice of Jewish departures.  When natural gas and oil fields 
were discovered in the south in the early 1950s, the French increased their attention on 
the M’zab and on repairing their relationships with the Jews of the Sahara. 
For their part, M’zabi Jews began to explore the possibilities of making aliyah 
with new interest.  Despite French attempts at reforming the colonial system in Algeria, 
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the memory of Vichy-era repression remained.  Whatever the reformist agendas in Paris 
or Algiers, the lives of M’zabi Jews and Muslims remained difficult in the postwar era, 
marred by environmental disasters and economic woes.  Unlike their Muslim neighbors, a 
new possibility for a better life presented itself to the Jewish community in Ghardaïa in 
the form of Zionism and immigration to Israel.  French officials who now found the 
Sahara economically useful and hoped to cultivate M’zabis—Jews and Muslims—as 
allies in the development of the south had to compete with Zionist organizations that 
actively worked to facilitate and encourage Jewish emigration.  This M’zabi Jewish 
exodus was part of a massive migration of Jews from throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa to Israel in this period, and spurred by a number of factors outside the 
control of French colonial administrators. 
 
 
















From 1948 to 1951, between 500,000 and 700,000 Jews immigrated to Israel from 
Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.  This massive influx doubled the Jewish 
population of Israel, while during the same time the Palestinian population dropped by a 
comparably large number of individuals who fled or were forcibly expelled by Jewish 
forces.  The state housed new Jewish immigrants in the abandoned or confiscated homes 
of Palestinian Arabs, in newly founded Jewish communities, and in transit camps.  Ben 
Gurion had suggested in his “One Million” plan that the government take different 
approaches to absorbing European and non-European immigrants.197  While European 
Jews could expect to spend only a few months in absorption centers, until a suitable home 
and employment could be found, the so-called “Oriental” Jews of the Middle East and 
North Africa were often confined to absorption or transit camps (ma’abarot) for up to 
two years.198  In these three years, the first for which statistics on immigration from the 
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics are available, 3,811 Jews came to Israel from Algeria.  
During the same period, 28,264 Moroccan and 13,294 Tunisian Jews migrated to Israel 
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from North Africa.199  Amongst the 3,811 Algerian individuals were several hundred 
Jews from the M’zab who left Ghardaïa and the surrounding Jewish communities.   
The deeply religious Jewish community of the M’zab had long believed in a 
religious and historical connection to the biblical Land of Israel.  A number of older Jews 
in earlier generations traveled to Ottoman and British Palestine to live the last years of 
their lives in Eretz Israel.  However, the religiously motivated pull towards the Holy 
Land had not been historically potent enough to draw significant migration from the 
M’zab, nor had the conditions of life in Palestine been sufficiently attractive.  Three 
significant changes shifted this reality for the M’zabi Jewish community following the 
Second World War.  First, the economic conditions of life in the Sahara declined 
following the Second World War.  Second, the process of migration was for the first time 
coordinated by a number of international organizations who actively encouraged Jews to 
leave North Africa, facilitated the emigration from the M’zab, coordinated transport to 
Palestine and Israel, and instituted a process of absorption in Israel.  Lastly, the French 
colonial administration made daily life more difficult for M’zabi Jews while continually 
refusing them full emancipation. 
The first two factors reflect larger regional and international shifts experienced by 
Jewish communities across the Maghreb and Middle East during this period.  The post-
war decade was one of deep economic and political instability.  As conflict between 
Jewish Zionist, Arab, and British forces in Mandatory Palestine increased, so too did 
outbreaks of violence between Jews and Muslims occur throughout North Africa.  In the 
Middle East and Maghreb, the waning of European colonial power coupled with growing 
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local nationalist movements to produce deep instability from Baghdad to Casablanca.  
For Jewish communities across the region, the conflict between Zionists and anti-Zionist 
forces in Palestine exacerbated already tense relations between Jews and Muslims and 
frequently Jews who had little or no connection to the Zionist movement were the target 
of local anti-Zionist groups.  Regardless of their personal views, many Jews in the 
Maghreb were scapegoated and made victims of random acts of violence and organized 
anti-Zionist derision that mistook all Jews for Zionists and thus morphed from anti-
Zionist to anti-Jewish violence.   
 The French pinpointed the moment when Muslim anti-Zionism or anti-Jewish 
attacks spawned by the conflict over Palestine reached Algeria, “at the end of 1945 
[when] several signs appeared in Algeria.”200  The Governor’s office attributed these first 
stirrings to the meeting of the Arab League in late 1945.  On May 10, 1946, an organized 
meeting of anti-Zionists took place in Algiers, the first of its kind in Algeria.  However, 
the French officials monitoring such political activity found that these gatherings 
remained infrequent in Algeria and never sanctioned action against local Jews.  Pressed 
to find a suitable description of the anti-Zionist movement in Algeria, one French official 
described it as, “in the tone of ‘pianissimo.’” In the same note, the author emphasized the 
greater presence of Zionists than anti-Zionists in Algeria, particularly in eastern Algeria.  
The center of Zionist activity in Algeria was Constantine, near the border with Tunisia.  
In 1946, roughly 40,000 Jews lived in Constantine and it was there that the largest 
number of Zionist meetings and organizations existed, perhaps, it was suggested, a result 
of their close proximity to the large Jewish communities of Tunisia, many of whom were 
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openly Zionist.201  Though much smaller in number, Zionist sentiments also took hold 
amongst some in the Jewish community Ghardaïa, who were more likely to emigrate than 
other communities in Algeria. 
 The behavior of Jews from Ghardaïa, particularly their steady emigration, 
resembled Jewish communities in Morocco, Tunisia, or even Libya more closely than 
most other Algerian Jews.  Apart from the M’zab, Zionist activity in Algeria never 
matched that of Morocco or Tunisia, though important members of the local Jewish 
leadership did express support for Zionism and for Jewish migration to Palestine.  Gilbert 
Nahon, president of the Jewish Fighters of Algeria, sent a telegram to the President of the 
Provisional Government of the Republic on August 12, 1946, demanding French support 
for Jewish migration to Palestine.  Nahon wrote that France should instead encourage 
“Jewish departs from French soil or elsewhere to return to their homeland” and argued 
“French interests in the Near East [coincided] with the rebirth of a Jewish state in 
Palestine.”202  Nahon did not devote himself to assisting this “rebirth,” and he and the 
vast majority of Algerian Jews did not demonstrate their Zionism through migration to 
Palestine.  Instead, members of the Algerian Jewish community raised funds for Israel 
and some young Algerian Jewish volunteered to fight in the 1948 war alongside the Israel 
Defense Forces.203 
For their part, French officials asserted that Jewish emigration and openness to 
Zionism would antagonize Muslims in Algeria.  In the decades after the Second World 
War, French colonial officials tried to reassure Algerian Muslims who demanded equality 
with their French colonizers.  On May 7, 1946, France granted citizenship to all 
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Algerians as part of the ideological and juridical shift from the French Empire to the 
French Union.  This act included M’zabi Jews, granting the same citizenship accorded 
Algerian Muslims and all “indigènes.”  However, this did not match the rights accorded 
Jewish citizens emancipated by the Crémieux Decree.  This stunted citizenship failed to 
remedy the gross inequality between European and Algerian, only temporarily assuaging 
some nationalists, but leading ultimately to greater demands for equality and contributing 
to the eventual outbreak of war against French colonization in November 1954.  For 
many in the M’zabi community, emigration presented an increasingly attractive 
alternative to their ambiguous legal status in French Algeria. 
 
Surveillance in the south: Contrary French policies and Jewish frustration 
 A critical justification the French used to explain their non-emancipation of the 
Jewish population in the south was their claim that elevating Jews to a higher legal 
standing would antagonize M’zabi Muslims.  French strategy aimed at appeasing Muslim 
Algerians who, they imagined, would support the French if they did not support the civic 
advancement of M’zabi Jews.  This logic failed because Jews in the M’zab were 
dissatisfied with their continued lack of citizenship and because Muslims in the south 
were similarly preoccupied with their own self-interests.  In 1948, the Jewish community 
of Ghardaïa and the M’zab again petitioned Governor Naegelen for citizenship, which he 
refused citing the potential for Muslim revolt following such a change.204  The French 
attempt to maintain the status quo ultimately frustrated the aspirations of both local 
Muslims and the local Jewish population. 
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Convoluted and often contrary strategies characterized French colonial policies in 
the Algerian Sahara after 1943.  French treatment of the Jewish population in the M’zab 
is a particularly useful way of “seeing into” colonial motivations and failures to 
understand the needs of local Algerians.  French officials failed on multiple occasions to 
appreciate the attraction of Zionism for non-emancipated Algerian Jews.  A government-
issued report of 1945 found that, “the reactions provoked in the Orient by the Zionist 
colonization have had, in Algeria, only a feeble echo.”  These “echoes” resulted, it was 
further argued, from superficial attempts to distract from more local political and 
economic problems.  Yet in the same letter the Governor acknowledged that “the 
amplitude of this conflict on a global scale forbids hope that North Africa might rest 
unscathed.”205  Of course, the conflict in Palestine did have repercussions across North 
Africa, first in Libya and Egypt, then Morocco, and eventually even in the isolated oases 
of the M’zab.  Yet, in the face of local manifestations of the conflict between Zionists and 
anti-Zionists, French officials throughout this period largely denied that Algerian Jews 
participated in Zionist activities. 
 Part of the reason that French officials underestimated the lure of Zionism for 
Algerian Jews was their failure to distinguish between the diverse populations of 
Algerian Jews.  The Jews of the M’zab who were historically denied citizenship never 
developed the same deep ties to French society and culture as the emancipated Jews 
affected by the Crémieux Decree in the north.  Rather, to many Jews in the south the 
option of Palestine as an alternative homeland appealed to them, particularly after the 
creation of Israel and the fulfillment of what was to many of them both a religious and 
political hope for a Jewish state.  The idea of making aliyah, of “going up” to Zion, 
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fulfilled the regular liturgical injunction to return to Zion that Jews repeated in almost 
every major prayer, on waking in the morning and going to sleep at night, before and 
after meals, at every major lifecycle event and holiday.  French officials on many 
occasions failed to understand the draw, spiritual, economic, or familial, that pulled 
individuals and families from the M’zab towards the east.  In leaving Algeria, the Jews of 
the M’zab confounded French officials, who, while expressing concern over this 
population loss, failed to enact policies that would have halted the Jewish exodus from 
the south. 
 French officials did recognize the possible economic consequences of this 
migration and that the M’zabi Jewish emigration could weaken the local and regional 
economy, as well as upset the social and political status quo.  In the M’zab, French 
reports expressed fear about losing an important part of the local economic workforce 
and one that held a near monopoly in the specialized fields of metalwork (blacksmiths, 
coppersmiths, and goldsmiths).206  However, despite these concerns about the loss of 
highly skilled artisans, individual French commanders went out of their way to monitor 
and restrict Jewish trade in gold and other Jewish small businesses during the same time, 
effectively crippling much of the Jewish economic activity in the M’zab.  French concern 
about Jewish emigration did not seem to alter French policies towards the M’zabi Jewish 
community, policies that made life for Jews in the M’zab increasingly difficult. 
 The French also feared the Jewish migration from the M’zab would incite Jewish 
communities in the region to follow suit.  This fear was soon realized, for though the 
M’zabi Jewish migration was the first colonial officials noticed, similar emigrations from 
nearby towns followed within a few years.  Particularly after 1950, French officials noted 
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that Jews from Laghouat and Djelfa were liquidating their assets in Algeria and leaving 
for Algiers, with the ultimate destination of Israel.207  The M’zabi emigration was thus 
interpreted, accurately, as a destabilizing force affecting Jewish communities throughout 
southern Algeria.  Yet, the French enacted a series of economic policies and police 
actions against the Jews of the M’zab at the same time that they lamented their 
emigration.  These resembled in some ways the surveillance that began during the Vichy 
period.  One particular series of incidents is worth greater investigation: the French 
preoccupation with monitoring a long-standing clandestine Jewish trade in gold. 
On January 9, 1946, members of the Police Economique seized four kilograms 
and seven hundred-twenty grams of gold dust, a one hundred twenty-three-gram ingot of 
gold and twelve gold handcrafted pieces collectively weighing 32 grams from three 
Jewish merchants of Ghardaïa: Mekha ben Aaron Sellam, Eliaou ben Aaron Sellam, and 
Samuel Birs. The head of the Economic Police, Robert Uriot, assisted in this operation 
alongside Inspector Boulanger of Ghardaïa, “Agent Dzib,” and a local informer.  This 
motley crew of official and unofficial agents of the French state arranged a meeting with 
Samuel Birs at a local hotel, where they arrested him and the Sellams and confiscated the 
gold.  During their interrogation, the brothers Sellam (Mekha and Eliaou) admitted their 
involvement in this clandestine trade and claimed to have purchased a thousand 
milligrams of the gold dust from “blacks from Sudan.”  During his interrogation, Birs 
acknowledged his involvement, but only as an intermediary, who charged a fee of sixty-
five francs for every gram of gold sold through him.  Uriot hoped for a second arrest that 
same day; however, their ambush was “quickly found out and [their] second trafficker 
soon disappeared.”  The initial ambush still yielded significant rewards, and Uriot 
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informed Algiers “major fortunes had been made solely from the trade in precious 
metals.”208 
 French commanders in the south were concerned about the traffic in gold across 
the southern borders at least as early as December 1945, though they acknowledged that 
monitoring the vast expanses of the Sahara for periodic caravans and sifting through their 
goods for a few grams of illicit gold powder or the stray gold bar would be difficult.  One 
aptly named Lt-Colonel Vigourous, after searching for illegal gold in the Oasis, wrote to 
his superiors that much of the gold originated in Nigeria.209  For his part, the Commander 
at Ghardaïa denied, in a letter to Algiers on November 17, 1945, that there was any illicit 
traffic in gold in the M’zab.  A subsequent letter from Algiers ordered the command in 
Ghardaïa to “urgently take all necessary measures of surveillance” and inform the 
Governor’s office of any facts suggesting a need for further investigation.210 
 After the arrests of the two Sellam brothers and Birs, the commissariat of police 
in Ghardaïa set up a special surveillance unit to monitor all Jewish trade in jewelry and to 
continue monitoring Samuel Birs.211  This surveillance appears to have had little success 
because the agents of the police and the officers themselves were well known and easily 
spotted in the small community of Ghardaïa.   Indeed, a communication from the 
commander of Ghardaïa to the Governor’s office in Algiers noted that Uriot’s prior 
success was due to the simple fact that he “was not known” to the residents of 
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Ghardaïa.212  The French continued their surveillance without making a single additional 
arrest the rest of the year. 
 By the summer of 1947, increasingly frustrated that they were unable to 
apprehend the “dishonest” Jewish craftsmen and traders who were trafficking in gold, an 
emissary of the Finance Ministry drew up a list of jewelers under suspicion: Meklouf 
Partouche, Aaroum Makla Sellam, Daoud Ben Issac Sellam, Simon Khouana, Michel 
Khouana, Gharbi Karallou, and Eliaou Sellam (who, it was noted, had been arrested in 
January 1946).  These craftsmen were warned that they should “regularize” their status 
by filing for permits for their work and trade in gold and paying the appropriate taxes to 
the French state.213  The Commander of the Territory of Ghardaïa (stationed at Laghouat) 
concurred with this opinion, writing in August “the regularization, by the jewelers of the 
M’zab, of their situation with the Services de la Garantié, is in my opinion the only 
measure that will put a stop to the clandestine traffic in gold to Ghardaïa.”214   
The commander in the city of Ghardaïa, the only French author among these 
officials with actual personal knowledge of the Jewish community, reported: 
…The Jewish jewelers of the M’zab seem to only engage in working the 
gold, the trade in the metal being in the hands of important Jewish 
merchants…the gold worked by the jewelers is furnished to them by their 
clients, in the form of old family jewels, gold purchased in Laghouat, 
Constantine, or with merchants who have relationships with the 
Sudan…these artisans work, themselves, with very small quantities of 
metal at a time, which can be easily hidden, searches at their homes have 
little chance of finding anything…it is true that the arrival of inspectors or 
the Principal Inspector of the security service is reported to the South, 
these employees being known by Jewish merchants who use the code 
words ‘Rabbin’ or ‘Grand Rabbin’ to inform their peers of their presence 
by telephone.215 
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The poorly informed French officials who attempted to thwart the Jewish trade in gold in 
the south shut down their campaign in late 1947 and 1948.  In addition to exposing their 
poor knowledge on the activities of the M’zab, these French colonial officers in Algiers 
and elsewhere demonstrated to the M’zabi Jewish community that life in French Algeria 
had changed dramatically from the pre-war disengaged colonial administration.  The new 
French regime in the south sought to upend the status quo in many ways, introducing and 
reinforcing colonial monitoring and policing.  French focus on the trade in gold was 
certainly aimed at gaining some economic benefit to the state through confiscation of the 
actual gold or in imposing and collecting new taxes.  All these efforts frustrated Jewish 
merchants and encouraged Jewish emigration from Ghardaïa. 
 
The “Question Palestinienne” and Muslim-Jewish relations in the M’zab 
Beginning in January 1948, French surveillance of the M’zab increasingly noted 
any effects of the “Question Palestinienne” on the local Jewish and Muslim communities.  
1948, the year of the Israeli War for Independence and the Palestinian Nakba, was also a 
turning point for the M’zabi Jewish community.  French surveillance increased during 
this period, concerned with the repercussions of that conflict in the Maghrib and the 
Sahara.  A number of clashes with the local Muslim community also arose, many were 
local reactions to the events in Palestine as well as the increasing Jewish emigration from 
the M’zab.   
In a letter of January 1948, Commander Then of Ghardaïa noted that while the 
“Question Palestinienne” had no immediate repercussions in the territory, the Muslims 
and Jews of the area had very different reactions to the news of partition in November 
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1947 and the subsequent fighting.  While he observed that the “mass of Muslims” had 
only “lukewarm” reactions to the UN decision on partition in Palestine, he noted that the 
Jews “feverishly follow the news.  They hope that Palestine will return to them one day 
and that they will be able to regroup there and create a nation in a land that will be their 
own.”216  The summary report for that month noted that some Jews were concerned with 
the events in Palestine because “many families have relatives in that region,” but 
nevertheless maintained cordial relations with the Muslims in the M’zab.  This report also 
mentioned that the Jews of Ghardaïa approved of the “conciliatory attitude” of the 
Haganah in offering peace to “the Arabs.”217 
The next report noted that the Jewish community followed the events in Palestine 
without participating actively in the conflict, neither sending funds nor volunteers, in 
contrast to Jewish communities elsewhere in Algeria.  In March, a Jew from Palestine 
(then living in Algiers) visited Ghardaïa and nearby Djelfa to present information about 
the Zionist youth movement.  While a group of fifty Jewish scouts was organized in 
Djelfa following his visit, no such organization emerged in Ghardaïa.218  These French 
accounts of Jewish ambivalence in the M’zab about the events in Palestine soon proved 
inaccurate or shortsighted, as by June 1948, the French commanders in Ghardaïa reported 
that the Jews, who were closely following the events in Palestine, had collected a sum 
“evaluated at several million [francs]” to be sent to the Comité Palestinien in Algiers.  
The same report noted that “incidents” in Oujda, Tripoli, Guerrara, and in Ghardaïa had 
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resulted in an understandable fear amongst the Jews in the territory.219  The “incidents” in 
Oujda and Tripoli in 1948 were a series of anti-Jewish attacks that left dozens dead and 
wounded, and resulted in large-scale Jewish emigration from both cities.  Without 
archival evidence from March, April, or May, of that year the specifics of the “incident” 
in Ghardaïa are unclear, but we might infer from the French grouping of them with the 
larger pogroms elsewhere that they similarly terrified local Jews. 
The issue of Jewish emigration appears from French reports to have divided the 
Ibadi community.  In early 1949, a group of eight Ibadi merchants and landowners 
organized the Comptoir commercial du Sud (CCS), whose mission was to undermine 
Jewish merchants who supported the immigration to Israel.  The actions of this group 
appear—despite their antagonistic agenda—to have been aimed at maintaining the Jewish 
community in Ghardaïa.  Many in the Ibadi community, according to the French, deemed 
the CCS’s activities “shameful.”  These activities included offering 450,000 francs for a 
Jewish store, which was worth “a tenth that much,” and requesting a Jewish jeweler take 
an Ibadi merchant’s son as his apprentice.  The French noted in their official report that 
“this marks a serious step in the evolution of the mozabite [sic] ideology,” ostensibly 
towards a kind of rapprochement with the Jewish families and individuals receptive to the 
idea of emigration.  Despite these attempts at reconciliation and Jewish integration in the 
community, six families left Ghardaïa during this same time.220   
 The actions of the CCS, some largely symbolic, and the efforts of the French 
produced calm, and a relative détente between Jews and Muslims developed by July and 
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August, whatever the earlier ‘incident’ in May.221  The September report observed that 
both the Jews and Muslims in Ghardaïa appeared less and less interested in following the 
events in Palestine, the Muslims even “indifferent” towards the Jews in contrast to the 
strife earlier in that year.222  The assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte by the Zionist 
Stern Gang in Jerusalem in September, which had far-reaching and dramatic reactions 
elsewhere in North Africa (notably in Egypt), did not register in the local report of 
October.  The report from that month described the Jews of Ghardaïa as engaging in 
“almost no political activity.”223 
However little the Jews of the M’zab engaged in organized political actions, many 
demonstrated their support for Zionism or for the idea of a Jewish State with their feet, by 
choosing to leave French Algeria for Israel.  Jewish migration, whether for political or 
economic reasons, alarmed the French command locally and at the national level.  The 
author of the November monthly report revealed, for the first time, that Jews from the 
community had been requesting immigration documents since February 2; this 
information appeared in November’s report because from the fifth to twentieth of 
October Jewish individuals “of each sex, from 14 to 50 years of age” filed twenty six 
requests for immigration documents.  The author noted further “these Jews sell 
everything they own, even their jewels, to try to attain the sum” needed for visas and 
immigration costs.224  Between the November report and mid-December 1948, a dozen 
more Jews left Ghardaïa for Israel via Algiers and Marseille.225 
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 The French at Ghardaïa expressed difficulty understanding the Jewish interest 
either in emigration from French territory or immigration to Israel, as noted in the end-of-
year report for 1948: “the draw towards the ‘Promised Land’ continues to be a mystery 
that torments the spirits of many, even among the most evolved [évolués].”226  Here, the 
French author confused the religious and the political motivations underpinning the 
Zionism of M’zabi Jews.  Again, French officials were often blind to the religiosity of the 
Jewish community in the M’zab.  They were now similarly blind to the modern, political 
activities of individuals who worked to promote political Zionism through involvement 
with Zionist organizations, though this participation sometimes took place openly by 
individuals with close relationships to the local colonial administration.  Brahim Ben 
Makhlouf Partouche, of the M’zabi Partouche family, was the French-appointed Chef de 
la fraction Israëlite of Ghardaïa at this time.  He was a representative of the Haganah 
(the predecessor to the Israeli Defense Forces) in Laghouat in September 1948.227   
Both the members of the Jewish community who remained in the M’zab, like 
Partouche, and those who emigrated demonstrated to the French the attraction of 
Zionism.  Yet, it was the local Muslim community that took steps to encourage the Jews 
of Ghardaïa to remain, though the CCS never enjoyed full support from the Ibadi 
population.  While the French observed the Jewish community dwindling, they did little 
to encourage Jews to remain in the M’zab.  The actions of a few Ibadi individuals to 
integrate M’zabi Jews deeper into the local economy were ultimately no match for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
OASIS 10. 
225 Bulletin de Renseignements, Territoire Militaire de Ghardaïa, 15 November-12 December 1948.  
ANOM OASIS 10. 
226 Bulletin de Renseignements, Territoire Militaire de Ghardaïa, 13 December-20 January 1949.  ANOM 
OASIS 10. 
227 “Délégués de la Haganah à Laghouat,” 8 September 1948.  ANOM OASIS 101. 
	   116 
attraction of Israel and the efforts of the large international network of relief agencies that 
began actively funding and facilitating the M’zabi emigration after 1948. 
 
Migration: an international effort 
The end of year report of December 1948-January 1949 noted that the “exodus” 
of thirty families from Ghardaïa since October had taken place under the auspices of the 
Consistory, within the quota of allocated places for the community of Ghardaïa by the 
Palestinian Office in Algiers.228  As this suggests, by this time the French acquiesced to 
the inevitability of Jewish migration to Israel from Southern Algeria (and to a greater 
number, of Moroccan Jews via Algeria) and agreed to allow certain international 
organizations to facilitate the emigration according to assigned quotas.  By the time 
France granted Israel de facto recognition on January 24, 1949, international Zionist 
organizations including the Jewish Agency worked with the French to further normalize 
this process of “semi legal aliyah.”229   
 The Palestinian Office in Algiers—and other organizations in Algiers, including 
the Consistory and the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) regional office—
promoted the Jewish emigration from Ghardaïa.  In February, the monthly colonial report 
noted that following the armistice between Egypt and Israel “a certain détente” developed 
between the Jewish and Muslim communities in Ghardaïa, a development they hoped 
would stem Jewish emigration.  However, “propaganda in support of the exodus towards 
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Palestine” reappeared soon after, which the French report suggested came from outside 
the community.230  Though French officials tacitly allowed some Jewish emigration in 
conjunction with the Jewish Agency and local Jewish organizations, official 
correspondence from Southern Algeria indicates they were none too happy about the 
population loss. 
 Within the community of international organizations facilitating the immigration 
to Palestine, there were often disagreements as to the best way to go about recruiting and 
transporting Jews from the M’zab.  At a confidential meeting at their Paris office on 
October 29, 1948, Hélène Cazès-Benatar of the AJDC noted that “Mossad agents [were] 
trying to facilitate illegal emigration.”  Benatar, a Jewish lawyer from Paris working for 
an American relief organization in North Africa, disagreed with the tactics of the 
Misgeret, a network of agents working to encourage emigration throughout North Africa 
and supported by the Jewish Agency.  For Benatar and the AJDC, maintaining relative 
peace for the remaining Jewish communities in the Maghreb was as important as 
persuading them to move to the newly established State of Israel.  She went so far as to 
claim that any place where Zionist emissaries appeared in North Africa there would be a 
pogrom.231  The Jewish Agency’s foremost concern, on the other hand, was recruiting 
Jews to come to Israel to help build the state, regardless of the consequences in the 
countries from where they arrived. 
Despite their squabbles and disagreements, after 1946 international organizations 
steadily provided extensive support to the Jews of the M’zab who immigrated to 
Palestine.  Foremost among these efforts was that of the AJDC, which shifted a large 
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amount of its financial aid to assisting the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria after 
the Holocaust in Europe.  In 1947, the AJDC’s Paris office established a North African 
department.  Two years later, in early 1949, they opened three “transient centers” around 
Algiers,  “to shelter and care for Jews who trek from Morocco to Algiers, from which 
point they hope to proceed to Marseille and finally to Israel.”  At these camps, “some 
3,000 men, women and children at a time receive food, clothing and physical 
examinations designed to screen out the sick from the well.”232  Among these three 
thousand individuals were several hundred from “Tunis and Southern Algeria.”233 
While the AJDC paid for the transit camps in Algiers, the Jewish Agency 
coordinated and supported the travel from French territory to Israel.234  Most of the 
immigrants’ time was spent preparing for emigration from Algeria and in transit 
facilities, where they were subject to medical exams.235  Members of the AJDC 
leadership worried openly about the medical condition of Jewish immigrants from 
southern Algeria.  William Schmidt, director of AJDC overseas health activities, wrote to 
the American Embassy in Tel Aviv that the high prevalence of “trachoma, favus, syphilis, 
blindness, and the number of the aged and infirm” prevented many Jews seeking 
emigration to leave AJDC camps in Algiers, resulting in a backlog of around 3000 people 
in spring 1949.  Schmidt noted that southern Algeria was in need of a mobile unit to deal 
with medical screenings, in particular tests for tuberculosis.236 One official suggested as 
early as July 1947 that South Algeria would need its own medical unit.237 
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 In 1948 and 1949, the AJDC organized a large-scale fundraising effort to meet 
these specific demands and provide assistance to the Jews of Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia.  Officials estimated the agency would need roughly seventy-five million dollars 
in 1949 to address the needs of “75 percent of the 256,000 Jews in Morocco, 40 percent 
of the 140,000 Jews in Algeria, 60 percent of the 105,000 Jews in Tunisia and 80 percent 
of the 130,000 Jews in Iran.”238  As part of their fundraising strategy, they sent a French 
photographer, Lillian Tonnaire (later Lillian Tonnaire-Taylor) to document the situation 
of the Jewish community in Ghardaïa for fundraising purposes.  What Tonnaire presented 
to the AJDC and its supporters in photos published by the organization and used 
throughout the United States was an impoverished community living in pre-modern 
conditions.239 
 
Figure 4.1.  "A group of Jewish children stand in one of the crooked, narrow streets in Ghardaia, 
where 1500 Jews exist in primitive, unhealthy conditions.  c. 1949”
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Figure 4.2.  "A typical Jewish family squat outside their windowless hovel in the mellah.  Ghardaia, 
Algeria.  c. 1949" 
 
Figure 4.3.  "Young Jewish girl learns to sew in the Algerian town of Ghardaia, where 1500 Jews live 
in primitive conditions.  Ghardaia, Algeria.” 
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Figure 4.4. "An elderly Jewish woman spins yarn in the mellah.  Ghardaia, Algeria. c.1949" 
 
Figure 4.5.  “A Jewish family sits down to a meal in their one room, windowless hovel in the mellah of 
Ghardaïa, Algeria, c.1949” 
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Figure 4.6. “Working as a watch maker, this Jewish man ekes out a living in the mellah.  Ghardaïa, 
Algeria. c.1949” 
 
Figure 4.7.  “Learning to make mirrors, these young Jewish boys work with a Jewish teacher in the 
mellah.  Ghardaïa, Algeria. c.1949” 
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These images present a particular image of the M’zabi Jewish community aimed 
at eliciting sympathy from a Western audience.  The depiction of the M’zabi Jews as 
“primitive” resembles the French colonial reading of this community as “backwards” and 
incapable of assimilation.  However, several individuals, male and female, are presented 
engaged in work, even happily so.  The subjects are portrayed as either industrious, 
members of families, or pitiful children, all images that might elicit sympathy.  The 
descriptions are accurate insofar as life was very difficult in the M’zab; however, these 
photos lack context, as the similarly difficult lives of Ibadis living in the same area are 
never depicted alongside the Jewish community.  The description of M’zabi Jewish life 
offered by Tonnaire is sometimes anachronistic; for instance, “A typical Jewish family 
squat outside their windowless hovel in the mellah,” despite the fact that French forces 
had opened the mellah in the late-nineteenth century.  In imposing a sometimes-
inaccurate Western perspective onto the Jewish community in Ghardaïa, Tonnaire lost 
sight of some surprising features of these images, including the juxtaposition of one 
apprentice wearing a fez next to another in a beret in figure 4.7.   
Of course, Tonnaire’s objective was instrumental: to win sympathy and elicit 
donations from the Western Jewish communities of the United States and Europe.  The 
particular tropes she employed, of the “primitive” non-European Jew oppressed by a 
violent Muslim majority, were commonly used to describe Jews throughout the region in 
this period, both to raise funds for their assistance and to bolster the Zionist mission to 
establish a safe haven for the beleaguered Jewish communities of the region after 1948.240  
Though exaggerations of the reality in the M’zab, these images are useful to interrogate 
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how foreign Jews saw the M’zabi community at a time when the actions and support of 
international organizations like the AJDC determined the future of these individuals and 
families. 
In additional to various international Jewish organizations, many in the Jewish 
establishment and leadership in Algeria and France supported emigration.  In March 
1949, the regional report to the governor noted that the Grand Rabbi of Algeria, Rabbi 
Eisenbeth, visited Djelfa and Laghouat to raise funds towards the creation of an Institute 
of Hebraic Studies in Algiers.  During this same trip, Eisenbeth encouraged Jewish 
families and individuals in their departures for Palestine, and seventeen Jews departed 
Laghouat during his passage through the city (through pre-arranged transport).  In 
addition to the encouragement of Eisenbeth and other leaders, Jews in Southern Algeria 
also heard about the possibilities for economic and social advancement in Israel from 
already emigrated relatives and friends who sent letters home.  French commanders in 
Ghardaïa intercepted and monitored correspondence to and from the Jewish community.  
In March 1949 they reported letters describing, in the words of the French commander, “a 
grand life full of charm in the ‘recovered Promised land.’”241  The actual efficacy of these 
individual motivating factors is difficult to know, but collectively they certainly 
contributed to the continued emigration of Jews from the M’zab; between March 19 and 
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A shift in French policy 
Certainly, not all the news from Israel was positive, and many Jewish leaders in 
Algeria and abroad cautioned against the rapid emigration.  Some in the chain of 
immigration assistance found their resources insufficient to meet the growing needs of 
the Jewish exodus from North Africa.  In Marseilles, the intermediate point between 
Algiers and Israel, the consistory of Marseilles received Jewish immigrants and provided 
them food and lodging.  In a letter of 26 November 1948, the president of the consistory, 
Pédia Cassin, wrote to the president of the Algiers consistory complaining of the 
condition in which the Jews from North Africa arrived: 
…The condition of our coreligionists arriving from North Africa in 
Marseilles in transit to Palestine is deplorable and highly humiliating.  / 
You know this concerns those who arrive here, clandestinely, without the 
necessary visas from the Palestinian office.  / Here, this office cannot take 
care of them nor lodge them, the housing found at the last minute is for 
those who have taken the regular channels.  / We have thus an influx of 
families who, having sold their homes and their belongings before leaving 
North Africa appear here in near total impecuniosity which transforms 
them after four or five days at a hotel into “mendicants.”   Their situation 
is tragic and hopeless.  They can neither leave for Palestine, since they do 
not meet the required conditions and there is not place on the ships for 
them.  They are without the means or the boats to return to North Africa.  / 
It is most important that you broadcast wherever it is possible, that all 
those who wish to leave North Africa other than by the regular methods 
and waiting their turn are condemned to the greatest misery in a city like 
ours where there is no housing, nor sufficient aid to feed them and no way 
to send them on towards the “Promised Land.”  / It is your duty to stop by 
any means this irregular exodus that engenders great misery.243 
 
From Marseille Jewish immigrants departed by boat for Bologna, Italy, whence they 
boarded ships towards Israel.244  While Cassin did not argue outright against migration to 
Israel, his note offered a more sober view of the migratory process.  His plea to Algiers 
offers a glimpse of a middle position between the enthusiasm for emigration of the AJDC 
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and Jewish Agency and the outright opposition of some in the French Jewish 
establishment. 
 Of the influential French Jewish institutions that worked alongside French state 
officials to encourage the community to stay in Ghardaïa and stem the flow of 
emigration, the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) invested a significant amount of time 
and money into improving the situation of Jews in North Africa following World War II.  
In contrast to the AJDC and the Jewish Agency, the AIU believed the situation of the 
Jews in North Africa could be best served by advocating for greater inclusion in the 
French empire, and in Southern Algeria, for full emancipation of the M’zabi Jewish 
community.  The AIU advocated for all Algerian Jews to remain part of the larger body 
of French Jewry; as Algeria was part of France, so was Algerian Jewry part of the French 
people.  The AIU’s advocacy of Jewish emancipation in the M’zab was the natural 
continuation of their decades-long struggle to bring “emancipation and moral 
advancement” to all Jews living in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.245 
 The secretary of the AIU, André Chouraqui, visited Ghardaïa on May 13, 1949, 
meeting the leaders of the community and holding a discussion at the synagogue during 
which he “promised his coreligionists that he would do his best to win their mass 
naturalization, by decree.”246  The French regional report from the period following 
Chouraqui’s visit noted that the Jews of Ghardaïa appeared less interested in the events in 
Palestine following his visit and claimed that none had requested migration documents or 
left the city since.  Furthermore, the report asserted, previously encouraging letters from 
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M’zabi Jews in Israel were now “generally somber,” contributing to the hesitation about 
migration.247  However, the following report from July contradicted this claim about a 
decrease in emigration.  Two hundred individuals from Ghardaïa left between June and 
July 1949.  This, despite Chouraqui’s visit and the subsequent visit of two emissaries 
from Algiers who arrived on June 28 and 29 in Ghardaïa in order to solicit funds for the 
AIU.248  An additional fourteen Jews (“three men, four young women, and seven 
children”) left Ghardaïa for Palestine in August and September 1949.249   
The policies of the AIU at this time were extremely close to those of the French 
state.  The president of the AIU (1943-1976), René Cassin, was also the Vice President of 
the Council of State from 1944 until 1960.  Cassin put emancipating the M’zabi Jews on 
his list of legislative demands in the early 1950s, largely in order to stem the growing 
Jewish emigration.  The Governor of Algeria wrote Cassin that it would first have to be 
deduced if the Jews themselves wished for the civil status, which would entail losing 
their Jewish personal status.250  The commander in Ghardaïa responded that this should 
not be pursued, because “many of the Jews of the M’zab wish to maintain their personal 
Jewish status in issues that concern marriage and divorce…[also] in matters of 
inheritance, many believe that only boys should inherit and not girls.”  Additionally, he 
wrote that “the Mozabites [sic] would not understand an ethnic group they believe 
inferior, with a standard of life analogous to their own” acquiring the civil status before 
them.251 
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 In a marked departure from earlier reasoning, the lieutenant-commander in 
Laghouat disagreed with the suggestions from Ghardaïa and declared that “despite the 
undesirable moral effects that it risks causing amongst the Muslim elements of the 
population,” he favored extending the civil status to the Jews of the M’zab.252  Following 
these reports, the Governor demanded an additional assessment of the situation because 
André Chouraqui and other members of the AIU had assured him that the Jews of the 
M’zab did indeed wish to become French citizens.253 A petition of the community in 
March found that a seventy-five percent majority supported naturalization.254  This was 
the first incident in which official policy found Jewish emancipation more important than 
maintaining the status for fear of upsetting the Muslim majority in Ghardaïa. 
 This sea change in policy attitudes arrived at the same time that local Muslims 
were trying to control the political actions of the local Jewish population as voting rights 
for Algerian subjects expanded.  While they had not yet achieved full emancipation, the 
Jews of the M’zab received limited citizenship after the war alongside Algerian Muslims.  
An ordinance of March 7, 1944, naturalized 60,000 Muslim (men) and gave them voting 
rights in the first electoral college of Algeria; at the same time all male Muslims and 
M’zabi Jews, aged twenty-one or older, were given voting rights in the second college.255  
These efforts were part of a major ideological shift in French imperial thought after the 
Second World War, from the outright racism and inequality of the pre-war empire to a 
more palatable “Overseas France,” the French Union.256   
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A later law, of September 20, 1947, “regularized” the status of the Territoires du 
Sud, making them a département in their own right, while also extending limited French 
citizenship to Algerian Muslims and Jews in the south.  However, despite all these 
reforms, the maintenance of the inferior second college voting system meant that 
Algerian Muslims and M’zabi Jews experienced a limited citizenship and curtailed voting 
rights.  The second college could vote for between two-fifths to one-half of candidates, 
depending on whether an election was national or local.  However, as Todd Shepard 
points out, after 1948 Governor Naeglen manipulated elections by excluding all Algerian 
nationalist candidates.257 
Consequently, many Algerians boycotted elections, and many in the M’zabi 
Jewish community abstained from the 1948 elections, refusing to recognize their 
relegation to the second college in the Algerian Assembly.258  In the same year, 
representatives of the Parti du Peuple Algérien, the successor party to Messali Hadj’s 
Étoile Nord-African, arrived in Ghardaïa, which the local French commander observed 
increased the tension between the Jewish and Muslim communities.259  However, in 
Ghardaïa, unlike much of Algeria, the M’zabi Islamic reform party, not one of the larger 
nationalist parties, was the party of choice for the Ibadi majority.  In a 1951 election 
placard the M’zabi Islamic reform party urged the Jews of Ghardaïa not to vote while 
recognizing their emancipatory ambitions: “The Israelites of the M’zab wish to have 
French citizenship [Statut Français] and belong to the first college; the best way for them 
to reiterate this wish is not to vote in the second!”  One motive behind this move was fear 
over the likelihood of Jewish votes for the rival (French) conservative party.  This Ibadi 
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attempt to build on Jewish disillusionment with past French slights points to fissures 
opening between the Jewish and Ibadi communities in the M’zab.260  On the actual day of 
the elections, members of the wealthy commercial elite, including the Balouka family, 
locked themselves inside their houses to avoid conflict with either the Ibadi or another 
group out to coerce Jewish votes.261  
In addition to avoiding actual violence, boycotting elections was a repeated tactic 
of the Jewish community when faced with French intransigence about their emancipation.  
In February 1951, returning to earlier French policies, Governor Naegelen rejected 
Jewish emancipation in the M’zab on the grounds that such an action would be 
“inopportune” and would antagonize the Ibadis who “considered [the Jews] to be less 
politically advanced.”  And, despite the earlier community survey that found precisely the 
opposite results, the French submitted that the Jews “wish to maintain their Mosaic 
status.”262  Yet, in a report filed two months later, the commander in Ghardaïa 
acknowledged the Jewish wish for emancipation, despite the “hostile protests on the part 
of the Muslims of the region.”263  According to the French report, following this 
frustrated attempt at achieving emancipation, the Chef de la fraction israelite (at that time 
a member of the Balouka family) urged the community to both boycott the election and 
to leave for Israel.264   
Thus, despite muted overtures inspired by the efforts of French Jews from the 
AIU and others, the French government made no genuine attempts to emancipate the 
Jewish minority in the M’zab.  Ultimately, they maintained their belief that Jewish 
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emancipation would antagonize the Muslim population, despite evidence to the contrary 
and the growing divide between the two communities regardless of Jewish legal status.  
The situation of the Jewish minority in the M’zab remained insufficiently compelling to 
alter French policies or tilt them towards radically upsetting the status quo in the M’zab.  
Jewish emigration continued and the appeal of exodus spread increasingly into the elites 
of the Jewish community.  In 1950, Sebban Balouka undertook a trip to Israel to 
“investigate the quality of life and commercial possibilities there.”265  A year later, one of 
the rabbis, Rabbi Yagoub, led a group from the community out of the M’zab towards 
Israel.266  The French continued to monitor the correspondence of the Jewish community, 
noting that the remaining rabbi, Amrane, as well as Sebban Balouka (who was then the 
French-appointed leader of the community) received a growing number of “brochures of 
propaganda written in Hebrew from Palestine.”267  As a drought decreased wheat 
production and increased prices in 1951, many Jews of Ghardaïa sought their future in 
Israel. 
 As is often true, the Jewish migration from Algeria to Israel was only sometimes 
linear.  Immigration worked in both directions, particularly after the first rush of 
migration to Israel in 1948 and 1949.  At least by 1952, news of the difficult and 
expensive life in Israel reached the M’zab via letters from family and friends there who 
expressed their desire to return to Algeria.268  The process of migration was difficult, with 
long journeys overland to Algiers followed by boat or plane rides, first to a European port 
and then on to one of the Israeli port cities, Tel Aviv or Haifa, where new immigrants met 
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with long, tedious, and sometimes invasive absorption processes.  While international 
agencies expedited the migration to Israel, they often did so making false promises or 
exaggerating the possibilities available to newly arrived Jews from the Maghreb, whose 
options were decidedly less open than immigrants from Europe.269    
A 1953 memorandum from the French Consulate in Israel noted “the immigration 
in Israel of the North Africans was organized by the Jewish Agency without considering 
the adaptability of those involved, lured by brilliant and vague promises, to the particular 
conditions of the country where they would arrive.  The result of this experience, 
conducted with ease, is that a considerable number of unhappy wretches find themselves 
in Israel, particularly in my district.”270  The Consulate in Jerusalem received hundreds of 
petitions for repatriation to France in 1953 alone, totaling 298, twenty-four from 
Algerians and the remainder from Moroccans and Tunisians from the French 
protectorates. The Consul General, attempting to ameliorate the situation while waiting 
for information about possible repatriation, appealed with little avail “to the directors of 
the Jewish Agency who showed perfect indifference towards their coreligionists.”271 
One can glimpse the disdain or indifference of many in the European Jewish elite 
towards the “Moroccans” (as all North African Jews were sometimes called regardless of 
origin), even before the emigration from Algeria.  A French regional report noted that the 
French rabbi, Birchess Zerbib, arriving in Ghardaïa after a trip to Palestine, quipped to a 
French officer about the M’zabi Jews in Palestine, “We do not want any more of these 
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dirty people who are no more than the pests [punaises] of the synagogue in Palestine.”272  
Even without such active discouragement of migration, the fear of the unknown was 
often significant enough to dissuade many from leaving. 
 Though hundreds left before 1954, most Jews of Ghardaïa remained in their 
homes and continued to make their lives in the M’zab.  Some even expanded their 
businesses, including David Cohana, who petitioned the French administration in 
Ghardaïa for permits to open a bar in February 1951.273  Others felt increasing animosity 
from their Muslim neighbors, concerns they expressed to the French authorities.  A 1951 
report noted the “concerns of some young Jews, who complain of the attitude of Muslims 
towards them.”274  Although they failed in their efforts to win emancipation and suffered 
from increasing enmity from their Muslim neighbors and growing economic restrictions 
from the French, the situation of the Jews in the M’zab, however worse than that of other 
Algerian Jews, remained somewhat better than other non-emancipated Jews elsewhere in 
North Africa.  The community found itself caught between two powerful choices: 
remaining in French Algeria, continuing to seek emancipation at some unknown future 
date, or emigration and the possibility of a better future. 
 
Conclusion: aliyah or assimilation 
 Zionist advocates continued to work diligently to recruit M’zabi Jews for aliyah.  
In the face of the reverse migration back to Algeria from Israel, the Jewish Agency 
“announced that it would offer repatriation free of charge to immigrants who, having left 
the State of Israel, declared themselves within three months wishing to return there.  It 
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also pledged its intention to facilitate immigration conditions to Israel, by certain new 
regulations, particularly those concerning the removal of the age limit and the lowering of 
the minimum age for each immigrant.”275  Perhaps enticed by these newly loosened 
requirements, the office of the Governor recorded one hundred Jewish individuals having 
left Ghardaïa for Israel in 1954.276  Certainly, the promises of the Jewish Agency, 
sometimes featured in romanticized illustrations of strong, well-fed Jewish pioneers 
tilling the fertile land of Israel, may have enticed some Jews from the M’zab to make 
aliyah. 
 Several scholars have argued that disingenuous promises from the Jewish Agency 
brought Jews away from peaceful existences in North Africa and the Middle East to 
Israel, where they suffered oppression, exclusion, and conflict from the Ashkenazi elite.  
Ella Shohat writes that Zionism imposed a “new binarism into the formerly peaceful 
relationship” between Jewish and Muslim communities throughout the region, 
characterizing that ideology as the driving force in the Jewish migrations to Israel of the 
postwar period.   However, her assertion that Jews from North Africa were “lured” to 
Palestine and then to Israel is disingenuous and fails to appreciate the equally strong 
factors in Algeria that sped their decision to emigrate.277  Within this small community, 
the motivations for migration or remaining in French Algeria varied, whether individuals 
chose emigration to escape French economic restrictions or to stay in Algeria and open 
new businesses.  M’zabi Jews participated in political Zionist activities without making 
aliyah, or emigrated for religious reasons that had little to do with the modern Zionist 
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ideology of Theodor Herzl or David Ben Gurion.  Religious leaders, business merchants, 
and others chose their future for a wide variety of reasons, hinging often on practical 
concerns and the most attractive route available at that particular moment.  The choice to 
leave Algeria reflected the situation there as much as it did the lure of Zionism or Israel. 
 French attitudes and policies towards the M’zabi Jews evidenced conflicting 
agendas and beliefs about their future place in French civil society and created instability 
and uncertainty in the lives of M’zabi Jews.  French Jews, including Rene Cassin and 
André Chouraqui, extolled the promises of assimilation publicly in order to influence 
French policymakers doubtful about M’zabi Jewish “regeneration,” even in the mid-
twentieth century.  To what extent Cassin or Chouraqui truly believed in the possibility of 
full assimilation varied; Cassin became increasingly involved with the French 
government while Chouraqui made aliyah himself less than a decade later, in 1958.  
Whatever their personal beliefs, their lobbying efforts appear to have made little inroads, 
particularly when faced with the competing argument that M’zabi Jewish equality would 
antagonize Muslim Algerians.  The specter of Muslim anti-Jewish violence served 
successive colonial regimes well in suppressing calls for reform or demonstrating to 
Algerian Jews the vulnerability of their situation (as in 1934 Constantine).  However, by 
failing to take real initiative on resolving the legal inferiority of M’zabi Jews, colonial 
officials alienated a population that they would soon find useful when the French turned 
again towards the Sahara as the saving grace of the dying French Empire. 





War and Development in the M’zab, 1954-1958  
 
 [France] will mobilize its forces so that the Saharan miracle can be 
realized.  The immense riches of coal, iron, oil, and natural gas in the 
Territoires du Sud will be developed.  The metropole will contribute 
technical knowledge and investment.  Algeria will contribute its 
increasingly skilled laborers and, later, project managers.  The 
development of the desert is the great undertaking of our generation.278 
 
 By 1955, the conflict that Algerian nationalists would call the War of 
Independence or the Algerian Revolution and the French the Algerian War was well 
underway.  The war officially began after the coordinated attacks of the Front pour la 
Liberation Nationale (FLN) on select French military locations on the eve of All Saints’ 
Day, November 1, 1954.  While the bulk of the action and violence occurred in the 
northern coastal regions, residents of the M’zab felt keenly the general instability of the 
war and the uncertain future of French colonial rule in Algeria.  Despite the difficulties of 
emigration and resettlement in Israel, the threat of violence and fears about their 
uncertain status in French Algeria incited many Jews to leave Ghardaïa in this period.   
Yet the pace of emigration progressed fitfully in the early stages of the war.  
While FLN boycotts of M’zabi goods and services hurt the local economy, French 
investment in the development of the Sahara reached unprecedented levels during this 
period as successive metropolitan governments waged campaigns to exploit the natural 
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resources of the desert.  As national interest turned to the Sahara, so too did the Jews of 
the M’zab catch the eye of French politicians who were seeking to integrate the 
populations and resources of the Sahara into French Algeria.  For the first time since the 
conquest of the M’zab in 1882, the National Assembly debated how to administer the 
Sahara and its inhabitants.   
The Sahara presented to the French not only the material resources to reinvigorate 
the economy, but also a new frontier in which they could rescue the colonial mission.  
With order increasingly difficult to maintain in the north and international and domestic 
support waning, the French government turned towards the Sahara as a means of 
extending and consolidating its power; some in the government even mused about the 
possibility of keeping the Sahara were they to lose the north.  In late 1955, the French 
government in Paris and in Algiers began to discuss a “reorganization” of the Territoires 
du Sud from militarily administered territories to départements.  This integration of the 
Sahara into French Algeria would, it was argued, reinforce the unity of French Algeria; 
the extension of greater control into the Sahara would in turn make it easier to exploit the 
mineral and fuel deposits there. 
For the approximately fifteen hundred Jews still living in the M’zab, the proposed 
change in jurisdiction and legal classification would also present a novel way of 
rectifying their problematic situation.  To reclassify the Territoires du Sud would bring 
them into juridical equality with the northern départements of French Algeria and thus 
invalidate the earlier logic used to defy Jewish requests for emancipation: that the 
Crémieux Decree could only be applied to Jews living in the French départements.  
Jewish advocates, including members of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, argued that 
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this change would furnish the M’zabi Jewish population with a clearer path to 
citizenship.279  Thus, in the midst of the chaos of the autumn and winter of 1954, some 
Jews in Algeria and abroad imagined that the reorganization of the south prompted by the 
chaos of rebellion and the promise of oil might hasten the emancipation of the M’zabi 
Jewish community. 
  Unfortunately, as in previous decades, many in the French command either 
argued against or ignored petitions for M’zabi Jewish emancipation in the 1950s.  The 
French recognized the problem of their legal inequality vis-à-vis other Algerian Jews, but 
fears of antagonizing an increasingly hostile Algerian Muslim population, coupled with 
French resistance to changing the status quo, produced an intransigent French position on 
Jewish citizenship in the south.  As a consequence of French inaction, Jewish individuals 
and families from Ghardaïa continued their steady emigration from the M’zab.  In the 
months leading to the November 1954 outbreak of war, dozens of Jews from the M’zab 
petitioned the government for permits and passports to leave Algeria.  The French issued 
eleven passports to members of the community in October, the same month that a 
delegate from the Jewish Agency arrived in Ghardaïa to help potential immigrants with 
making aliyah.  Including these eleven, France issued thirty-six passports to Jews from 
Ghardaïa that month.280  Following news of the FLN rebellion, the heads of the Jewish 
community in the M’zab wrote to the French demanding arms so that they might defend 
themselves, fearing, as the French reported, that “the nationalist unrest will win the south 
and the furor of the Muslims will definitively turn against them.”281 
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 In July 1955 the district summary report noted again that the Jews feared reprisals 
from the local Muslim population and that the Jews in Ghardaïa, “especially the poor, 
dream only of leaving for Palestine.”282  In September, the month when Jews typically 
celebrate their most important holidays, the French report mentioned Jewish fears about 
Muslim violence, yet noted that the “festival of ‘Yom Kippur’ took place in peace.”283  
Despite this, by October the number of passports requested between January and October 
1955 was already twice that requested in the entire previous year, with thirty passports 
issued in the month of October 1955 alone.284  French colonial officials bemoaned the 
Jewish emigration.  From 1955 onward, French reports of Jewish activity in the M’zab 
took greater notice of how and where Jewish emigrants went.  They noted the difference 
in where various Jewish emigrants went: the poor, to Israel, while those who “had 
acquired Western culture and a certain wealth,” chose France or coastal Algeria.285 
Regional reports and memoranda from the governor’s office often linked Jewish 
insecurity in the M’zab with the larger instability of Jewish communities across North 
Africa and the Middle East.  In the reports from September and October 1955, the French 
commander in Ghardaïa noted that the general instability and sense of fear amongst the 
Jewish population was to a certain extent reflective of the mounting conflict between 
Egypt and Israel.  With some of the leadership of the FLN in Cairo, for the French the 
linkage between Arab nationalism in Algeria and Egypt was proven and dangerous.  At 
times, French officials in Ghardaïa projected larger diplomatic conflicts onto the local 
situation, often inaccurately assuming that anti-Jewish violence from Muslims in 
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Morocco would arrive in the M’zab or recording reports of Jewish insecurity alongside 
notations about the relative calm in Ghardaïa, producing a confused official record of this 
period. 
 Though French reports exaggerate the conflicts between Jews and Muslims in the 
M’zab, the conflicts between Jews and Muslims in the Levant did contribute to local 
conflicts between Jewish and Muslim communities.  This violence was initially much 
more threatening for Jewish communities in Tunisia and Morocco than in Algeria.  In a 
1954 report to the American Jewish Congress, André Chouraqui wrote, “At a time of 
heated passions, particularly in Morocco and Tunisia, there was profound peace between 
Arabs and Jews in Algeria.”  Chouraqui’s summary accurately emphasized that the 
greater problem for Jews living in southern Algeria remained their poverty and lack of 
legal rights.  By 1954, Jewish unemployment in the Territoires du Sud reached 45.4 
percent, while only 13.4 percent, 18.6 percent, and 27.7 percent in the French 
departements of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, respectively.286   
 Events in Algeria and across the region soon challenged the “peace between 
Arabs and Jews” in the M’zab and across Algeria.  While terror did not arrive in the 
Sahara for several years, the threat of such attacks produced ample fear.  For the Jewish 
population and their Muslim neighbors, the escalating conflict between Egypt and Israel 
over the Sinai Peninsula and Suez Canal during this same period added another element 
of tension to local Jewish-Muslim relations throughout the Maghreb.  Violence between 
Jewish and Muslim Algerians in the Sahara would escalate in the coming years, 
exacerbated by the increasing difficulties of daily life produced by the pressures of war.  
Demands for higher taxes, ransoms, and “contributions” came from both the French 
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colonial administration and Algerian nationalist groups.  As the war progressed, these 
monetary demands would be coupled with actual acts of violence against persons and 
property in the M’zab, mounting poverty and outbreaks of disease and drought.  Caught 
between the vague emancipatory promises of the French, the possibility of nationalist 
violence, and the difficulties of life in the desert, some Jewish residents of the M’zab 
pushed for their emancipation while others elected migration to Israel.  The brief 
flourishing of French investment, material and symbolic, in the Sahara temporarily 
slowed Jewish emigration until the realities of war and French recalcitrance persuaded 
many to leave. 
 
The Algerian War and the M’zab: a local and global conflict 
The nationalist insurrection of November 1, 1954, was the work of a unified 
movement still organizing itself.  The dominant FLN faced challenges to their authority 
from rival domestic Algerian factions and tribes as well as international organizations of 
Algerian émigrés, led by Messali Hadj and others.  Thus, the initial period of rebellion 
was characterized not only by conflict between French colonial and Algerian nationalist 
forces, but to an even greater extent by internal purges of Muslims deemed collaborators 
or rivals.  Far more Muslims died at the hands of the FLN than Europeans in the first 
years of the war.  Violence and the fear of violence were effective tools for the FLN for 
both terrorizing the civilian settler population as well as controlling Muslim, and Jewish, 
Algerians. 
Where violent tactics were deemed unnecessary or counterproductive, the FLN 
instead pressured Algerians for financial assistance.  This was the fate of the M’zabis 
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when in the spring of 1955 the FLN organized a boycott against M’zabi merchants 
throughout Algeria, accusing the M’zabis of collaborating with the French and 
undermining the nationalist struggle.  This would affect both Ibadi and Jewish M’zabi 
merchants.  While comparatively benign when contrasted with the violent confrontations 
between the FLN and other political factions, this boycott was nevertheless a painful 
reminder to the M’zabis (Muslim and Jewish) that they were on the fringes of the 
Algerian nation, reinforcing their marginalized status within both French Algeria and the 
nascent government structures of the nationalist movement.   
In Ghardaïa, the local French commander reported that the boycott “created 
among the Mozabite [sic] and israélite [sic] populations…a strong anxiety and real 
uneasiness.”  In the opinion of the French, a “campaign of false news” against the 
M’zabis being spread throughout the region was more worrying than the actual boycott, 
as it was exacerbating tensions locally and between the residents of the M’zab and the 
French colonial government in Algiers.  The local Jewish community worried about a 
rumor that was spreading throughout the country that the boycott was the initiative of a 
group of rival Jewish merchants.  However, according to the French report, most M’zabi 
Muslims doubted this rumor because “too many mutual interests [linked] Jewish 
wholesalers and mozabite [sic] retailers.”  M’zabis, both Muslim and Jewish, filed a 
number of complaints accusing the colonial police and administration of failing to protect 
their commercial interests and expressed to the French surprise and incomprehension 
about the reasons for the boycott.287 
 The FLN, for their part, blamed French colonial subterfuge for the boycott and 
wrote as much in a letter to the leader of the M’zabi djemaa (council of elders) in Algiers, 
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a letter that also encouraged M’zabi merchants to join the nationalist struggle.  The FLN 
accused the French of “pernicious propaganda,” “a maneuver of diversion of the most 
pure colonial style,” against their “Mozabite [sic] brothers.”288  How far the FLN had 
come from the accusations only a few decades earlier that the M’zabis were the “Jews of 
the Desert” and not part of the Algerian Muslim community!  A member of the djemaa 
forwarded the letter to the French authorities in Ghardaïa, who observed that after their 
invitation to join the FLN the djemaa felt compelled to cooperate.  The French 
commander noted, “it is not clear if this simple declaration of solidarity with the 
‘Algerian cause’ has exempted [them] from financial participation in the fight for this 
same cause.”289 
The Ibadi organization “El Houda” in Constantine (representing the community of 
M’zabi merchants in residence there) responded to the boycott with an open letter to the 
Algerian population of the city.  In this letter they asserted their Islamic identity and 
commonality with the Muslims of Algeria: 
O Algerian People!  Mozabites [sic] constitute a part of the community on 
which you depend, a group of your own children.  They practice the same 
religion as you, Islam, and express themselves in Arabic, which is also 
your language.  They come from the same race as yours and are like you 
Algerian Arab Muslims.290   
 
This letter is remarkable in so far as it did not mention Ibadism once, instead associating 
the M’zabi Muslims with the Islam of “Abdelhamid Benbadis, Bachir Ibrahimi, Tafiche, 
Bayoud and other reformist Ulemas” of Algeria, all non-Ibadi Islamic leaders of the 
twentieth century Islamic reform movement in Algeria.291  The Ibadi authors also placed 
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themselves in an unusual hierarchy of identity: first, Algerian, then Arab, and finally 
Muslim.  This letter connected the Ibadis both with local Algerian nationalism as well as 
regional and global Arab nationalist and Islamic movements.  However, in appealing to 
the pan-Islamic and pan-Arab sympathies of their boycotters, the Ibadis excluded Jewish 
M’zabis.  This language marks a critical turning point, as the Muslim majority had long 
ostracized both Ibadi and Jewish M’zabi merchants, who in turn had for centuries 
considered themselves part of a separate community.  The bonds between M’zabis of 
different faiths had weakened significantly by this point. 
  The extent to which this and other Ibadi pleas to the FLN and local Algerian 
Muslims were genuine is unclear.  According to French reports, some M’zabis believed 
the boycott was nothing more than an attempt on the part of the nationalist movement to 
blackmail them for financial support.  Incidents of kidnappings for ransom did not give 
M’zabis confidence in the motives of the FLN and associated nationalists.  For instance,  
 a M’zabi merchant in Biskra had his son taken hostage by a group of nationalist 
“terrorists” who demanded two million francs for his return.  Boycotts and kidnappings 
were but one of the tactics employed to extract support from the local population.  The 
M’zabis were not the sole targets of financial demands for support from the nationalists 
and these demands did not cease following the boycott.  The French reported that the 
FLN continued to demand financial support from each city and town in Algeria with the 
warning that those who did not comply would be punished.  In Ghardaïa, the local Ibadi 
Muslim authorities demanded the French arm them individually and that a military 
detachment be stationed in the town to halt any planned kidnappings or violence targeting 
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M’zabis.  The boycott slowly petered out, but clearly, despite its end, the community in 
Ghardaïa felt themselves vulnerable to outside attacks.292 
 A minority within a minority, the Jews of the M’zab were as ever doubly 
vulnerable to attack.  Their fear of both foreign and local violence separated members of 
the Jewish community in Ghardaïa from the larger Ibadi and Muslim populations.  
Leaders of the Jewish community appealed to the French authorities for support and 
protection, fearful that “certain young mozabites [sic] … are disposed towards taking 
revenge on the Jews [sic] of Ghardaïa and seek to create a serious incident of which the 
Jews would be the victims.”  Although the French administrator in Ghardaïa investigated 
these claims and found that “no element of the mozabites [sic] wishes to take revenge on 
the Israelites,” he reported that local nationalists continued to hold clandestine meetings 
and had a noticeable presence in the area, suggesting that the army install an additional 
police unit and send a military detachment to maintain the (tenuous) peace.293  For all 
M’zabis the possibility of nationalist violence was very real, while for Jewish M’zabis the 
additional threat of localized attacks scapegoating the Jewish community produced a 
climate much different from the “profound peace” André Chouraqui described in 1954. 
 Despite the growing ethnic divisions between Jews and other M’zabis, equally 
troubling for both the Muslim and Jewish populations was an outbreak of malaria that 
swept through the M’zab in 1953.  In Ghardaïa, the insecurity that spread through the 
Jewish population following the outbreak of war in late 1954 was certainly also a 
consequence of the worsening quality of life throughout that and the previous year.  In 
1953 there were two hundred and twenty-one cases of malaria and fifty-seven deaths 
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around Ghardaïa.294   The local commander in Laghouat appointed a “Hygiene 
Commission” that undertook an examination of the possible sources of the epidemic.  In 
Ghardaïa, they found that the Jewish quarter was particularly unclean and required 
“sanitization by hermetic sealing of waste pits and the creation of a dedicated seepage pit 
for used water.”295  The official descriptions of the state of the Jewish quarter painted a 
picture of an isolated neighborhood in disarray, echoing the images taken by American 
photographers in the late 1940s. 
At the same time that malaria and domestic Algerian conflicts made life in the 
M’zab ever more difficult, international events also challenged the status quo and 
complicated Jewish-Muslim relations there and throughout the Maghreb.  The March 
1955 bulletin reported to Algiers, “the Jewish communities follow attentively the 
evolution of the international situation, especially the events along the Egypto-Israeli 
[sic] border.”  The French author speculated that the Jews feared local Muslim retaliation, 
but observed they had not as yet experienced any violence from their non-Jewish 
neighbors.296  News of the situation in Israel seems to have influenced local feelings of 
fear and uncertainty.  Yet, for all these concerns, in Ghardaïa there were no attacks on 
Jews in 1955 or 1956.  The April 1955 monthly report noted, “The festivities of the 
Jewish Passover were celebrated with the usual finery and in the greatest calm.”297  
However, the calm described by local French reports ignored the increasingly 
international nature of the conflict over Algeria, and the ways that the war became a 
symbol around the world for larger global movements, especially decolonization and 
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Arab nationalism.  In addition to the war in Algeria, the 1956 Suez Crisis highlighted for 
the French how critical it was that they maintain control over Algeria; for Jews in the 
M’zab and throughout North Africa, the successful Israeli attack on Egypt resulted in a 
widespread deterioration in Jewish relations with local Muslim populations.  French 
involvement in the failed attempt to halt Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal 
discredited the French and nearly destroyed French relations with the United States.  
French involvement in Egypt also strained an already overtaxed French military. 
French support for the Israeli attack on Egypt was a continuation of the friendly 
relations between the two countries.  France promised Israel two hundred tanks and 
nearly one hundred Mystère fighter planes in exchange for Israeli support in routing 
efforts by the FLN to drum up international support and actual interventions in FLN 
overseas operations.  Israeli intelligence agents alerted the French to at least one ship 
from Cairo carrying arms for the FLN in Algeria, and may have provided the information 
that made the French hijack of Ahmed Ben Bella’s plane possible.298  French arming of 
Israel and pursuit of an alliance with Britain against Nasser were both strategies put in 
play to bolster France in the face of what the government believed was “a question of the 
West against Islam, a war for civilization.”299  French officials saw Nasser’s influence 
spreading into Algeria, in part through the close ties between the FLN leadership and his 
government in Cairo and also more generally through the growth of an alternative to 
European power in the Mediterranean.  Thus, the Algerian war became not only a 
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struggle for control of Algeria, but also a conflict over the future of the larger spheres of 
influence across the region. 
 The former governor of Algeria Jacques Soustelle articulated this vision of the 
Algerian and French conflict in an editorial in Foreign Affairs in October 1956.  In this 
piece Soustelle insisted that Arab and Muslim states were manipulating the situation in 
Algeria, noting especially the involvement of Cairo in Algerian affairs.  He argued that 
French colonization had to continue, for the good of the world and even for the good of 
the Algerian people.  Soustelle invoked several classic justifications for colonization and 
against self-determination for the Algerians, for instance, that “there has never been an 
Algerian state or an Algerian nation” and that the rebellion “did not spring from a deep 
feeling within the native population…its inspiration, its slogans, its directives and its 
arms come from abroad.”  Additionally, Soustelle cited “the Communist factor” as a 
powerful influence on the Algerian conflict, concluding, “If the tricolor is lowered in 
Algeria the red flag will soon fly in Paris.”300  Writing in English for an international 
audience, Soustelle framed the Algerian conflict as one in which the self-interest and 
strategic interests of the entire “West” were at stake. 
 Within this Cold War framework, Israel was for Prime Minister Guy Mollet, 
Soustelle, and their contemporaries a critical ally.  Of Soviet support for Nasser, Soustelle 
wrote: 
The goal is to be able to cut the West from its Middle East oil resources 
and thus threaten it with economic suffocation.  This is what leads 
Moscow to play the neo-imperialist card of the Arab League against the 
West and against the state of Israel, a true Western outpost in the heart of 
the Middle East.  For Israel and Algeria to fall into pan-Arab hands would 
create a solid barrier isolating Europe from Arabia and the west coast of 
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Africa.  In geopolitical terms, therefore, Israel and Algeria are two pillars 
of Western strategy; their fall would involve a general collapse.301 
 
In local terms, the official French line that linked Israel and Algeria in a global struggle 
against Communism and its allies placed the Jewish communities of Algeria and the 
M’zab in an awkward position vis-à-vis Algerian nationalists. Many Jews throughout 
Algeria supported the nationalist struggle against French imperialism, while many also 
wished to maintain French colonial rule.  However, for a Jewish community with a larger 
rate of migration to Israel, their relationship with Israeli communities, the Israeli state, 
and international Zionist and Jewish relief organizations pitted the M’zabi Jewish 
community against Algerian nationalists and, sometimes, against their own neighbors. 
 
“The key to the Sahara”: the key to France’s future 
 The Suez Crisis and the threat to French access to oil resources in the Arabian 
Peninsula reinforced French determination to secure their energy needs elsewhere.  By 
1956 the development of oil and natural gas fields in the Sahara was well underway.  
Early that year, drilling at Hassi Messaoud yielded high quality oil, four hundred miles 
south of Algiers and less than two hundred miles east of Ghardaïa.  Though the oil found 
in the desert remained tremendously expensive to access and develop, the French public 
and government celebrated this new potential for economic riches in the desert.302  The 
oil discovery and development in the northern Sahara was also an economic boon to the 
local population.  Tradesmen, merchants, and local suppliers worked to capitalize on the 
new clientele of oil, natural gas, and construction companies and workers.  The Jewish 
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community of Ghardaïa profited from this new industry, especially Jewish merchants 
who established several general stores for the workers in and around the Hassi Messaoud 
fields and the smaller natural gas facility near Ghardaïa, including the one depicted 
below.  The discovery and development of oil and other energy resources in the Sahara 
seemed to slow the instability of the war as the French invested heavily in maintaining 
and extending their control in the desert (alongside many international corporations). 
	  
Figure 5.1 The Sebban family depot at Hassi Messaoud, “Rebbi Amrane,” bearing the name of its 
proprietor, who had been a rabbi in Aflou before returning to the M’zab.  Amrane Sebban owned 
two similar stores in Ghardaïa and a number of commercial trucks.  Vayikah Amran, 133. 
 The French had been anticipating or hoping that oil would be found in the Sahara 
at least since the Territoires du Sud were declared a département in September 1947.  
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The discovery of valuable natural resources in the desert gave hope that the Sahara might 
provide the mechanism for France’s return to her prewar glory.  Between July 1951 and 
November 1952, over seventy-five articles about the importance of the Sahara appeared 
in the French press in newspapers and journals including Le Figaro, Le Monde, Combat, 
and Paris-Press.  The general consensus in the public sphere, across the political 
spectrum, was that the Sahara was an integral part of French territory, possibly containing 
unlimited and unexploited riches, and should be integrated into the French economic and 
political system to a greater degree.  Describing the Sahara as an “El Dorado,” a “land of 
adventure,” a “promised land,” and “Alaska with high temperatures,” the diverse authors 
of these articles evoked a kind of idyllic frontier land ripe for development, and a land 
that could in turn redeem and rebuild a France still struggling to recover after 1945.303 
 Though French accounts of Saharan development were overwhelmingly 
optimistic, the vast majority of Algerians opposed the consolidation of French rule in the 
Sahara and extension of French control beyond Algerian borders.  The French took little 
heed of Algerian protests and by 1955 it was obvious that France intended to consolidate 
French control into the Sahara.  It was within this context that the president of the Ibadi 
djemaa in Algiers, Brahim Hadjoute, expressed to governor Jacques Soustelle his and his 
community’s opposition towards attaching the M’zab to the administrative districts of the 
north.  He instead asked that the M’zab be kept part of the eventual Saharan 
administrative district, “whatever that may be.”  In his report to Paris, Soustelle 
emphasized the “importance, notably on the economic plan, of this community that 
represents the populations of the M’zab in Algiers.”304 
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 In 1955, with the attention of the metropolitan press and public focused on the 
Sahara, the governments in Paris and Algiers recommenced a series of investigations into 
the populations of the Sahara and particularly of the M’zab, whose residents might be 
cultivated as future allies.  As in the earlier deliberations about the emancipation of 
M’zabi Jews in the 1940s, the Vice President of the Council of State, René Cassin, was 
again deeply involved in assessing the situation in the M’zab.  Alongside André 
Chouraqui and other delegates of the AIU in Algeria, Cassin reinserted the debate about 
emancipating M’zabi Jews into the debates surrounding the integration of the Sahara.  
Soustelle appears to have been particularly friendly with Cassin and Chouraqui.  Perhaps 
persuaded by conversations held during their visits to both Algiers and the M’zab, he 
noted in a memorandum to Paris that the emigration of Jews from Ghardaïa was of 
serious concern because it could “be a cause of the depopulation of the M’zab.”305  
French authorities appeared to see both Ibadi and Jewish M’zabis as valuable allies. 
 Cassin had, in fact, maintained a steady amount of pressure on successive 
governors before Soustelle to address the legal inequality of the M’zabi Jewish 
community.  However, following a 1952 proposal to the Assembly of the French Union, 
there had been no communication about addressing the question of Jewish emancipation 
in the M’zab.306  It was only in summer 1954 that the Ministry of the Interior reopened 
this question, writing to governor Roger Léonard in Algiers to solicit his opinion.  
Léonard wrote that his opinion had not changed in the past two years, that he maintained 
his support for “the complete integration of the Jews of southern Algeria in the French 
community, with the inscription of those interested on the electoral lists of the first 
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college.”  Léonard attached the caveat that if Paris was worried about taking such a 
“radical” step, it should at least establish a civil status for the Jewish community in the 
south such as was then being extended to the Muslim populations of the extreme south, as 
far as El-Golea, three hundred kilometers south of Ghardaïa.307  No action from the 
Ministry followed.  Soustelle succeeded Léonard in January 1955 and his administration 
immediately reopened the matter.  There followed a series of reports and demands 
between Algiers and the Ministry of the Interior in Paris about the future of the Jewish 
communities in the M’zab.  Soustelle’s administration, as expressed by multiple officials, 
supported Chouraqui and Cassin’s agenda to extend to the Jewish community full 
integration into the French community, with the abandonment of their personal status, 
and inclusion in the primary electoral college.308  
 Chouraqui and Cassin maintained steady pressure on Soustelle and the 
Metropolitan government to make the M’zabi Jewish issue a priority in their new policies 
towards the Sahara.  In a six-page note to the Ministry of the Interior and the governor’s 
office in Algiers, Chouraqui emphasized that the status of the Jews of the M’zab was the 
result of their 1882 classification as “indigenous Muslims” despite their being Jewish.  
Despite this obvious error, Chouraqui wrote, “a bill aimed at regularizing the legal 
situation of the Jews of the M’zab is still sleeping in the files and has achieved nothing 
positive….It goes without saying that serious inconveniences result from this fact.”  
Chouraqui asserted that the French Ministry of the Interior was to blame, for despite the 
“unanimous desire” of all M’zabi Jews for an end to the personal status, since 1951 both 
he and René Cassin had been met with refusals by French officials who now asserted that 
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not until the territories of the south were fully incorporated into Algeria could this 
question be addressed.  In Chouraqui’s estimation, failure to address the M’zabi Jewish 
question had only hurt the French because their steady emigration “impoverished the 
south where the Jews played an important commercial role, while at the same time 
weakening the French presence which [the Jews in Ghardaïa] naturally support.”309  In 
his assertion that the Jews of Ghardaïa would “naturally support” French colonization 
Chouraqui echoed mid-nineteenth century assertions that the emancipation of Algerian 
Jews would supply the French with allies in North Africa.  However, this argument that 
had been persuasive a century earlier now failed to convince French officials in Paris. 
 Three weeks later the legislative oversight office in Algeria issued a critique and 
response to Chouraqui’s claims, but only internally to various officials in Paris.  The 
author, M. Passeron, dismissed Chouraqui’s claim that the Crémieux decree should have 
be extended to the Jews living in the territories of the south once those areas were 
declared départements in September 1947.  Passeron reiterated the old argument that the 
1882 annexation of the M’zab meant that the 1870 Crémieux Decree could not be applied 
retroactively and also stressed that the current government “should respect” the 
jurisprudence of previous administrations.  The only solution, to his mind, would be to 
construct and propose to the French National Assembly a new law pertaining to the legal 
status of M’zabi Jews.310 
 The director of the southern territories drew up just such a possible bill and wired 
it to the legislative oversight office of the governor’s office on July 15, 1955.  The 
concise bill contained six articles and promised the emancipation of all those classified as 
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Français israélites (Jews classified under the personal status) in Algeria.  However, the 
law included a proviso that those individuals wishing to maintain their personal status 
would be able to do so after declaring their intention to the French courts.  Soustelle 
noted that it would be logical to extend to the Jews who opted to maintain their personal 
status the same laws that had been amended to reform the legal status of Muslim 
Algerians.  He also emphasized that Paris should undertake this measure “with 
urgency.”311   
   Soustelle was the last Gouverneur Général in Algeria and his replacement, 
Résidant Général Catroux, indicated his interest in pursuing the amelioration of Jewish 
legal status in the south via a number of communiqués to Paris after his appointment in 
early 1956.  However, Parisian officials concluded their investigations into amending the 
legal status of Jews in the M’zab around this time.  While Catroux favorably summarized 
Soustelle’s positions and himself advocated addressing the question of M’zabi Jewish 
status, a handwritten inscription from the recipient at the Ministry of the Interior reads 
“The Minister does not wish to resume this inquiry for the moment.”312  During this 
whole convoluted process, the wishes of the M’zabi Jews themselves never appear in 
official documents, only the demands of representatives talking about M’zabi Jews or 
French debates about jurisdiction in legalese.   
 Despite the unwillingness of officials in Paris to deal directly with the question of 
Jewish emancipation in the M’zab, they nevertheless came to address some of the 
concerns of the community while working towards cultivating the residents of the M’zab 
as allies in the development of natural gas and oil in the northern Sahara.  In April 1956, 
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the same month that the Interior Ministry suspended their investigation into the situation 
of the Jews in the M’zab, the French government solicited proposals from a wide range of 
government officials as to the future reclassification of the Sahara.  With missions from 
the Algerian Assembly already investigating the work of Shell and other international 
corporations in resource extraction, there was tremendous momentum to set up a system 
that would expedite French development of the Sahara.  While some advocated that the 
Sahara be made its own autonomous region—as the M’zabi djemaa and other Algerians 
wished—the majority of proposals argued that the interests of the French in the region 
would be better served by integrating the southern territories into the administrative 
districts of the northern départements while simultaneously affiliating the Algerian 
Sahara with a larger regional economic zone. 
The Director of the Territoires du Sud, Casset, wrote in April 1956, “forming the 
area of the Sahara in a département directly attached to the metropole, proclaiming it part 
of the nation, should…separate the Sahara from the neighboring areas, protect it from 
Islamic propaganda and affirm its definitively French character.”313  Hence, a formal 
joining of the Algerian Sahara with the Algerian départements would only strengthen 
French interests there.  Again, Casset like so many of his peers presented the conflict 
over Algeria and the Sahara as one between Islam and the West.  Many in the Algerian 
and Parisian governments invoked the specter of neighboring Islamic states threatening 
the European colonization along the coast.  At a time when the growing conflict between 
French and Algerians had begun to suggest to many in the metropole that the colony was 
unsustainable, French officials stressed that the economic riches of the entire Saharan 
region would fall from French hands if they lost Algeria.  As Casset wrote, “wisdom 
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orders…that we must convince Parliament and metropolitan public opinion that France 
will only keep the Sahara if it retains Algeria.”314   
Despite all the promised wealth that the Sahara might yield, until the exploitation 
of its mineral, oil, and natural gas resources became more accessible and inexpensive, the 
administration in Algiers recommended installing a limited administration in the south to 
provide direction and oversight more locally.  In hierarchical terms, this would mean the 
governor of Algeria would remain the prefect of the new département as he had been for 
the previous territories, to avoid the fees associated with establishing a new prefecture 
and paying its employees.  There would still be under-prefectures in Laghouat and, 
further south, at Ain-Sefra.  Perhaps most critically, the new Département des Oasis 
would be represented at the Algerian Assembly and the Assembly of the French Union.  
Lastly, a new judicial system would gradually be implemented; however, only at an 
undeclared future date and until that point local officers and administrators would 
continue to arbitrate local disputes.315 
 As part of their inquiry into the best means of governing the Sahara, a number of 
researchers and officials sent detailed reports on the inhabitants of the areas of the new 
département.  One of these reports yields an account of how certain French officials 
viewed the Jewish community in the M’zab at this time. 
They have not yet been able to escape the shabby condition that has been 
theirs for centuries.  The Jewish quarter of Ghardaïa appears very dated: 
tall houses of sometimes two stories, but whose outward appearance does 
not redeem the interior simplicity; dark alleys where from time to time 
nauseating puddles stagnate. …  Many women and men have kept their 
biblical costumes—those women dressed in long shimmering dresses, fat 
underneath the filthy cloth, with matted hair, coarse brass or silver jewelry 
around their neck, raising wan children in an insipid atmosphere that the 
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relentless summer heat makes even more unbearable.  The men, for their 
part, are hardly more evolved.  They experience the greatest difficulties in 
finding profitable occupations locally; nevertheless some of them achieve 
affluence.  …  The French school and the inherent qualities of the Jewish 
race should enable the Jewish population of Ghardaïa to catch up.  The 
change has begun, but it is usually outside the M’zab that the Jews today 
look for a better future.  Several hundred of them left the M’zab for the 
Promised Land, once the State of Israel was created.  A number are 
already engaged in business in the centers of the South.316 
 
This anonymous description of the Jewish quarter and community in Ghardaïa hewed 
very close to the late nineteenth and early twentieth descriptions by French travelers and 
journalists, presenting the Jews of the M’zab as a static community, “biblical” in 
appearance, lacking hygiene, and rife with sickness.  The author contradicts himself in his 
observations of economic life in the M’zab, citing in the same sentence the difficulty 
finding employment and the few men who “achieve affluence.”  This account is a 
glimpse of the poverty that still characterized much of the Jewish community; however, it 
is to a greater extent revealing of the ways that French officials still perceived these Jews 
and indicative of the thinking that influenced legislators to set aside the question of 
Jewish equality in the south during this period. 
Resident Minister Robert Lacoste issued a directive in April 1957 that called 
Algeria “the key to the Sahara” and argued that with the oil in Hassi Messaoud France 
might “retake quite naturally her due place in Europe and in the world.”317  Such were the 
hopes of many in the French government at this time, when the war with the FLN and its 
army, the ALN, was escalating and international support for French control in Algeria 
waning.  The new statute of 1957 ended the “special regime” of the Territoires du Sud, 
combined the budgets of the north and south into one Algerian budget, and provided 
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representation for the Département des Oasis in the Algerian Assembly.318  While these 
legislative changes gave greater agency to the residents of the south, the utopian ideal of 
the Sahara as rehabilitator of French colonial prowess and economic power never came to 
fruition.  The domestic and international political crises of the war followed swiftly on 
the heels of the new Saharan reclassification, stunting development and further 
threatening the stability of the M’zab. 
 
Conclusion: anti-Jewish violence and Jewish emigration 
 On August 14, 1957, twenty-four Jewish men, women, and children left the port 
of Algiers aboard the ship Sidi Mabrouk en route to Marseille.  They included members 
of the Sellam, Attia, Zenou, and Agou families, women, men, wives, husbands, and 
children.  French officials in Algeria did not mark their passage from Algeria with any 
significant notice and there is no record of their individual motivations for leaving.  
However, life for all Jews in the M’zab became a bit more insecure and certainly more 
difficult in 1957 when the FLN targeted Jewish goods and merchants in Ghardaïa, 
Constantine, Aflou, and elsewhere in a new boycott.319  Jews were increasingly cast by 
the FLN as traitors to the nationalist cause, supporters of French colonialism rather than 
the future Algerian nation.  Anger at Algerian Jews manifested itself in a number of 
violent episodes in that same year: a grenade attack in May on Jewish neighborhoods 
wounded several Jews and killed one woman in Constantine, while attacks damaged 
dozens of Jewish homes and shops in Oran in July.320  
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 By October of that year, if not earlier, organized and casual physical attacks by 
Muslims against Jews began in Ghardaïa.  On October 10, militia forces associated with 
the FLN executed several non-fatal attacks against the Jewish population and property in 
the M’zab.  The local police force and a nearby army unit responded quickly and pushed 
the FLN forces out of the area in only a few days, according to French reports.  In the 
wake of these events, the local Jewish population expressed to the French “regret for 
times passed.”  A French report noted that some in the community “[believed] they were 
more tranquil and at ease when they were considered as Jewish mozabites [sic] or 
mozabite [sic] Jews.”321  That they moved from a sense of inclusion in or tolerance by the 
M’zabi Ibadi community who brought the first Jewish metalworkers to Ghardaïa in the 
fourteenth century to alienation and fear of bodily harm, within a matter of decades, 
speaks volumes of the rapid changes in their quotidian experience and the impact of 
outside ideologies and conflicts on the local populations. 
 Attacks on Jews in the northern Sahara continued through 1958.  Nearby 
Laghouat was also home to a significant number of Jewish merchants originally from the 
M’zab who established households and shops there.  One such merchant, Abraham 
Sebban, was the victim of an improvised bomb thrown at the door of his house on March 
31, 1958.  Sebban, like his relatives at Hassi Messaoud and in Ghardaïa, had established a 
relatively lucrative general store in Laghouat.  The photographs below, taken from 
French archives, depict first the doorway of his shop and home, followed by a corridor 
leading off the entrance.  Though taken in black-and-white from the police inquiry, the 
force of the explosive device used is apparent from the photographs.  The French report 
named no specific perpetrators and attributed the attack to a “rebel exaction,” implying 
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FLN involvement.322  Though no fatalities resulted from this incident, the psychological 
and economic damage to the Jewish community was surely felt acutely throughout the 
south.   
	  
  Figure 5.2 “View of the whole”323 
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Figure 5.3 “View of the Hallway”324 
The turbulence in Laghouat and Ghardaïa was an extension of the chaos and 
extreme violence of the larger colonial conflict over Algeria.  Less than two months after 
the attack in Laghouat, on May 13, 1958, a military coup overthrew the government in 
Algiers.  With fears that the instability in Algeria might similarly upset the government in 
Paris, General Charles De Gaulle emerged from retirement on May 15 and offered his 
services to the Republic.  President René Coty offered De Gaulle the premiership for a 
trial six-month period, which the National Assembly overwhelmingly approved.  De 
Gaulle tasked legal scholar Michel Debré with the writing of a new constitution for the 
Fifth Republic, one that the National Assembly ratified on September 28, 1958, 
establishing a much stronger presidency than in the Fourth Republic.  In December 
elections, De Gaulle won by a landslide in both France and in Algeria. 
 De Gaulle championed the idea of Algerian self-determination, but also expressed 
hope that Algeria could remain “associated” with France, as a province or similar 
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distinction.  In September 1958, De Gaulle and his interim government extended 
citizenship to Muslims in Algeria, elevating their voting rights to the primary electoral 
college.  De Gaulle also implemented the Constantine Plan, aimed at offering Muslim 
Algerians greater access to education, social services, and labor opportunities, likely in an 
attempt to weaken the FLN and provide late reforms to appease the local population. 
 In addition to these reforms to Muslim political status, Debré (a grandson of an 
Alsatian rabbi) and his co-authors Robert Lecourt and Edmond Michelet drafted 
legislation to amend the problematic legal status of the Jewish population of the south.    
This would be the first official draft of legislation to formally emancipate the Jewish 
community of the M’zab, though its ratification would require several more years of 
debate and revision.  Prior to the introduction of a final bill in the National Assembly in 
1960, Jewish advocates from New York, Tel Aviv, Paris, Algiers, and Ghardaïa actively 
lobbied the new government for Jewish emancipation in the M’zab.  In the United States, 
leaders of the American Jewish Congress met with Vice President Nixon on September 
11, 1957, to push the French to amend the status of the Jews of the M’zab, and Nixon 
gave them a sympathetic audience.325  This and similar lobbying efforts were successful 
in bringing international pressure to bear on French officials in Paris and London.  
However, the emancipation of the Jews of Ghardaïa would arrive too late for most, who 
would eventually choose migration to Israel over repatriation to France by June 1962. 
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“The Milk of Liberty” or the Land of Milk and Honey: 
Citizenship, Emigration, and Absorption, 1958-1962 
 
  
 The French colonial administration in Algeria ultimately yielded to M’zabi 
petitions and international pressure, replacing the Jewish personal status in the south with 
the civil status in late 1961.  However, unlike the dramatic emancipation of Algerian 
Jews by the 1870 Crémieux Decree, this legislation simply “regularized” M’zabi Jewish 
status, without much fanfare or opposition.  By this point, the toll of the war in Algeria 
and the growing forces of decolonization and metropolitan opposition to colonialism 
made French withdrawal from Algeria practically a fait accompli.  The belated inclusion 
of M’zabi Jews in the French polity was far from revolutionary and distant from the 
heated debates about Jewish emancipation that influenced earlier colonial officials not to 
extend them citizenship.  Yet, there were disputes about M’zabi Jewish citizenship and 
some French officials dredged up old tropes about Jewish dual loyalty and 
“regeneration.”  In the midst of official legislative discussions and doubts, M’zabi Jews 
asserted their desire for citizenship and harnessed the lobbying powers of international 
Jewish organizations as well as French and Algerian Jewish support to win their 
citizenship. 
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 The slow progress towards Jewish citizenship in the M’zab rapidly accelerated 
after 1955.  After the start of the Algerian War, official discussions about M’zabi Jewish 
legal status were often mired in bureaucratic minutia, as was the case with one of the first 
proposed legislative solutions to what was dubbed “The M’zabi Question” in 1956.  One 
suggestion, a repetition of earlier proposals, was simply to apply the earlier laws 
governing Muslim civil status to the Jewish population.  In a note to the Minister of the 
Interior on February 4, 1956, then Minister of Justice François Mitterand noted that the 
application of the laws of 1882 and 1883 to the Jewish population in the M’zab 
“appeared inopportune,” because these laws would submit Jews to the authority of local 
Muslim judges and mandate certain documents be written in Arabic, “provisions that 
seem difficult to apply to the Jews.”  Mitterrand also took exception to the provisions 
allowing Jews who wished to remain under the personal status.326  The issue of allowing 
Jews to elect to remain under the personal status would be one of the most contentious 
aspects of legislation to regularize the Jewish status in the M’zab and prompt allegations 
of Jewish dual loyalty reminiscent of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Mitterrand was ignorant of the particularities of the Jews in the M’zab, but he did 
acknowledge that the civil statuses of both Muslims and Jews were in flux and that 
solutions presented to this “problem” in the 1920s and 1930s were no longer viable 
options in the context of the Algerian War.  Perhaps most critically, Mitterrand’s 
opposition to Jews maintaining access to their personal status presaged the impending 
debates about Jewish particularity and individual rights that would accompany the final 
passage of civil status legislation in 1961.  After the ratification of the new constitution 
and creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the Ministry of Algerian Affairs submitted 
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another bill to regularize the status of Jews in the south in the summer of 1959.  As in 
1956, officials in the Prime Minister’s office worried whether Jewish individuals should 
be allowed to maintain their personal status in matters of marriage and divorce.  
Mitterrand’s comments represent a consistent way of thinking about Jews in France, and 
a continued French suspicion of Jews wishing to retain their particular traditions and 
legal rights under the personal status, from the debates surrounding emancipation in 1789 
to that moment in Algeria. 
Simultaneous legislative reforms aimed at reforming Muslim personal and civil 
affairs informed French proposals seeking a solution to the problem of M’zabi Jewish 
status.  Though some opposed this generalist approach, other French officials suggested 
that the reforms of Muslim personal affairs be extended to the Jews in the south.  An 
ordinance passed in February 1959 mandated that marriages carried out privately in 
Muslim courts be documented before civil authorities and recorded in the civil register.  
The State Secretary from the Prime Minister’s office suggested that the same requirement 
be applied to the Jewish population and that the old rules regulating Jewish personal 
status in the south be amended quickly in a “modern and liberal” way.327 
The “modern” and “liberal” way to amend the problem of Jewish legal standing in 
the M’zab was to shift Jewish reliance on rabbinical courts to their secular French 
counterparts and place M’zabi rabbis into the centralized hierarchy of the consistory.  As 
in earlier debates in Napoleonic France and Third Republic Algeria, loyalty to Jewish 
traditions and the use of Jewish legal processes were incompatible with citizenship. Todd 
Shepard writes that the Algerian war and the legislation drafted on M’zabi Jewish status 
confronted France with “The Jewish Question” yet again, and French officials explored 
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and tried to resolve the old question of whether or not Jews belonged to the category of 
“Europeans of Algeria.”328  Algerian Jews themselves insisted on their Frenchness and 
rejected the claims of Algerian nationalists that they were “Jewish Algerians.”  René 
Cassin argued publicly that there could only be two groups identified in Algeria: the 
French and Muslims.  These two groups were exclusive of one another, with Jews firmly 
ensconced in the former.329  French Jewish advocates and French officials flattened the 
distinctions between different groups collectively seen as “Muslim,” with one exception: 
M’zabi Jews who had been part of the “indigène" population for decades were now 
separated from that population and integrated into their “true” place as Jews, that is to 
say, as French people.   
French officials made clear at negotiations with Algerian nationalists that Jews 
would be part of the French community, going so far as to erase references to the Jewish 
minority in documents.  The emphasis on constructing rigid boundaries between French 
and Muslim that determined future nationality during talks about Algerian independence 
left little room for flexibility.  Thus, Algerian Muslims who supported France and hoped 
for French citizenship and eventual immigration to France had these hopes destroyed 
when their Muslim identity was seen as incompatible with French nationality.  By the 
same logic, M’zabi Jews long classified as “indigènes” had to now be included into the 
French people, quickly, and in a way that would emphasize their Frenchness and not their 
accession to citizenship via their Jewishness.    
However, in this set of beliefs about Jewish identity and about the possible space 
available to Jews in the French nation-state, French officials and French Jewish advocates 
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lost sight of the actual differences of the M’zabi Jewish community and the ways that 
many M’zabi Jewish individuals strongly self-identified as members of a local or global 
Jewish community while simultaneously petitioning for French citizenship.  Some 
officials on the ground in the Sahara argued loudly for a new solution that would meet the 
unique needs of this Jewish community.  Certain French officials with greater personal 
experience and knowledge of the M’zab argued, for instance, that the responsibilities of 
rabbis were quite different than those of Muslim judges, or even imams, as they spanned 
both legal and religious duties.  The special reporter on the M’zabi legislation to the 
National Assembly, M. Pigeot, argued in May 1961, “the Jewish community is not 
organized like the Muslim community…what role does a Cadi play in the Jewish 
community?”  Pigeot went on to note that French judges sent to adjudicate Jewish 
disputes would be “very embarrassed” by their lack of familiarity with Jewish practices 
in the south.330 
French officials stationed in Ghardaïa were most familiar with the community, 
especially sub-prefect Charles Kleinknecht and commissioner Jean Moriaz.  These two 
men played important roles in the last years of Jewish life in Ghardaïa, often advocating 
for Jewish demands to their superiors, and were instrumental in the final evacuation of 
the Jewish community from the M’zab in an organized airlift in June 1962.  While 
ministers in Paris and colonial politicians in Algiers spoke abstractly about the Jewish 
community in the M’zab, these two men lived with them and often attended important 
religious events as honored guests of the community.  In his memoirs, Kleinknecht wrote, 
“on 17 June 1962, I left the M’zab for good…I witnessed the final act in the dispersion of 
a fascinating community, that of the Jews of the M’zab…who were amongst all the 
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Jewish communities of North Africa the most unique, because, across the centuries, they 
were able, in their isolation, to maintain their social and religious traditions.”331 
What Kleinknecht termed “the final act in the dispersion” of the M’zabi Jewish 
community marked the departure of less than half of the total population of Jewish 
individuals originally from the M’zab.  A census of Jewish individuals born in the M’zab 
in September 1961 found that, of 2437 individuals, 1034 lived in Israel while only 978 
remained in the M’zab.  An additional 164 had moved to France, while 261 lived 
elsewhere in Algeria.332  The extension of full citizenship to the M’zabi Jews in this 
period was thus a belated solution that failed to meet the needs of the hundreds of Jews 
who had already left French territory.  For many M’zabi Jewish immigrants in France, the 
state and local Jewish institutions also failed to adequately support the absorption needs 
of the community.  Meanwhile, in Israel a much more extensive absorption network was 
better able to meet the needs of Jewish immigrants from Ghardaïa, though Jews from 
North Africa met with a number of difficulties.  The M’zabi Jewish migration continued 
well after 1962, when individuals and families moved between Israel and France in 
response to economic and social difficulties. 
 
M’zabi Jewish citizenship and the international Jewish community 
French Jewish leaders and organizations sometimes failed to see or willfully 
ignored the preference of M’zabi Jews to immigrate to Israel instead of France.  Even 
before their actual departure from Ghardaïa, French Jewish leaders demonstrated a 
number of misperceptions about the actual wishes of the Jewish community in the M’zab.    
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This was in part the function of a lack of communication with members of the 
community, with whom French Jewish organizations had failed to cultivate relationships.  
This discrepancy between reality and expectation also resulted from over a century of the 
particular ideologies surrounding Jewish integration and assimilation in France, of which 
the AIU was an ardent advocate.  At this time, the leaders of the AIU were deeply 
integrated into the French government and their approaches to the problem of M’zabi 
Jewish legal status evidence their attempts to reconcile official duties with their advocacy 
for the AIU. 
President of the AIU René Cassin, who was concurrently president of the Council 
of State, visited the Sahara in early 1958 as part of a trip organized by the Compagnie de 
Recherches et d’Exploitation de Pétrole au Sahara.  During this five-day tour, Cassin and 
his colleagues visited Algiers, Hassi Mesaoud, El Goléa, Edjeleh, and spent one night in 
Ghardaïa.  Cassin arrived in Ghardaïa at six o’clock on the evening of Friday, February 
28, and left at ten o’clock the following morning.  There is no evidence, in French 
archives or those of the AIU, that he made further visits to the M’zab.  Surprisingly, after 
lobbying on behalf of the Jewish community in Ghardaïa since his appointment as AIU 
president in 1943, Cassin organized no meeting with the local Jewish community.  The 
lack of direct communication between the AIU and community in Ghardaïa suggests that 
Cassin and his colleagues were perhaps more concerned with general questions of Jewish 
treatment in Algeria and, more critically, with the future of French control and power in 
Algeria and in the M’zab than with the actual wishes of the local Jewish community. 
Cassin missed this opportunity to hear firsthand the demands of the community; 
however, he may well have discussed with the local French command their opinions on 
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the question of Jewish legal status in the M’zab.  Regardless of whether any such 
conversation took place, French officials in Paris and often in Algiers evidenced great 
ignorance about the wishes of the Jewish community in Ghardaïa for civil status.  In a 
letter on February 6, 1959, Jacques Soustelle, delegated by the Prime Minister as Minister 
of the Sahara, wrote to the Prime Minister that before regularizing the civil status of the 
M’zabi Jews, the Prefect of the Oasis should inquire if the community was “still 
demonstrating the same willingness to receive the civil status.”333  During Soustelle’s 
own tenure as Governor of Algeria, he was well aware of Jewish appeals for civil status 
in the M’zab, yet urged caution about granting that request a few years later. 
In response to these doubts, in May 1960 M’zabi Jews drafted a lengthy plea for 
civil status that yields one of the richest glimpses into the aspirations of the community 
and their direct interactions with the governor in Algiers as well as the government in 
Paris.  The Association cultuelle israélite de Ghardaïa (Jewish association of Ghardaïa) 
wrote to the Minister of the Sahara of their desire for full inclusion in the French nation, 
“The Jewish community of the M’zab is today unanimous in demanding the total 
suppression of the personal status, driven by the conscious will to gain full French 
citizenship.”334  The M’zabi authors stressed, “It is not lost on the Jewish community that 
obligatory military service could be imposed as a consequence of the total 
francization…and [we] accept in advance the task of bearing arms under the French 
flag.”335  René Cassin, President of the AIU, received a copy of this letter from the 
community, to whom they further wrote that they wished to see an article that preserved 
the privilege of M’zabi Jews to refuse civil status and maintain the Jewish personal status 
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removed from the current legislative proposal.  The Association wrote to Cassin, “this 
provision is counter to the unanimous wish of our community today, to acquire full 
francization.”336   
What exactly the Jewish community in Ghardaïa believed francization would 
entail is never detailed in their correspondence with French officials or AIU 
representatives.  It is surprising that they chose this term instead of the Crémieux-era 
“regeneration,” or the commonly used “assimilation,” or “integration.”  The idea of 
francization or gallicization had been a concern for Jews in France during the initial 
emancipation of the Jews in the revolutionary period.  Many feared that emancipation and 
gallicization would inevitably mean “dejudaization” as well.337  The Jewish community 
in Ghardaïa was at this time still traditional in their religious practices and it is unlikely 
that they intended to abandon their Jewish identity to achieve any kind of “francization.” 
Memoirs by sub-prefect Kleinknecht, commissioner Moriaz, and Jewish 
individuals from Ghardaïa attest to the extent to which the community was deeply 
invested in maintaining their Jewish identities.  Individuals maintained the same types of 
names used by their ancestors, names more often associated with Muslims, like Aisha or 
Zaineb.  Few in the community had officially registered patronyms, surprising as the 
French demanded all persons classified as “Muslims” in Algeria assume last names by 
the late 1950s.338  In official community documents, Jewish months, festivals, and life 
cycle events marked the year’s passage.  Western dress was relatively new to the men and 
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especially to the women.  One member of the Sebban family remembered wearing a 
western shirt and pants for the first time on a pilgrimage to Israel in 1955.339   
Yet, despite these clear markers of difference and their dedication to maintaining 
a Jewish way of life, leaders of the community in 1960 professed their willingness to 
adapt their Jewish way of life in order to win the French civil status.  From their 
insistence on erasing the Jewish personal status, it might be inferred that members of the 
community now agreed with earlier generations of French colonial officials that certain 
Jewish practices were incompatible with full French citizenship.  However, it seems more 
likely that members of the community still in the M’zab realized the future advantage 
French civil status would win them in the increasingly likely scenario of Algerian 
independence and French withdrawal. 
Some in the international community believed that the community wished for 
citizenship simply because it was the surest way to win French protection from Algerian 
nationalists.  Such was the assertion of Max Lapidos, whom the AJDC sent on a fact-
finding mission to Ghardaïa in early 1961.   Lapidos wrote in his report to New York 
headquarters: 
This picturesque group, living in rather primitive fashion, close to and on 
friendly terms with their Arab neighbors in the oases of the Sahara, 
refused at one time to accept French citizenship because they preferred to 
continue to live in their own inimitable way and to adhere to the Mosaic 
Law, which permitted them to have more than one wife.  What was sauce 
for their neighbors was sauce for them.  Therefore, such Jews were 
officially considered as “natives.” However, time marched on and things 
changed with western influence taking its toll and finally they no longer 
practice the privilege of polygamy.   
 
Lapidos saw “native” behavior typified in polygamy, echoing earlier French 
sentiments that Jewish participation in this practice was sufficient evidence of 
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their inassimilability and distance from Western culture and civilization.  Lapidos 
stopped short of the kinds of judgments typical of French observers who had 
linked Muslim and Jewish polygamy to moral degeneracy since the early 
nineteenth century, in the M’zab and elsewhere.340 
 Lapidos described the confusing legal standing of the M’zabi Jewish 
community in the postwar period and noted the idiosyncratic definition of who 
could and could not be considered “European” in French Algeria. 
Now their status is one of confusion.  Although all Algerians are now 
considered as French, so they are also French, but are not included in the 
category of “Europeans” as are the other Jewish inhabitants of the country.  
Due to present conditions, this group, located and isolated in what is 
known as the “Mezab” territory in the deep south, addressed a petition to 
the French Government requesting that they now be considered French 
citizens in exactly the same manner as all other Algerian Jews, which 
means as “Europeans.”  Thus, if their new status is officially recognized, 
they will become eligible for whatever measures may be taken to protect 
the European population generally.341 
 
Lapidos and other American Jews recognized the strategic value of French civil status for 
the M’zabi Jews, as did many in Israel.  The AJDC maintained support for Jewish 
emigration from North Africa during this period, and the network established to assist the 
larger emigrations from Morocco and Tunisia after independence in 1956 and 1954 also 
facilitated the emigration from Algeria. 
 French and Algerian Jews recognized that the fate of this community might have 
serious repercussions for the broader relationship between France and Jewish 
communities within her borders.  French Jews were deeply invested in the deliberations 
over granting civil status to Jews from the M’zab because at issue was the fundamental 
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question of Jewish categorization as European or French in Algeria, and how Algerian 
Jews would be treated in the case of a large-scale exodus from Algeria to France.  In 
December 1960, President De Gaulle refused to meet with AIU leader Jacques Lazarus 
and a delegation from the Algerian Jewish Social Studies Committee.  Instead, a lower 
level cabinet member met with the committee.  The Secretary General of the AIU 
hypothesized that De Gaulle did not receive the Algerian Jewish delegation in order to 
avoid any indication of preferential treatment; however, some in the French Jewish 
community interpreted De Gaulle’s refusal to meet with the Jewish delegation as 
indicative of his lack of support for Algerian Jews.342 
 The lack of transparency about the future of Algerian Jews was worrisome to 
many because the FLN and its governmental body, the Provisional Government of the 
Algerian Republic (GPRA) had maintained for years that Algerian Jews were an 
inseparable part of the Algerian populace, despite the Crémieux Decree.  The GPRA 
declared to the Algerian Jewish population after its formation at the Congress of 
Soummam on August 20, 1956, “You, the Jews, you are an integral part of the Algerian 
people; there is no choice for you to make between France and Algeria but to become 
effective citizens of your true country.”343  This remained the FLN’s position for the next 
five years and at the initial Evian talks in 1961: 
The FLN considers the Jews of Algeria natives, completely Algerian, and 
it gladly leaves to those individuals the right to choose…at the moment 
when Algerian sovereignty is recognized, [we] have always estimated that 
the problem would not exist for the Jews, in the same terms as for the 
Europeans.  Because those of European origin were colonists, who settled 
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in a foreign land, while the Jew was a native who had access to Algerian 
nationality.344   
 
The FLN and the GPRA reasserted the Jewishness of the emancipated Algerian Jewish 
population precisely at the moment that the latter group wished to reaffirm their 
assimilation and French citizenship.  The divisions between “Muslims” and “Europeans” 
of Algeria were becoming increasingly important for officials to elaborate and reinforce 
and most Jews lobbied heavily to remain in the latter, while M’zabi Jews and their allies 
lobbied for their entry into that category. 
 As the divisions between “European” and “Muslim” grew ever more calcified, 
Jews were increasingly caught in the crosshairs.  While some Jews joined the French 
dissident Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS) or the FLN, most Jews (as well as most 
“Europeans” and “Muslims”) were simply civilians caught between two increasingly 
violent adversaries.  L’Arche, the largest Jewish monthly in France, published multiple 
eyewitness accounts of the cruelties Jews faced in Algeria.  They described to their 
French and Algerian audience how one family was given 24 hours to leave their 
apartment complex by their Muslim neighbors.  In another eye-witness account, one 
woman told reporter René Sussan how her eldest son, “twenty years old, was assassinated 
last year [1961] by the FLN.  Her youngest, 14 years old, was killed the next day by the 
[French] policemen.”345  Such stories increased in frequency until a ceasefire was 
declared in early 1961 and talks recommenced. 
The French and FLN talks at Evian in 1961 faltered around several issues, 
including the fate of Algeria’s Jewish populations.  For their part, Algerian Jews were 
adamant that they not be viewed as a part of the Algerian community, but as individual 
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citizens of France.  Under pressure from Jewish leaders, Louis Joxe, the minister of 
Algerian Affairs, made sure to edit out any mention of the Jewish “community” from 
French position papers and be sure that Jews were included as part of the “European” 
minority.346  The GPRA reaffirmed that they would not consider “150,000 Jewish citizens 
of the country, considered to be autochthonous” as part of the “European” population. 
Assurances from French representatives in Algiers that Algeria’s Jews were fully French 
citizens did not immediately assuage Jewish fears resulting from this declaration.347  
In a letter published in Le Monde on April 5, 1961, AIU delegate Louis Kahn 
reiterated that any attempts to re-categorize Algerian Jews as non-French Algerians 
would replicate the Nazi Nuremberg laws, by setting Jews aside and violating their 
human rights.  Citizenship was an inalienable right of the Jewish population in Algeria.  
In case of any challenge, Kahn asserted that the Jews of Algeria were French citizens not 
only because of the 1870 Crémieux Decree, but also according to the 1927 French 
nationality law that ruled French all persons born on French soil to a French father.  Kahn 
concluded, “The Jews of Algeria, and all those who have drunk the milk of French 
liberty, will not, it seems to us, accept a self-determination imposed on them.”348 
After repeated negotiations and a number of statements on the part of the French 
government asserting that the Jewish population would be part of the European 
community, the FLN withdrew their statement on Algerian Jewry.  A January 31, 1962, 
article in Le Monde declared that, “The exit of the Jews, over which the talks at Evian-
Lugrin seriously stumbled, seems to be on the way towards regulation: after having long 
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claimed them as ‘of Algerian lineage,’ the FLN now accepts that they be considered 
Europeans.”349  The FLN’s shift in policy followed the extension of the civil status to the 
M’zabi Jewish population and thus, both the legal status and the official relationship 
between the Jews of Ghardaïa and the Algerian population dramatically shifted in the 
span of a few months, from “indigènes” and “Muslims” to “Europeans” whose future lay 
outside an independent Algeria. 
 
Belated equality and emigration 
During the period that French officials worked to clarify exactly who was 
“European” in French Algeria, the problem of the “Muslim” Jews in the M’zab took 
center stage in legislative debates.  To gain a better appreciation of the problem, the 
government organized several reports on the community and the situation at hand.  In 
summer 1960, the National Assembly appointed a special delegate, M. Pigeot, to write a 
report on the M’zabi situation, which would be the basis for future legislation.350  
Minister of State Robert Lecourt and Minister of Justice Edmond Michelet presented 
Pigeot’s findings to the Prime Minister on August 4, 1960 as a draft bill, cosigned by 
Michel Debré.  The bill summarized the problem thusly: “the Jews of the former 
Territories of the South who are French citizens, as are all residents of Algeria, since the 
promulgation of the law of 7 May 1946, have kept their personal status and have no 
regular civil status.”  The proposal also noted that the Jewish community of the M’zab 
was “ready to renounce their personal status and acquire the civil status…in the same 
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conditions as those expected by the aforementioned decree of 24 October 1870,” the 
Crémieux Decree.351 
The proposed bill contained thirteen articles detailing the process by which Jews 
in the south would acquire the civil status and the various ways that they might initiate or 
postpone this change in their legal standing.  Articles of the bill included a demand for a 
census of the Jewish population in the south and for all Jews in this census to assume 
surnames chosen by “men of the same family of at least twenty-one years of age.”352  
Civil authorities would record all civil acts corresponding to each family according to 
their surname.  Thenceforth, all marriages, births, deaths, and matters of inheritance 
would be made public to the government in Algeria and France.  The use of surnames 
would be afterwards obligatory for all.  This requirement included even those Jewish men 
who elected, under a provision of this bill, to remain under the personal status.  Though 
French women won the vote in 1944, Algerian women had only been able to vote since 
1958.  The exclusion of M’zabi Jewish women in this bill was deliberate and meant to 
“honor” the particular nature of the Jewish community in Ghardaïa, a set of assumptions 
about the inferior status of women in the M’zab.  Men’s choice of surnames and whether 
or not to opt out in favor of the personal status would equally affect their wives and 
children under eighteen years of age.353 
The edits supplied by the Prime Minister’s office note that apart from the 
“administrative territory of the Sahara and especially the M’zab” there were few places 
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where this legislation would be applicable.354  The final bill giving Jews of the 
Départements des Oasis accession to the civil status passed on the first reading in the 
National Assembly on July 11, 1961.355  The bill passed on to the Senate for final 
ratification included the same thirteen articles following a summary of the problem, 
which again reiterated that the question of Jewish personal status applied almost uniquely 
to the M’zabi Jewish community, as other Jews installed in the south arrived as citizens 
to those territories after the 1870 Crémieux Decree, stating, “essentially, the law will only 
apply in the M’zab.”   
The finalized bill made no mention of the February 1959 ordinance on Muslim 
accession to the civil status, instead establishing new requirements specific to the M’zabi 
Jews.  Additionally, the National Assembly removed the articles allowing Jews who 
elected it to remain under the personal status, simplifying the article and aligning it more 
closely with Article 75 of the Constitution.  This meant that the law would automatically 
apply to all unless they expressly made known to the relevant official their desire to 
maintain the personal status prior to the date of its implementation.356  The Senate passed 
the law on July 28, 1961.  The swiftness of its passing was remarkable for the many years 
that any such legislation had been quickly dismissed or mired down by competing 
ideologies, likely hurried by the importance of the issue of Algerian Jewry at the Evian 
talks between the French and FLN. 
In these final years of the Algerian War a number of legislative bills passed 
rapidly, while attempts at peace settlements and negotiations failed.  As international 
opinion turned increasingly against French colonization in Algeria, President De Gaulle 
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looked for solutions to the problem of French Algeria.  On November 16, 1960, De 
Gaulle called for a referendum in the metropole and Algeria on Algerian independence.  
In this January 8, 1961 referendum seventy-five percent of the voters voted in favor of 
self-determination, though in Algeria where the FLN had boycotted the vote, the measure 
carried only by fifty-five percent.357  Many in the settler population were increasingly 
frustrated by De Gaulle’s attempts towards what they viewed as appeasing the FLN.  In 
April of that year, the OAS attempted a failed coup in Algiers; following this the OAS 
launched increasingly violent attacks on Algerian civilians and French government 
targets alike. 
At the Evian talks, sovereignty over the Sahara was an even more contentious 
issue than the future of Algeria’s Jewish population.  De Gaulle and his negotiators came 
to Evian fully expecting to retain control over the Sahara and the vast mineral and oil 
deposits there.  When the talks broke down, and after continued OAS bombings 
throughout Algeria, De Gaulle surrendered future control of the Sahara by September 
1961 in a move that shocked his ministers, particularly Michel Debré who had publicly 
committed to retaining the Sahara for France.  In his New Years address for 1962, De 
Gaulle asserted that “one way or another,” France would extricate itself from Algeria.358  
After this great concession from De Gaulle, the GPRA agreed to return to talks, and the 
final agreement was signed at Evian on March 18, 1962, recognizing the formal 
independence of Algeria. 
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In the wake of De Gaulle’s rapid capitulation on the Sahara, the registration of 
M’zabi Jewish surnames and conferral of the civil status proceeded apace.  However, 
authorities in the M’zab ran into various problems.  Though seemingly no M’zabi Jews 
opted out of the civil status in favor of retaining the personal status, the choosing and 
recording of surnames presented a number of difficulties.  Several M’zabi Jews refused to 
choose a surname for their families and consequently had surnames given them by the 
state, names that they then disputed before French officials.  On this point, Algiers asked 
the Ministry of Algerian Affairs for suggestions as to how to treat and record in official 
documents individuals who appeared without surnames, as well as how to then force 
them to choose surnames.359  In his reply, the State Minister in charge of Algerian Affairs 
suggested that the relevant French officials, when presented with individuals who refused 
their surnames, “invite them to choose another surname.”360  This produced much 
confusion when members of the same family had their names recorded with various 
spelling errors or inaccurately.  This clerical error affected families and individuals to 
different degrees, as those who made eventual aliyah would give their Hebrew names, 
while the minority who immigrated to France arrived with confused papers, including 
some who lacked surnames completely.361 
 Many in the international Jewish community interpreted the 1961 law as a sign of 
French commitment to equality and to the future of Algeria’s Jewish population, 
regardless of the future of French rule in Algeria.  The AJDC office in Algiers reported to 
Geneva that this law was for Jews in Algeria “a new proof of France’s will to leave no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 DG to State Minister in charge of Algerian Affairs, 20 September 1961.  ANOM 81F/1227. 
360 State Minister in charge of Algerian Affairs to DG, 21 December 1961.  ANOM 81F/1227.  This subtle 
approach did not work for all and French authorities reported many M’zabi Jews arriving in France without 
any surnames.  Shepard, Invention of Decolonization, 246. 
361 Ibid., 245. 
	   183 
stone unturned to help the Algerian Jews in present circumstances and, above all, to avoid 
any line being drawn between the Jews and the other Europeans residing in this 
country.”362  However, this amended civil status arrived too late for most in the M’zab.  
The AJDC report in late 1961 noted “a number of religious leaders and employees of 
communal institutions have already left the country.”363   
 The legal standing of M’zabi Jews regularized and resolved after almost a century 
of debate, but another “M’zabi Question” now presented itself to the French government 
and international Jewish relief organizations: how to evacuate what remained of the 
Jewish community from independent Algeria.  An overwhelming number of the 
community in the M’zab expressed their desire to leave the M’zab rather than stay in an 
independence Algeria, where the future of Jews and other French citizens seemed 
uncertain.  The French government actively collaborated with the Jewish Agency, AJDC, 
and a number of French Jewish relief organizations including the Fonds Sociales Juif 
Unifiés, or United Jewish Welfare Fund (FSJU), to assist the Jewish emigration from 
Algeria.  The final evacuation of the Jewish community from the M’zab is a particularly 
astonishing example of this cooperation.   
Members of the community initiated their final emigration by asking the Israeli 
government, not the French, for assistance.  The Jewish Agency, in turn, sent an emissary 
to work out the details with the French officials in Algiers and the M’zab and French 
Jewish organizations including the AIU.  There were roughly nine hundred Jews living in 
the M’zab at this time and the officials involved determined that a mass airlift would be 
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the most efficient and rapid way to evacuate the Jewish community.364  Michael Laskier 
describes the events: 
Towards the end of June, French planes chartered by the Jewish Agency 
reached Ghardaia’s military airport.  The emigrants were able to take the 
twelve-kilometer ride to the airport on buses, guarded by military jeeps 
and a helicopter.365  
 
The planes left Ghardaïa for Algiers and then Marseille.  Staggered over the course of 
fifteen days, this airlift suddenly and dramatically removed the Jewish community from 
the M’zab. 
 
Figure 6.1 “A family headed to the airport for the departure to Eretz Yisrael.  The woman carries a 
Sefer Torah in her arms.”   Sebban, Vayikah Amram, 185. 
 
Individuals and families fled Ghardaïa quickly, able to carry only a few suitcases 
and family or community artifacts.  In the image above, taken from the personal 
collection of Eliahou Sebban and his family, a Jewish woman clad in traditional clothing 
carries a Torah scroll towards the awaiting plane, with the hills of the M’zab behind.  
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This image powerful displays the tension between the M’zabi Jewish life that had been 
and the uncertain future in Israel or France and resembles similar images of Jewish 
emigrations from other parts of the Middle East and North Africa during this period, 
particularly that of the Yemeni Jews in 1951.366 
At the time of their departure from Ghardaïa, the Jewish community possessed 
“one synagogue, one religious school, one building with three stores, one ritual bath, 
[and] seven properties in various areas of the city” according to the Association des Juifs 
originnaires d’Algérie (AJOA).367  Before leaving Ghardaïa definitively by July 2, 1962, 
dozens of young and old men from the community buried various religious scrolls and 
personal documents in the Jewish cemetery outside town. Jean Moriaz, the French 
commissioner, accompanied them in this task and himself interred a number of his 
personal effects, as is depicted in the photograph below.  Moriaz enjoyed a friendly 
relationship with the community, whose members seen here are by this time all wearing 
European dress and even berets, perhaps marking themselves as citizens of France. 
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Figure 6.2 M. Jean Moriaz assisting the youth of Ghardaïa in burying sacred scrolls in the local 
cemetery, 1962.368 
 M’zabi Jewish acquisition of the common law status expedited their emigration 
from Algeria and immigration to France and Israel.  However, once arrived in their new 
homelands, M’zabi Jews met with a number of difficulties getting accustomed to their 
new lives.  In Israel a large network of immigrant absorption agencies was accustomed to 
similar immigrations from Libya, Yemen, Morocco, and Tunisia.  In France, the earlier 
immigrations of Jews from Tunisia and Morocco had also laid the groundwork for the 
much larger arrival of Algerian Jews in 1962.  However, in France the specific absorption 
of M’zabi Jews proved much more difficult than that of the general Algerian or North 
African Jewish population.   
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Citizens, Refugees: Absorption in France 
 Even before their arrival in France, French, Israeli, and American officials and 
advocates worried about the absorption of the Jews from Ghardaïa.  An article in L’Arche 
described the community in an unflattering profile, “the more you approach the south, the 
more the Jews ‘self-Islamicize’ in some way; there is a certain contamination in their 
superstitions, rituals, and clothing.”369  An AJDC emissary, Abe Karlikow, presciently 
reported on June 19, 1962, that Israeli officials hoped France would facilitate the 
migration of certain Jewish Algerians to Israel, “particularly…some 200 Jews from 
Ghardaïa, the Jews of the Sahara desert, flown from their remote M’Zab region to 
Marseilles, and whose readjustment in France might prove particularly difficult.”370  Now 
that M’zabi Jews had French citizenship, immigration officials and Jewish organization 
representatives tasked with facilitating their immigration and assimilation voiced the 
same concerns French colonial officers had used to refuse them citizenship in Algeria. 
Of the one hundred and fifty Jewish individuals from the M’zab who immigrated 
to France in 1962, most were resettled in Strasbourg, with a few in Marseille, Paris, and 
various cities along the Mediterranean coast.371  Immigration to France was in some ways 
the ultimate expression of the full citizenship M’zabi Jews had fought for and won in 
1961, however the reality of migration and integration in France proved extremely 
difficult and many ultimately left France for Israel.  The M’zabi Jewish absorption in 
France differed significantly from that of most Algerian Jews, whose arrival and 
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integration were generally celebrated and actively facilitated by French Jewish 
organizations and French ministries. 
The Algerian Jewish immigration to France was a “total” immigration, 
encompassing all sectors of the population, and massive in size.372  The FSJU observed 
that Algerian Jews arrived like “a tidal wave in the last weeks and last days” of the 
summer of 1962.373  A May 30, 1962, article in Le Monde noted that on some convoys 
from Algeria, “nearly 30% of the passengers were Jewish.”374  By late 1962, while the 
total pied-noir population comprised two percent of the entire French population, the 
newly arrived Algerian Jews constituted one-third of the French Jewish community.375  
By the end of the year, 120,000 Algerian Jews had arrived in France, effectively doubling 
the Jewish population to 250,000.376  Michel Salomon, editor-in-chief of L’Arche, mused 
of the effects of this massive immigration on the French Jewish community, “We will 
have to increasingly… ‘Algerianize’ ourselves, in a way.”377 
The French Jewish community was much better prepared for the 1962 wave of 
Algerian immigration than they had been for either of the two earlier immigrations of 
Jews from North Africa, after Tunisian independence in 1954 and Moroccan 
independence in 1956.  The timing of the Algerian immigration was also fortuitous.  
Jewish immigrants in the 1960s did not face the same level of French hostility 
encountered by earlier East European waves of Jewish immigration in the interwar years.  
Many Jewish immigrants to France prior to World War II were unwelcome at a time 
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when France was recovering from the First World War.  The 1960s were, in contrast, a 
time of renewal and expansion for France, the Trentes Glorieuses, an economic climate 
that facilitated the incorporation of the pieds noirs into the metropolitan population and 
economy.  Though Jewish Algerians faced initial hurdles to their integration into French 
society, they were able to create niches for themselves in France much more quickly than 
previous waves of Jewish immigrants.   
In May 1962, only two months before official Algerian independence was 
declared, the General Congress of the FSJU held a two-day conference to assess the 
readiness of their programs and ensure their ability to handle the impending arrival of 
thousands of Algerian Jews.378  The French Jewish community worked diligently to 
accommodate the new arrivals.  The director of the FSJU later described the reception 
Algerian Jews met with in 1962, “the Jewish welcome [was] exceptionally warm…In 
each train, in each port, the Jewish community was present, day and night if needed, to 
welcome the refugees.”379  The French government also invested in the Algerian Jewish 
absorption, as it was in the future of all rapatriés, repatriated French citizens from 
Algeria.  This was a critical distinction between the earlier North African immigration 
and the Algerian: as French citizens Algerian Jews received a number of benefits from 
the French government to facilitate their adjustment in France.   
In early 1962, L’Arche published a discussion between several French Jewish 
leaders, introducing the Algerian Jewish community to the Jews of metropolitan France.  
Editor Michel Salomon reflected, “the Jewish community of Algeria seems similar to 
ours.  It is a community of French Jews, more religious without doubt, a community more 
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homogeneous than the metropole, and so less ‘dejudaized’ it seems to me, but finally it is 
a ‘province’ of the French Jewish community.”380  Later than year in the same magazine, 
Jacques Sabbath wrote of the Algerians, “They represent the possibility of a 
regeneration.”381  In this sentiment, both the meaning and historical trajectory of 
“regeneration” reversed, heralding not a move away from traditional Jewish practice, but 
a return to Judaism and from the unlikely source of the same North African Jewish 
community that French Jews fought to “regenerate” as French citizens a century earlier.  
The romanticized hopes for Algerian integration and reinvigoration of French Jewish 
communities soon confronted the difficulties of daily life for M’zabi Jews.   
Most M’zabi Jews were resettled in Strasbourg and the Bas-Rhin département.  
French officials and French Jewish relief organizations believed that the pre-existing 
Jewish institutions in the northeast would facilitate the integration of M’zabi Jews into 
metropolitan life.  Though they followed distinct Jewish practices, Jews from southern 
Algeria could make use of the kosher butchers and grocers, Hebrew schools, and 
synagogues throughout Strasbourg and its environs, historically home to one of the most 
vibrant Jewish communities in France.  That the pre-existing community was European 
Ashkenazi Jews whereas the M’zabi Jews came from a completely different Northern 
African environment did not register in official thinking.  The local religious and secular 
authorities found this community presented a number of difficulties, much more so than 
the thousand or so other Jews from Algeria who also arrived in Strasbourg in 1962. 
 André Neher, a professor at the University of Strasbourg, worked diligently to 
assist the new immigrants and closely monitored the problems with integrating the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 “Les Juifs d’Algérie …,” 27. 
381 Jacques Sabbath, “Judaisme nouveau et renouveau du judaisme,” L’Arche 70 (November 1962): 3. 
	   191 
children of these new immigrants into local schools.  He shared his concerns with AIU 
President René Cassin in an August 31, 1962, letter that accompanied two detailed 
reports summarizing his findings.382  The first, “Problems in the education of Jewish 
adolescents from Algeria,” enumerated at length the negative consequences of the “moral 
ravages” and “spiritual stagnation” produced by the massive assimilation of Jews into the 
European population in Algeria.  Neher was sympathetic to the plight of the Jewish 
refugees in France and acknowledged there existed a certain Jewish “racism” on the part 
of French Jews towards “their Sephardic brothers.”383 
 In his educational study, Neher recommended three solutions to remedy the 
difficulties of life and education in France.  Firstly, immediate action in the last months 
of the summer vacation to assist these students in reviewing material and preparing them 
psychologically for the coming year.  Secondly, residential schools that would provide 
students with “a Jewish life with regular rhythm, a kind of spiritual breath.”384  Lastly, 
Neher recommended that the Jewish adolescents of Strasbourg and the Bas-Rhin be 
educated exclusively in Jewish schools, the only place where he believed existed “a 
channel of communication and harmonious exchanges between the Jewish singularity of 
the student and French culture,” “secular life and Jewish life.”  Existing Jewish schools 
would be expanded with special classes about “catching up and adapting.”385 
 A second report, twice the length of the first, focused on the “populations from 
the départements of the Algerian south.”  According to Neher and his research team, the 
M’zabi Jewish population presented unique challenges and problems and Neher 
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recommended a coordinated national plan to address their specific issues.  He likened the 
M’zabi Jewish immigration to France with that of “comparable populations” to Israel, 
suggesting that the French learn from the failures and successes of those migrations to 
Israel.  While commending the Jewish Agency on their success in absorbing various 
populations from the Middle East and North Africa, Neher elaborated possible solutions 
to the education of children, adolescents, and adults, concluding with a sociological 
analysis of the religious traditions of the community.386 
 In his research, Neher and his colleagues tested the intelligence quotient of all the 
children from the Oasis départements and found, “with no exception,” that their IQs were 
inferior to that of other children and below the “normal” levels (which he did not 
elaborate).  A psychologist on his team classified these children as “morons” (débiles) 
and “anormal” from the perspective of their intellectual and mental development.  Neher 
noted that these conclusions were directly contradicted by the reports of French officials 
from the M’zab who had noted that the general behavior of the children in the south was 
at least comparable to other children in Algeria, if not superior.  To reconcile these 
disparate assessments, Neher suggested that the tests performed in France reflected 
simply the Western orientation of the pedagogical methods employed and not the actual 
intelligence of the children surveyed.387  He went on to voice his personal objections to 
these findings, “it is absolutely necessary to eliminate the idea that [these children] are 
children of inferior mental development than other children from Algeria or France.”  
Neher argued that “a few courses in catching up in September or October or the normal 
education in primary schools” would be totally insufficient to match these children to 
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their peers, instead suggesting that the pedagogical systems surrounding them be adapted 
to their particular needs, both in their secular and religious educations.388 
 Adolescents from Ghardaïa, Neher found, had been poorly educated in Algeria, 
and wished overwhelmingly to pursue vocational education at the Organisation 
Reconstruction Travail (ORT) schools run by that Jewish organization.  To this 
“problem,” Neher proposed patience and increased testing to monitor their progress and 
encourage them to continue their hoped-for improvement, which meant moving away 
from vocational schools into the professions.  Neher found assessing the abilities of adult 
Jewish immigrants from the Algerian south the most disheartening.  As is often the case, 
older immigrants experienced the greatest difficulties adjusting to their new situations 
and government policies aimed at easing their transition often did just the opposite.  
Factory work, often suggested to new immigrants, “condemned them to inferior status 
and a feeling of inability and even of failure,” as few had any prior experience in such 
working conditions.  Neher found one of the greatest obstacles the lack of punctuality 
amongst the male population who were used to more flexible work schedules and had a 
different sense of time.  Again, the report urged patience and prolonged professional 
training to address the problems of unemployment while avoiding physical or mental 
injuries.  He made no mention of adult women from the M’zabi community.389   
 These reports concluded that a vibrant religious life was essential to the mental 
and physical health of the Jewish community from the Algerian south, “the fundamental 
element of their social wellbeing.”  While the intersection of religion and daily life in the 
M’zab had been a given, in France such practices had to be cultivated and deliberate.  
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Many of the conditions of resettlement precluded M’zabi Jews from continuing their 
customary Jewish practices: being housed alone far from family or friends, lacking the 
sufficient number of Jewish men for a minyan, or jobs and schools that did not observe 
Jewish holidays or Shabbat.  Neher called for a census of the community in order to 
facilitate local gatherings, a liaison service with individuals or families in isolated areas, 
treating the supply of kosher food products as a basic social service, and the creation of a 
national plan to equip various institutions to provide these services.  As a final note, 
Neher wrote that the establishment of a Jewish school for the unusually high number of 
deaf-mute children from the M’zab was absolutely essential.390 
 Neher’s tragic picture of the M’zabi Jewish community in Strasbourg is 
misleading in some ways, as the majority of Jews from Ghardaïa who came to France 
were members of the M’zabi Jewish elite and had greater financial means to support 
themselves than most.  Many members of the Balouka family chose emigration from 
Algeria to France, as did members of the Sellam and Partouche families.  Ghardaïa’s 
rabbi, Abraham Elbaz, was able to obtain a posting as rabbi of a small town near 
Strasbourg.  Yet, even these, the most wealthy and well-connected Jews from the M’zab, 
found life in France difficult.  In a 2002 interview, Eliahou Balouka and Richard Sellam, 
who remained in Strasbourg after their initial arrival in 1962, noted that several of their 
friends and family members committed suicide soon after their arrival in France, because 
they “lacked resources, had no housing, and no way to feed their children.”  Balouka 
initially settled with his family in Paris, but after visiting his sister in Strasbourg opted to 
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move to the northeast because he found the community there “welcoming and very well 
organized.”391 
 There were also members of the larger Algerian Jewish community who found 
adjustment to their new lives in France exceedingly difficult.  L’Arche published a 
regular feature “Letters from rapatriés,” and many immigrants wrote in to air their 
grievances.  One woman complained that the single time she had been able to arrange 
transportation to the nearest synagogue, it had been closed.  Another letter wrote, “In this 
area, alas, there isn’t a single Jew, we are drowning in the middle of people who don’t 
share our beliefs.  We only know the dates of our holidays thanks to a Jewish calendar 
that we bought in Paris.”392  On April 23, 1963, the AJOA had an unsuccessful meeting 
with François Missoffe, the Minister of Rapatriés, during which they requested an 
allowance for Jews who wished to emigrate from France to Israel.  Missoffe refused this 
request, which ran contrary to his purpose assisting French citizens from Algeria in 
adjusting to their new lives in the metropole.393   
Despite the lack of French governmental support, many M’zabi and some 
Algerian Jews emigrated from France to Israel. According to Le Monde, between ten and 
fifteen thousand Algerian Jews, including the M’zabi community, immigrated from 
Algeria and from France to Israel by summer 1962.394  Norman Stillman disputes this, 
finding in official documents records of only some five thousand Jews originally from 
Algeria arriving in Israel by the end of 1962.  The number of Algerian immigrants paled 
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in comparison with earlier migrations from North Africa and the Middle East: by this 
time there had been 31,000 Jewish immigrants from Libya, 44,000 from Yemen, 110,000 
from Iraq, 50,000 from Egypt, 160,000 from Morocco, and almost 20,000 from 
Tunisia.395  Regardless of their number, the absorption of Algerian Jews is useful to 
examine the ways that Israeli officials viewed this community and the motivations 
underlying Algerian Jews’ decisions to immigrate to Israel. 
 
Absorption in Israel 
M’zabi Jews who immigrated to Israel, whether directly from Algeria or after an 
attempt at life in France, usually had an easier adjustment than other Algerian Jews.  Of 
the several thousand Algerian Jews who immigrated to Israel, many left soon after for 
France, while most M’zabi Jewish immigrants remained.  The preference of over ninety-
five percent of Algerian Jews for immigration to France presaged the later difficulties 
many encountered upon attempting immigration and absorption in Israel.  Algerian Jews 
demonstrated their preference for France rather than Israel even prior to 1962.  An April 
1962 investigation in Le Monde asked why Algerian Jews were not immigrating to Israel, 
as most Moroccan and Tunisian Jews had, but to France. The conclusion of the series 
deduced vaguely that, “Algerian Jews admired Israel but did not want to live there.”396 
In an article for L’Arche distributed in both France and Algeria, entitled “An 
Aborted Aliyah,” André Scemama interviewed several Algerian Jews in Israel.  He heard 
accounts from one individual that “the people in charge of the Jewish Agency made 
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promises to us that were forgotten as soon as we set foot in Israel.”397  Another individual 
from Orléansville claimed to have received a letter from the Jewish Agency assuring him 
of a job in an organization comparable to the one where he worked in Algeria.  However, 
when he arrived in Israel, this company “claimed to be completely ignorant of this job 
offer.”  Yet another Algerian Jew told Scemama that, “I wasn’t a Zionist.  They came 
looking for me and attracted me with promises.  Being a lawyer I didn’t trust those 
simple verbal contracts.  I asked for a letter that they gave me after consulting with 
Jerusalem.  Here they have treated me with an intolerable offhandedness; no one worries 
about the arrangements that were made for me…I am suing the Jewish Agency.”398 
These anecdotes surely deterred many from making aliyah and an uncertain future 
in Israel, especially with assurances about their repatriation in France.  The number of 
Algerian Zionists had never been significant when compared with Zionist activity in 
Tunisia or Morocco, and thus Israel presented an attractive alternative to only a small 
number.  The table below illustrates the decline in the Algerian aliyah following Algerian 
independence, from the initial surge to a meager twenty-two immigrants only six months 
later. 
Table 1 Numbers of Algerian Jews making aliyah in the six months following the declaration of 
Algerian independence in 1962.  
 Number of Algerian Jews  
making aliyah 
June 1962 735 
July 1962 903 
August 1962 127 
September 1962 54 
October 1962 68 
November 1962 14 
December 1962 22 
André Scemama, “Une ‘alyah’ avortée,” L’Arche 74 (March 1963): 44. 
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Of all the previous Jewish emigrations from Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia, this was the first large-scale Jewish migration from the Middle East and 
North Africa that did not make aliyah.399  Instead, the overwhelming majority of Algerian 
Jews chose repatriation to France over immigration to Israel.  Although this choice has 
been interpreted as the ultimate fulfillment of the Crémieux Decree and the following 
decades of Algerian Jewish integration, acculturation and assimilation,400 at the time 
many in the international Jewish community failed to understand the Algerian Jewish 
choice and read it as a denouncement of Israel and Zionism. 
 André Chouraqui, the former Assistant Secretary General of the AIU who had 
made a number of voyages to Algeria in the 1940s and 1950s, was vocally critical of the 
Algerian Jewish repatriation to France.  Chouraqui made aliyah to Israel in 1958, where 
he became an advisor to David Ben Gurion on the integration of Jews from North Africa 
and the Middle East and, later, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem under Teddy Kollek.  
Chouraqui was an ardent Zionist and advocate for the North African Jewish migration to 
Israel from Morocco and Tunisia earlier in the 1950s.  He was incensed by the small 
numbers of Algerian Jews arriving in Israel and announced as much to Scemama in the 
aforementioned article on aliyah in L’Arche.   
In a colorfully worded interview, he elaborated twelve ways in which the 
Algerian Jewish community had “destroyed the hopes that the State of Israel had for it.”  
Being in exile, they have not learned the lesson of history and preferred a 
second exile rather than finding in the State of Israel their permanent home.  
[…]  It seems that material concerns were determining factors for them, 
and spiritual concerns had no role in their decision.  In refusing the Israeli 
solution, the Algerian Jew consciously engages in the risks of assimilation, 
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thus rejecting traditional Jewish culture.  The immigrants from Algeria 
arriving in the nation refuse to go to new regions of settlement … and 
prefer to go expand the already immense community in the cities.  …  
[They] do not have the pioneer spirit.  The Jews of Algeria want benefits 
from Israeli society but do very little to organize themselves and come 
together to ask for help.  The defection of Algerian Jews deprives the State 
of Israel of a Jewish community that is already integrated into a Western 
and Muslim society and whose job would have been to reinforce the link 
between the different communities of Israel who would then have been 
able to step over the abyss which separates the Sephardim from the 
Ashkenazim. 
 
Chouraqui’s remarks came from his personal experience as an Algerian Jewish 
immigrant from an earlier period as well as his professional capacity as a government 
official specifically tasked with recruiting and assisting North African Jewish immigrants 
in Israel.401  These comments are also useful in his broader mention of the schism 
between “Sephardim” and “Ashkenazim.”   
 There were visible signs of Ashkenazi, or European, discrimination by the Jewish 
elite and government in Israel against so-called “Sephardim,” “Mizrahim,” or “Oriental” 
Jews from the Middle East and North Africa.  A particularly visible difference in the 
treatment of these two communities appeared in housing assignments and allocations.   
On their arrival in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption 
settled Algerian immigrants throughout Israel.  However, the ministry settled certain 
groups of Jews in particular areas based on their ethnicity and geographic origins.  
Immigrants of European origin were usually settled in more desirable locations, including 
the major cities.  Meanwhile, the Jews of the Middle East and North Africa were usually 
sent to desert settlements, areas near the unstable borders, and to development towns 
located in strategic areas. 
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Figure 6.4 Map of Development towns in Israel402 
These towns and cities were part of a deliberate national policy established 
between 1948 and 1964 with the aim of developing new industries and also “solving the 
problem of settling large numbers of new immigrants, while ensuring at the same time a 
more even distribution of the population over the whole of the country.”403  The 
development towns were often clustered near one another, with each town acting as a 
supplier in a larger regional industry chain.  The state often created development towns in 
high priority areas, that is, near Israel’s borders or in areas with large Arab populations, 
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388 NEW TOWNS IN ISRAEL 
Fig. 1 Map of new towns in Israel 
New infrastructure would necessarily be required whether immigrants were 
accommodated in new towns or on the outskirts of the existing cities. New trunk 
roads were in any case to open up the country. 
THE PATTERN OF SETTLEMENT 
In 1948 the pattern of urban settlement which planners generally regarded as 
desirable was a hierarchy of towns by size, as was common in Europe, and which 
had been validated by the central place theory. As a means of bringing urban 
services clos  to agricultural settlements and spreading towns throughout the 
country, the hierarchical model appeared to be appropriate to Israel and was 
adopted as the national plan. Each new town was assigned a place in the hierarchy, 
in either the C, D or E orders. 
A centre; village, kibbutz or moshav 500 inhabitants 
B centre; rural centre 2 000 „ 
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hence the concentration of development towns in the Upper Galilee (Nazareth Illit) and in 
the Southern Negev desert (Dimona and Eilat).  Particular communities, deemed by 
Israeli officials “better suited” for particular climates and areas, were often settled in the 
same towns; for example, the population of Dimona and surrounding cities in the Negev 
was comprised of eighty-four percent North African immigrants before 1967.404 
The state repeatedly sent M’zabi immigrants to a handful of cities and areas, 
including Eilat, Dimona, Ashdod, and Nazareth Illit.  In the period immediately 
surrounding the organized airlift of M’zabi Jews from Ghardaïa in June and July 1962, 
over six hundred Algerian Jews of mostly M’zabi origin arrived in Israel.  For many, 
then, the trip from the M’zab to Algiers or France and then on to Israel occurred with 
some haste, facilitated as it was by various agencies.  These six hundred M’zabi and 
Algerian Jews arrived aboard one of five ships that made regular trips between Algeria, 
Marseilles, and Israel: the Fusah, the Istanbul, the Palminia, the Moldat, and the 
Jerusalem.  Dozens of members of the Partouche, the Sellam, and the Sebban families 
arrived in Haifa aboard these ships during this short period.405  Most were sent on to 
resettlement in the south, in Dimona and Beersheva, with some families sent to Nazareth 
(ostensibly Nazareth Illit, not the majority Arab city of Nazareth) and the suburbs of 
Haifa, including Kiryat Atta, which was also adjacent to a sizeable, historic Arab village, 
Shefar’am.406 
 M’zabi Jews, then, did not meet André Chouraqui’s criticisms of Algerian Jewry 
in general.  Whether by choice or according to government dictate, these Jews 
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demonstrated “the pioneer spirit” by settling in remote, often inhospitable areas of Israel 
that included the Negev desert.  M’zabi Jews also fulfilled Chouraqui’s wish that they 
might be a bridge between European and North Africa or Middle Eastern communities.  
In the decades after their arrival in Israel, many of the second- and third-generation of 
immigrants intermarried with Jews from diverse communities, including Ashkenazi 
families.407  In these ways, the M’zabi Jewish aliyah resembles those of many other non-
European Jewish communities who came to Israel in this period.  All faced systemic 
discrimination, in housing allocations, prolonged stays in ma’abarot (transit camps) 
while European immigrants were given priority in housing, in finding employment, and 
in other ways large and small.    
 
 Conclusion 
 M’zabi accession to full French citizenship passed the National Assembly with 
little fanfare in 1961 and what was left of the Jewish community in Ghardaïa enjoyed the 
benefits of French citizenship in Algeria for only a few months.  However, the lobbying 
efforts of French, Algerian, and international Jewish individuals and organizations, 
French officials, and the leaders of the community, were successful in producing the 
circumstances that enabled the final M’zabi emigration in summer 1962.  In a short 
period of four years, M’zabi Jews moved from “indigènes” to “Europeans” with full 
citizenship rights in Algeria and the metropole.  Their rapid acquisition of citizenship 
reflected the importance to French officials of clearly delineating the boundaries between 
Algerians, or “Muslims,” and French.  Their status as a community of Jewish “indigènes” 
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had become anachronistic at a time when any mention of Jewishness or a historical 
Jewish community in Algeria was seen as undermining both Jewish rights and the 
integrity of the “European” French population.  French officials resolved the problem of 
M’zabi Jewish difference when the issue of Muslim difference became more critical. 
Citizenship enabled M’zabi Jews to seize hold of the advantages of repatriation to 
France, but only a small group chose to do so alongside the vast majority of Algerian 
Jews.  The fears of French officials in Algeria that Zionist propaganda would pull M’zabi 
Jews away from French influence proved true, though Zionism or politics did not 
significantly influence M’zabi Jews in their choice to continue on to Israel.  Rather, 
personal considerations, financial prospects, and the logistic assistance of Zionist 
organizations and representatives encouraged the M’zabi Jews who left Ghardaïa en 
masse in 1962 to continue on to Israel after arriving in France.  For the small group who 
remained in France, the difficulties of daily life and religious needs determined the 
decision many of them made to leave France in the following years, not necessarily a 
Zionist awakening or political rebirth.   
Well-meaning French Jews worked to assist M’zabi Jews with the unique set of 
challenges life in France presented to their absorption.  Though M’zabi Jews also met 
with a number of difficulties upon their arrival in Israel, notably discrimination and 
poverty, most Jews from Ghardaïa continued the trajectory to Israel followed by their 
friends and families in the decades since the first aliyah in 1943.  Thus, M’zabi Jewish 
history again diverged from the larger narrative of Algerian Jews in 1962.  In the M’zabi 
aliyah in that year and earlier, the history of Jews from Ghardaïa dovetails with the larger 
history of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa in the postwar period.  Contained 
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for a brief period in their history within the borders of French Algeria, in their ultimate 
emigration from the M’zab to Israel, this Jewish community demonstrated their different 
priorities and aspirations in comparison with most Algerian Jews. 










Conclusion: The Ambiguity of Empire 
 
To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour. 
—William Blake 
 
This project offers a new perspective for the historiography of French Algeria and 
Jews in North Africa, through the experience of the small and isolated Jewish community 
of Ghardaïa.  Using the lens of the unique historical experience of the M’zabi Jews 
enables us to “see [the] World[s]” of colonialism and Zionism in Algeria in new and 
important ways.  M’zabi Jewish historical experience was long relegated to a footnote in 
the larger history of Jews in Algeria.  Just as French politicians ignored the irregular legal 
status applied to these Jews, so too have historians failed to address the non-emancipation 
of M’zabi Jews and their later migration to Israel at a time when almost all other Algerian 
Jews immigrated to France.  French policies towards M’zabi Jews evidence persistent 
antisemitism as well as French racism towards “indigènes” and “Muslims” from 1882 
until 1962 and after.  Colonial authorities claimed M’zabi Jews to be too alien, too 
“Muslim,” for French citizenship, while also finding fault with their practice of Judaism, 
relationships with Zionists and Zionist organizations, and lamenting M’zabi immigration 
to Israel.   
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The evolving legal status of M’zabi Jews offers a glimpse into a more 
complicated Jewish relationship with French nationality policies than is often given after 
French citizenship in 1791, the Crémieux Decree in 1870, or the Vichy abrogation of the 
Crémieux Decree in 1940 and its reinstatement in 1943.  In eighteenth and nineteenth 
century France, philosophers and politicians constructed definitions of citizenship that 
addressed the problem of Jewish difference and sought to assimilate Jewish individuals 
into the body politic.  French discourses about Jewish difference persisted in the M’zab 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, when officials argued that M’zabi 
Jewish practices and identity were incompatible with French citizenship.  The contrasts 
and continuities between nationality policies towards Jews in France and most of Algeria 
versus those in the M’zab opens up new discursive spaces in the scholarly exploration of 
French nationality policies and their evolution.  Though the Crémieux Decree was 
successful in emancipating most Algerian Jews, it generated a violent, long-lasting 
antisemitic backlash in Algeria and France that thwarted later efforts to extend citizenship 
to M’zabi Jews.  French citizenship policies towards Jews in Ghardaïa highlight the limits 
of French universalism in the colonial context.  This is true both when French discourses 
about M’zabi Jews in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrated the continued 
stigmatization of Jewishness in France and French Algeria, and later when French 
negotiators after 1961 insisted that all Jews be included in the French population while 
excluding all “Muslims.” 
French colonial policies contributed to the eventual growth of hostilities between 
Jews and Muslims in the M’zab and ultimately the Jewish emigration from Ghardaïa; 
however, these policies significantly improved Jewish daily life.  The tearing down of the 
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actual walls separating the Jewish community in Ghardaïa’s mellah heralded a significant 
improvement in the Jewish standard of living in the Sahara, as did the arrival of 
electricity and the railroad, French schools and hospitals, and greater mobility.  However, 
while the end of the dhimmi system and the news of the Crémieux Decree encouraged 
Jews in Ghardaïa, decades of administrative neglect, surveillance, and prejudice brought 
many to question the utility of colonialism for the M’zabi Jewish community.  To the 
question of whether or not colonialism was “good” for the Jews, the experience of Jews 
in the Algerian south complicates the standard assumption that Empire and European 
influence uniformly improved Jewish life in North Africa or the Middle East.  Much 
historiography takes the Crémieux Decree as definitive proof of the ways that French 
colonialism assisted Jews in Algeria.  The more complicated story of M’zabi Jewish 
exclusion and eventual emancipation sheds light into the crevices of French attitudes and 
shifting policies towards Jews, telling us a more complex and nuanced story about 
Jewishness in French Algeria, colonial treatment of Jews, and the goals of the French in 
colonizing the Sahara. 
From the time of annexation in 1882 to the 1961 “regularization” of their legal 
status and even after their immigration to France and Israel, French officials and French 
Jewish organizations considered the M’zabi Jews to be more foreign than other Algerian 
Jews because of their historical proximity to the Ibadi Muslims of the M’zab.  Legal 
categorization of the M’zabi Jews as either “natives” or even “Muslims” in Algeria are 
highly unusual and show new ways that the racial hierarchy in Algeria evolved during the 
colonial period.  Much recent historiography has examined the long tension between 
Islam and the West in the context of French colonialism and decolonization.  French 
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attitudes towards Islam, manifested in anti-Muslim policies in Algeria, also played out in 
the metropole in restrictive labor policies and, more recently, the debates about the 
headscarf in public spaces.  Algerian Jews are often seen in France as a part of the larger 
pied-noir population, many of whom are opposed to the spread of Muslim cultural 
practices in France.  M’zabi Jewish history complicates these assumptions about the 
relationships between Muslims and Jews in Algeria and the metropole and is further 
evidence that the French colonial administration often constructed arbitrary hierarchies of 
difference throughout the empire. 
However, French thinking about Algerian difference did to a certain extent reflect 
the reality in the M’zab, whose Jewish community was indeed historically and culturally 
distinct from the rest of the Algerian Jewish population.  The study of M’zabi Jewry has 
been until very recently a lacuna in the historiography of North African Jewry.  This 
project has sought to introduce this difference into our knowledge of what it meant to be 
a Jew in Algeria and in North Africa.  The uniqueness of the M’zabi Jewish community 
in their religious practice, relationships with Muslim neighbors, customs, and aspirations 
predated the French conquest of the Sahara and differed in important ways from other 
Algerian Jews.  The different treatment of Algerian Jews and M’zabi Jews reinforced the 
divide between the two groups from 1882 until the end of French Algeria in 1962, and 
even afterwards during immigration to and absorption in France and Israel.   
French colonial policies towards M’zabi Jews simultaneously claimed M’zabi 
Jewish difference to be insurmountable while misunderstanding that difference and the 
reality in the Sahara.  This disconnect between French aspirations in the Sahara and the 
events on the ground grew particularly obvious after 1954, when France placed high 
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hopes for economic revival in the natural resources of the desert.  Only in the final talks 
with Algerian nationalists did De Gaulle admit (even to the surprise of his closest 
councilors) that France could not retain the Sahara while losing northern Algeria.  French 
forces in the Sahara, with the notable exception of the local administrators in Ghardaïa, 
ignored the demands of the Jewish community in Ghardaïa for citizenship for decades.  
Governors in Algiers and high-ranking ministers in Paris dismissed M’zabi Jewish 
petitions for emancipation, instead making baseless arguments about Ibadi resentment 
towards the Jewish community in order to justify their inaction.  Sifting through the 
bureaucratic memoranda regarding M’zabi Jewish citizenship reveals a colonial 
administration largely unwilling to admit the particularities of the desert and its 
inhabitants while desperate to retain and develop the Sahara.  The instrumental French 
attitude towards M’zabi Jewish citizenship up until the very moment of withdrawal 
challenges arguments made about Algerian Jewish experience that focus on the Crémieux 
Decree as evidence of French benevolence towards Jews and colonial dedication to the 
mission civilisatrice.  M’zabi Jews were denied legal equality for decades and French 
officials went to great lengths to justify their continued exclusion. 
The consequence of French obstructionism and recurring antisemitism was the 
very early beginning of Jewish emigration from the M’zab.  The ultimate benefit of 
French colonialism in the M’zab for the Jews in Ghardaïa was that it made Jewish 
emigration out of French territory possible.  Citizenship availed M’zabi Jews of a way 
out of the ambiguity of colonial policies, European antisemitism, local Muslim-Jewish 
conflicts, and the violence of the Algerian War.  The interplay between Zionism and 
colonialism in the M’zab in many ways resembles the same processes for the Jewish 
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communities of Morocco and Tunisia.  After the 1961 emancipation, however, the choice 
to make aliyah as French citizens is historically remarkable when juxtaposed with the 
larger Algerian Jewish migration to France.  M’zabi Jews were among the only Algerian 
Jews who immigrated to Israel rather than France, and began doing so two decades 
before 1962.  The migratory and absorption experiences of M’zabi Jews in both France 
and Israel demonstrate how the experience of Jews from Ghardaïa diverged from that of 
Algerian Jewry in important ways even after 1962.  The immigration of M’zabi Jews and 
their absorption in France was an exceptional migratory experience in the context of the 
massive pied-noir exodus from Algeria. Whereas the arrival of other Algerian Jews has 
been heralded as the commencement of a process by which French Jewry “rediscovered” 
itself and Judaism after the Shoah, the absorption of M’zabi Jews presented unusual 
difficulties that perplexed and discouraged French Jews.  The few anthropologists and 
sociologists who studied the absorption of M’zabi Jews in the northeast of France 
characterized them as the victims of the loss of French Algeria and powerless before the 
overwhelming shifts in their historical experience.408 
 This description of M’zabi Jewry, lacking agency and subject to the whims of 
French bureaucrats and French Jewish charity, loses sight of the real and important ways 
that Jews from Ghardaïa chose their future, negotiated French legislative and legal 
processes, and took advantage of French citizenship to control their fates.  Most Jews 
from Ghardaïa who received full citizenship in 1961 used their citizenship as a way out 
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of French territory, not as a means towards repatriation in the metropole.  These Jews 
voted with their feet, as had M’zabi Jews since 1943, electing immigration to Israel over 
repatriation to France.  This migration suggests a new response to the old query “What 
did Emancipation mean for the Jews?” 
 Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson have written that emancipation took different 
paths in various places and time periods, depending on the particular ideologies 
undergirding the emancipating governments and Jewish responses to their acquisition of 
citizenship.409  The history presented here is an addition to the canon of work on Jewish 
emancipation and a unique one as M’zabi Jewish emancipation arrived late in the 
twentieth century, a century after Algerian Jewish emancipation and almost two hundred 
years after the first European emancipation of French Jews in 1791.  By 1961, 
emancipation meant something very different to the Jews of Ghardaïa, a means to an end, 
their emigration from Algeria.  Whereas emancipation had historically been contingent in 
France on a rejection of the idea of a Jewish “community” in favor of “individual” 
French citizens, M’zabi Jews emigrated as a community even after their emancipation.  
M’zabi Jews offered to French officials promises of future military service and evidenced 
a well-informed understanding of the duties expected of them as citizens in their petitions 
to win full citizenship.  These arguments, articulately made to French and French Jewish 
individuals and organizations, hid the actual wishes of many, to use French citizenship as 
a mechanism to escape the chaos of the Algerian War and a kind of currency towards 
migration.  The contrast between M’zabi and Algerian Jewish responses to emancipation, 
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between aliyah and repatriation, is to a certain extent the product of the different French 
policies towards each population.   
However, Algerian Jews overwhelming elected to immigrate to France not only 
because of their 1870 emancipation, but also because of long-standing and important 
cultural and economic linkages across the Mediterranean to Jewish communities and non-
Jewish trading partners that predated the French conquest in 1830.  M’zabi Jews did not 
have similar connections to Jewish communities in Europe and were most closely 
associated with neighboring Jewish communities in the Maghreb, in Morocco and 
especially Tunisia.  French annexation in some ways reinforced the isolation of Ghardaïa, 
legally isolating the Jews of the south even while individuals made use of the new 
economic possibilities in French Algeria.  Thus, though the long exclusion of M’zabi 
Jews from French citizenship surely heightened the divisions between Ghardaïa and the 
rest of Algeria, the similarities in Jewish emigration from Algeria to Israel resemble 
similar migrations from Morocco, Tunisia, and elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle 
East because of longstanding historical and cultural similarities between these 
communities that defied borders imposed on the region by European colonial powers.   
 As much as the M’zabi Jewish immigration was and has been described as 
unusual or exceptional in Algeria and France, in Israel it was and has been treated as a 
small part of a much larger process, the immigration and absorption of Jewish 
communities from the Middle East and North Africa in the decades following the 
establishment of Israel in 1948.  Within this historiography, the M’zabi Jews are one 
component of a much larger whole of Jewish communities from Yemen, Syria, Iraq, 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco.  Within this larger context, it is Algerian Jews who 
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immigrated overwhelmingly to France who are the atypical group.  Historians of 
immigration and absorption in Israel have more completely analyzed the experience of 
North African and Middle Eastern Jewish communities in Israel, detailing the prejudice 
they met with and the difficulties of forging new lives for themselves.  Rather than argue 
Jews fled their homes because of local confrontations with the Muslim communities of 
North Africa and the Middle East, historians of Jewish communities in North Africa and 
the Middle East have begun to stress the ways that other factors contributed to the Jewish 
emigration from the region, notably the economic pressures of war and decolonization.  
Droughts, poverty, economic restrictions, and spread of violence from the Algerian War 
to the M’zab are just a few of the multiple factors that encouraged Jewish emigration.  
The history of M’zabi Jewish aliyah is thus part of the larger movement to complicate the 
historiography of the North African and Middle Eastern Jewish immigrations to Israel 
during this period and affirms the complexity of motivations underlying the decision to 
emigrate. 
 Narratives about the large migrations of Jews from the Middle East and North 
Africa to Israel after 1948 have accurately characterized that period as fraught with 
violent conflicts between the Arab or Muslim majority and the Jewish minority in many 
areas, particular Iraq and Egypt.  However, the dominant argument that this period was 
marred by tremendous Muslim antisemitism against Jewish minorities who were rescued 
by Zionists and Israel is a gross oversimplification.  Though there were indeed many 
instances of extreme violence and economic persecution targeting Jews, the large-scale 
immigration of Jews to Israel during this period is also the result of the idealism and 
fervor of certain Jewish communities who chose to make aliyah for religious, cultural, 
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and personal reasons.  The migration of Jews from Ghardaïa straddles these two 
narratives, as both the chaos and violence of the Algerian War as well as their own 
support for Zionism, financial needs, or religious investment in the Jewish homeland 
inspired M’zabi Jews to leave Algeria for Israel between 1943 and 1962.   
 Just as the motivating factors in Jewish immigration to Israel from the Maghreb 
during this period are diverse, so too the absorption experiences of these Jewish 
immigrants varied once in Israel.  While traditional scholarship cast a rosy light on the 
“in-gathering” of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa, recent historiography 
challenges the optimistic rendering of early Jewish life in Israel for these non-European 
Jews.  Certainly, many experienced an improvement in their quality of life; however, an 
equal number found themselves without employment or relegated to menial labor despite 
their having been trained as lawyers, doctors, and other high-skilled professions in their 
countries of origin.  M’zabi Jews, largely traders and small business owners, were 
perhaps better able to adapt to their new surroundings.  Many, certainly, found 
employment and subsequent generations intermarried with Ashkenazi families, a fact that 
has been generally interpreted as an indication of the success of immigrant absorption in 
Israel.410 
 In Israel as in Algeria, the authorities enacted policies based on assumptions about 
M’zabi Jewish difference.  However, these policies of absorption were applied to M’zabi 
Jewish citizens of Israel whose inclusion in the nation was never questioned.  A 
comparison of the citizenship of M’zabi Jews in Israel and France could further enhance 
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this study by providing additional insights into the legacies of colonialism and Zionism 
for this population.  Ultimately, rather than providing a tidy answer to the question of 
whether or not empire was “good” for the Jews in Algeria, the history of the Jews in 
Ghardaïa emphasizes the ambiguity of Empire.  Though rendering some tangible 
benefits, the promise of French emancipation was never fully realized for M’zabi Jews in 
the way that it was perhaps intended, certainly not as it was conceived of centuries earlier 
or in 1870.  The extended debates about whether or not they merited legal equality 
diminished the promise of French universalism for many M’zabi Jews who left Ghardaïa 
for an uncertain future in Israel and perhaps even for those who remained in French 
territory. 
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